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Abstract
Within the field of regulation policy and politics, various scholarly works 
have  examined  policy  reforms  intended  to  change  the  regulation  of  large-scale 
infrastructure-based public  service industries.  Relatively little attention has been 
placed,  however,  on  the  jagged  and  ineffectual  implementation  of  regulatory 
reforms  that  especially  takes  place  when  the  implementation  context  includes 
features of a multi-level governance system.  For reasons especially related to the 
technical, economic, and territorial characteristics of infrastructure and sub-national 
governments' political responsibilities towards local communities, within this type 
of scenario the implementation of regulatory reforms tends to exhibit high levels of 
political confrontation between actors of the reformed infrastructure industry, with 
respect to what is ordinarily experienced when a regulatory reform is implemented 
by public agencies or any body of the executive at the central level.
This thesis aims  to contribute furthering our understanding of the political 
economy of implementing regulatory reforms  by conducting an exploratory case 
study whose episode is the implementation stage of the 12 year long (1994-2006) 
policy  cycle  to  liberalise,  re-regulate,  and  privatise  Italy’s  (drinking  water  and 
waste)  water  sector.  The  main  explanatory  issues  at  stake  relate  to  why  the 
implementation  trajectory  changed  over  time  (i.e.,  a  period  of  obstructed 
implementation was followed by one of accelerated execution of the policy reform 
content) and across space (i.e., implementation progressed faster in Alto Valdarno in  
Tuscany than elsewhere in the country). The analysis of the case is conducted by 
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following  two  alternative  theoretical  approaches  in  turn,  namely  institutional 
rational choice and institutional processualism. Answers to these questions provide 
some  evidence  for  qualifying  existing  generalised  arguments  about  the  policy 
process of implementing regulatory reforms and for assessing the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of alternative theoretical perspectives.
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Introduction
Within  the  field  of  regulation  policy  and  politics,  scholarly  interest  in 
regulatory  reforms  aimed  to  restructuring  entire  sectors  of  the  economy  has 
increased substantially in the last decades. Topics such as the design and the making 
of regulatory systems, the administration of the day-to-day working of regulatory 
regimes, and the assessment of the performance of regulatory reforms figure high in 
the research agendas of economists and political scientists alike. Within this body of  
literature, quite an amount of attention has been placed, in particular, on regulatory 
reforms of  infrastructure.  On the  basis  of  a  wealth  of  evidence  on  episodes  of 
infrastructure  regulatory  reforms  carried  out  in  sectors  such  as  electricity,  gas, 
telecommunications,  highways,  railways,  and  water,  several  studies  especially 
tackled  issues  related  to  what  kind  of  regulation  better  suits  the  technological, 
economic, and social features of infrastructure industries, whether the government 
should  play  an  invasive  role  or  whether  the  private  sector  should  be  largely 
involved in the provision of infrastructure-related services, and whether and how 
regulation ultimately affects the performance of regulated infrastructure industries. 
Generally,  most  of  the  scholarly  literature  on  regulatory  reforms  of 
infrastructure focused on either the design of regulatory systems or the performance 
effects  of  infrastructure  regulation.  Relatively  less  efforts  have  been  exerted, 
instead, to address issues related to the process of putting a new regulatory system 
into place. Yet, the central issue of how regulatory reforms are implemented – or, 
how the process of installing a new regulatory system unfolds – deserves careful 
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consideration. Rather than the mere administrative execution of a policy mandate, 
the implementation of regulatory reforms is a highly political  process that bears 
important  implications  for  the  very  establishment  of  a  new  regulatory  regime. 
While putting the regulatory reform mandate into effect, implementers and target 
groups make decisions that may well reshape the original regulatory policy design, 
with the effect that, first, the resulting regulatory regime may well differ from what 
policy-makers intended to establish and, second, performance of the infrastructure 
industry cannot be plainly related to features of the regulatory system that were 
contained in the regulatory reform mandate. Accordingly, if attention is not placed 
on how regulatory reforms are implemented, we miss fully understanding whether 
and  why the  making of  regulatory  reforms results  in  any change of  regulatory 
regimes and of the performance of infrastructure industries. 
Broadly  stated,  this  thesis  aims  to  contribute  furthering  our 
understanding of the political economy of implementing regulatory reforms. More 
precisely, this study aims to explain the trajectory (i.e., path and outcome) of the 
process  of  implementing  regulatory  reforms  in  infrastructure  industries  under 
special conditions that arise when the implementation context includes features of a 
multi-level  governance system.  In  such context,  sub-national  governments  often 
play  the  function  of  direct  providers  of  public  services  at  the  local  level  and 
typically  enjoy  prerogatives  like  the  exercise  of  veto  powers  provided  by  the 
constitution  and/or  relevant  legislation,  the  right  to  appeal  to  supra-national, 
constitutional,  and  administrative  courts,  and  exclusive  competences  on  the 
regulation of local public services. For reasons especially related to the technical, 
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economic,  and  territorial  characteristics  of  infrastructure  and  sub-national 
governments' political responsibilities towards local communities, within this type 
of scenario the implementation of regulatory reforms tends to exhibit high levels of 
political confrontation between actors of the reformed infrastructure industry, with 
respect to what is ordinarily experienced when a regulatory reform is implemented 
by public agencies or any body of the executive at the central level. The study of 
regulatory  reform  implementation  in  multi-level  governance  systems,  therefore, 
allows  to  enrich  our  analysis  of  the  emergence  of  new  regulatory  regimes  by 
looking  at  how  new  regulatory  systems  are  put  into  place  when  political 
confrontation  is  a  salient  feature  of  the  interaction  between  policy-makers, 
implementers, and target groups.
The aim of this thesis is attained through the case study of the episode of 
the implementation stage of the policy cycle to reform Italy's (drinking and waste) 
water sector regulation in the period 1994-2006. The episode originated from the 
enactment  of  a  piece  of  legislation  (Act  36/1994)  that  the  central  government 
advanced  with  the  aim to  improve the  dismal  state  of  water  infrastructure  and 
dissatisfying performance of  the  water  industry.  This policy objective would  be 
attained through the combined effect of the execution of three features of the reform 
policy  content,  namely  to  liberalise  access  to  the  water  industry  that  had  been 
traditionally dominated by public sector organisations, to re-regulate the provision 
of  water  services  through  combined  mechanisms  of  franchise  allocation  and 
discretionary regulation, and to privatise water services by opening up ownership of 
water  firms  to  private  operators  and  investors.  The  policy  reform  would  be 
17
especially executed by sub-national governments, which bore responsibilities and 
enjoyed  prerogatives  sanctioned  by  the  constitution  and  general  public  service 
legislation  on the  organisation  and delivery of  local  water  services  within  their 
respective jurisdictions. 
The implementation of the water reform included two events that related 
to  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the  reform,  namely  aligning  sub-
national legislation with the national reform statute and establishing new regulatory 
authorities,  and an event  that  related  to  the  privatization  part,  namely  awarding 
water franchises. Both the liberalization and re-regulation part and the privatization 
part of the episode were characterised by a first period of slow motion followed by 
one  of  acceleration  in  the  execution  of  the  implementation  tasks  after  “turning 
points”: the liberalisation and re-regulation of water services proceeded relatively 
slowly first, and then accelerated from 1997 onwards, and the privatisation of water 
service provision progressed relatively slowly first, and then accelerated after 2001. 
Additionally, the implementation of the water reform exhibits some variation across 
the country: both the liberalization and re-regulation part and the privatization part 
of the policy reform were executed remarkably faster in a particular area of Tuscany  
named Alto Valdarno, where the new regulatory regime was established already in 
1999,  than  elsewhere  in  the  country.  The  episode,  therefore,  exhibits  some 
intriguing features – precisely, variation over time (when comparing the trajectory 
of the implementation episode before and after the “turning points” in 1997 and 
2001) and across space (when comparing the trajectory of the implementation of the 
water reform in Alto Valdarno with respect to the rest of the country).
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The  analysis  of  the  case  will  aim  to  explain  what  accounts  for  the 
observed variety of the path and outcome of water reform implementation over time 
and across space. Such variety of water reform implementation trajectories may not 
surprise  anyone  familiar  with  the  general  scholarly  literature  on  public  policy 
implementation. After all, the episode of the water reform implementation in Italy is 
illustrative of the well-known obstacles, detours, and mixed results that are often 
encountered  when implementing a  regulatory  reform – if  not  any  public  policy 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981, 1983, 1989; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). The 
episode of the water reform implementation in Italy, however, contains more than 
meets the eye. As we shall see, the difficulties encountered to implement the water 
reform  cannot  be  fully  explained  by  ordinary  administrative  factors  or  by  the 
resistance  of  sub-national  governments  against  the  mandate  to  give  up  full 
ownership of incumbent water firms and to open up water services to competition. 
The episode includes variation of implementation trajectories over time and across 
space  that  calls  for  an  explanation  for  why  reluctant  implementers  became 
favourably inclined towards executing the implementation tasks and for why the 
water reform implementation proceeded faster in some areas than in the rest of the 
country (and, as we shall see, why this mattered for the implementation of the water 
reform in the rest of the country).
The analysis of the case will be conducted by following two alternative 
theoretical frameworks in turn, namely an analytic narrative based on institutional 
rational  choice  and  an  institutional  processualist  perspective.  The  recourse  to 
different theoretical frameworks is a strategy that is often followed when, given the 
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complexity  of  the  phenomenon  under  consideration,  alternative  theoretical 
perspectives are expected to provide complementary insights and to overcome the 
limitations of the assumptions inherent in any specific approach. Explaining the 
variation of the trajectory of water reform implementation over time and across 
space  requires  such  kind  of  combined  analytic  effort.  The  first  approach  – 
institutional rational choice – will provide an explanatory argument that builds on 
the assumptions and the logic generally related to game theoretic modelling. The 
second approach – institutional processualism – will offer an explanatory argument 
that places greater attention to the way in which the context is brought to bear into 
actors'  decisions  and  behaviour  than  institutional  rational  choice  analysis  does. 
When  taken  together,  the  two  explanations  will  result  in  a  comprehensive  and 
balanced account of how the implementation of the water reform unfolded. When 
contrasted and compared, the two explanations will also form the basis for some 
discussion  about  the  relative  strengths  and  limitations  of  the  two  alternative 
theoretical approaches.
 This thesis is organised into three parts.  Part I (Chapters 1-2) will set up the 
stage for conducting the case study of the implementation of the regulatory reform 
of the water sector in Italy in the period 1994-2006. Building on a review of the 
literature on regulatory reform, Chapter 1 will present an argument for the lack of 
satisfactory theoretical arguments about how regulatory reforms are put into effect 
and for the adoption of a processual perspective for researching regulatory reform 
implementation.  Chapter  2,  then,  will  outline  the  research  design  of  the  thesis, 
especially including formulation and justification of the research question, criteria 
20
for case selection, methods of data collection and analysis, and principles followed 
for the application of the two theoretical frameworks.
Part II (Chapters 3-5) will provide the narrative history of the episode of 
implementing the regulatory  reform of  the  water  industry in  Italy  in  the  period 
1994-2006. As a prelude, Chapter 3 will outline the historical background of the 
water reform, by illustrating the evolution of water policies in the country since 
1865 until the making of the 1994 water reform. Chapter 4 will narrate the part of 
the episode comprised between 1994, when the water reform statute was enacted, 
and  2001,  when all  parts  of  the  water  reform policy  content  –  liberalising,  re-
regulating,  and privatising  water  service  provision  – started to  be  executed  full 
steam. Chapter 5 will continue the narration of the episode in the period between 
2001 and the 2006, when the water reform legislation was eventually abrogated.  
Finally, part III of the thesis (Chapters 6-8) will analyse and discuss the case 
study. Chapter 6 will present the analysis of the case conducted by following the 
institutional rational choice approach, while Chapter 7 will present the analysis of 
the  case  conducted  along  the  lines  of  the  institutional  processualist  approach. 
Lastly, Chapter 8 will contrast and compare the explanatory arguments provided by 
the two theoretical perspectives and will discuss the findings of the case study with 
respect  to  existing  studies  on  the  political  economy  of  policy  reforms  in  the 
implementation stage. Finally, the Conclusions will especially discuss how this case 
study contributes to our understanding of the regulatory reform policy process and 
of the relative strength and weaknesses of the two analytical perspectives.
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PART I
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Chapter 1
Literature Review
Within the field of study of regulation and regulatory reforms, relatively 
little  attention  has  been  placed  on  the  issue  of  how  regulatory  reforms  are 
implemented. A review of the scholarly literature shows that works on regulation 
and  regulatory  reforms  primarily  focused  on  issues  related  to  the  design  and 
performance  effects  of  regulatory  systems.  The  issue  of  how a  new regulatory 
system is put into place, instead, has been relatively neglected so far. Yet, this issue 
is important because the process through which a regulatory reform is put into place 
includes efforts of implementers and target group that are intended to reshape the 
regulatory reform mandate,  in  a  way that  bears  important  consequences  for  the 
emergence  of  the  new regulatory  regime  and for  the  delivery  of  infrastructure-
related services. This gap in the literature, therefore, should be filled if we wish to 
attain a better understanding of the features of regulatory regimes and of the extent 
to which design choices made in the making of regulatory reforms result in any 
change of the performance of regulated sectors of the economy. 
The chapter begins with a section on definitions, that is intended to clarify 
the  meaning  of  key  terms  are  used  in  the  thesis.  Section  two  will  discuss  the 
scholarly literature on regulation and regulatory reforms of infrastructure. Section 
three  will  discuss  limitations  of  current  research  on  regulation  and  regulatory 
reforms. Section four will outline a way forward for overcoming the limitations of 
25
existing  studies  by  following  a  processual  approach  to  researching  regulatory 
reform implementation.
1. Definitions.
This  section  aims  to  clarify  the  meaning  of  key  terms  –  especially 
regulation, regulatory system, regulatory regime, and regulatory reform – that will 
be repeatedly used throughout this thesis. The first of such terms is “regulation”, 
that  is  often  subjected  to  various  interpretations  depending  on  both  different 
theoretical  and  historical  perspectives.  Baldwin,  Scott,  and  Hood  (1998) 
distinguished  between  a  relatively  narrow  sense  of  the  term (intended  as  “the 
promulgation of an authoritative set  of rules,  accompanied by some mechanism, 
typically  a  public  agency,  for  monitoring  and promoting compliance  with  these 
rules”; Baldwin et al., 1998: 3), a middle-range sense (“all efforts of state agencies 
to steer the economy”; Baldwin et al., 1998: 3), and a relatively broad sense (any 
kind  of  mechanism  of  social  control).  Jordana  and  Levi-Faur  (2004),  instead, 
outlined the variety of meanings attached to the term “regulation” in relation to 
different  historical  and  institutional  settings,  where  indeed  the  term  has  been 
associated to indicate partially divergent phenomena (Cook et al, 2004; Jayasiriya, 
2001; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2003; Majone, 1994, 1997; Müller, 2002; Selznick, 
1985). In this thesis, the terms “regulation” will be used in its middle-range scope, 
in the sense of referring to diverse kinds of regulatory activities as those carried out  
by  independent  regulatory  agencies  as  well  as  those  performed  through  direct 
governmental interventions.
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The  term  “regulatory  system”  will  be  used  here  to  refer  to  the  set  of 
institutions and processes that are installed by the government for subjecting an 
industry  to  economic  regulation.  This  meaning of  the  term “regulatory  system” 
broadly correspond to the one generally employed in the scholarly literature as well 
as  in  professional  publications.  For  example,  OECD  works  typically  refer  to 
regulatory systems as “the processes and institutions through which regulations are 
developed, implemented, enforced, adjudicated, and revised” (OECD, 1994, 1997). 
World  Bank  publications  ordinarily  consider  “regulatory  systems”  as  “the 
combination of institutions, laws, and processes that give a government control over  
the operating and investment decisions of enterprises” of the regulated sector of the 
economy (World Bank, 2006). While any “regulatory system” consists of various 
institutions  and  processes  put  together,  it  is  occasionally  convenient  to  broadly 
characterise any regulatory systems in terms of a given set of regulatory tools, as it 
is  the  case  for  regulatory  systems  such  as  “public  ownership”,  “franchise 
allocation”, or “discretionary regulation” (Gómez Ibáňez, 2003).
The term “regulatory regime” will be employed here to refer to the specific 
way in which a sector is regulated. In the scholarly literature, however, the term is 
variously  defined.  Eisner  (2000:1)  explained  it  as  “a  historically  specific 
configuration of policies and institutions which structures the relationship between 
social interests, the state, and economic actors in multiple sectors of the economy”. 
Francis (1993: 43) considered it as a “reasonably enduring purposive arrangement 
[…],  embracing  both  formal  and  informal  organizations,  incorporating  the 
relationship  between  private  interests  and  public  bodies  that  make  governing 
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decisions”.  Vogel  (1998:  20)  referred  to  it  more  generally  as  a  “specific 
constellation of ideas and institutions”. More accurately, Harris and Milkis (1996: 
25) conceived it as a constellation of ideas justifying governmental control over 
business activity, institutions that structure regulatory politics, and a set of policies 
impinging on business. With respect to a “regulatory system”, then, a “regulatory 
regime” is understood as the particular way in which a regulatory system – as a set 
of institutions and processes – is run in particular historical and local circumstances.
“Regulatory reform” is a term that has been used to indicate a policy cycle 
where policy-makers intend to replace an existing regulatory regime with a new 
one, typically with the general aim to improve regulatory quality (OECD, 1997). 
Regulatory  quality,  in  turn,  is  defined  as  “a  regulatory  framework  in  which 
regulations and regulatory regimes are efficient in terms of cost, effective in terms 
of  having  a  clear  regulatory  and  policy  purpose,  transparent  and  accountable” 
(Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004; OECD, 2002, 2004). Regulatory reforms have also 
been related to policy cycles where regulatory regimes are changed for the sake of 
attaining policy objectives generally related to improvement of performance of the 
regulated sector of the economy. Regulatory reforms, in this sense, may include 
policy content features that relate the liberalisation, re-regulation, and privatisation 
of  industries  where  policy-makers'  concerns  are  openly  directed  towards  fixing 
perceived  or  constructed  problems  with  existing  regulatory  regimes.  (Bel  and 
Fageda,  2007,  2009;  Doern  and Wilks,  1996;  Donahue,  1989;  Levi-Faur,  2005; 
Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).
Finally, multi-level governance is a term that is used in this thesis to refer to 
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a  form  of  governance  where  policy  and  administrative  decisions  result  from 
continuous  negotiation  between  governments  at  different  territorial  levels  rather 
than in any particular single jurisdiction. This definition broadly draws from the one 
of Marks (1993), who defined multi-level governance, in a more articulated way, as 
“a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers”  (Marks,  1993:  392),  “characterised  by  co-decision-making  across  several 
nested tiers of government, ill-defined and shifting spheres of competence (creating 
a consequential potential for conflicts about competences), and an ongoing search 
for  principles  of  decisional  distribution  that  might  be  applied  to  this  emerging 
polity” (Marks, 1993:407)1. In multi-level governance systems, the constitution of 
non-unitary  states  attributes  exclusive  powers  to  sub-national  governments  with 
respect to the central government. Unitary states, in contrast, are understood here as 
those where the central government is attributed supreme sovereignty and any sub-
national  government  only  exercise  the  powers  that  are  delegated by the  central 
government (Cole and John, 2001; Elazar, 2005). Federal governments are typically 
regarded as the clearest form of non-unitary state, although also other forms of non-
1 Within the political science literature, the term multi-level governance has been related to various  
meanings,  such  as  “a  change  in  the  meaning  of  government,  referring  to  a  new process  of 
governing;  or  a  changed condition or  ordered  rule;  or  the  new method by which society  is  
governed” (Rhodes,  1997: 35; Rhodes,  1996).  The same term “governance”,  however,  might 
deserve some further clarification. The EU White Paper on European Governance (2001: 8), for 
example, defines it as “rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised  at  European  level,  particularly  as  regards  openness,  participation,  accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence”. The OECD report Thematic Evaluation of the EC support to good 
governance (2006: 11)  defines  governance as  “the structure,  functioning and performance of 
public  authorities/institutions at  all  levels.  Governance is about the way public functions are 
carried out (including public service delivery), public resources (human, natural, economic and 
financial) are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised (including enforcement) in the  
management of a country’s affairs”. Following Peters and Pierre (2004: 78), governance is here 
understood as  “the process through which collective  interests  are defined and pursued”. The 
authors  conceived  governance  as  a  process  through  which  public  and  private  actions  and 
resources are coordinated and given a common direction and meaning.  As such, it is important to 
highlight that the governance context is conceived as a process, rather than a structure. 
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unitary states exist based on various forms of “regionalism” that is constitutionally 
sanctioned.
The role played by a system of multi-level governance on the policy cycle 
has  been  highlighted  by  several  studies  especially  concerned  with  the  policy 
process in the EU and in non-unitary countries such as Germany and Spain (e.g.,  
Eberlein,  2000;  Gallego and Subirats,  2012;  Jeffrey,  1996;  Lodge and Wegrich, 
2005).  Works done  in  this  area  include,  for  instance,  those  on  the  making and 
implementation of EU policies in general (Börzel, 1998a, 2000, 2001; Levy, 2000; 
La Spina and Sciortino, 1993), EU cohesion policy (Blom-Hansen, 2005; Hooghe, 
1996), EU environmental policy (Börzel, 1998b; Knill and Lenschow, 2000), and 
EU agri-environmental policy (Jones and Clark, 2000). Some works, among others, 
have also particularly addressed issues related to regulatory reforms within multi-
level  governance  systems  (Doern,  2003;  Doern  and  Johnson,  2006;  Levi-Faur, 
2006),  including  those  of  infrastructure  industries  (Coen  and  Thatcher,  2008; 
Eberlein and Grande,  2000).  While  these studies  did not  precisely focus on the 
process  dynamics  of  putting  infrastructure  regulatory  reforms  into  place, 
nevertheless they showed how special conditions related to features of the multi-
level governance systems affect the policy process in ways that are not ordinarily 
contemplated when policy cycles unfold within unitary systems of government. 
2. Regulatory reforms of infrastructure: a review of the literature.
Regulation  and  regulatory  reforms  is  a  field  of  study  that  has  attracted 
considerable amount of scholarly attention in the last  decades.  From the side of 
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economists, research efforts have been especially directed towards the design and 
performance effects of regulatory systems that are intended to offset the negative 
effects of natural monopoly, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and regulatory 
capture that generally plague the working of imperfect markets (Armstrong et al., 
1999;  Bishop et  al.,  1995;  Joskow,  1996,  1997;  Newbery,  2000;  Stigler,  1971). 
From the side of political scientists, scholarly works have been primarily made on 
the  rationales  for  which  regulatory  reforms  are  made,  on  the  features  of  the 
“regulatory state”, and on the variety of modes of governance of regulatory regimes 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Dunleavy, 1985; Gilardi, 2003; Hood et al., 2001; James, 
2003; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004; Kirkpatrick and Parker,  2005; Lodge, 2002, 
2003, 2008; Lodge and Stirton, 2006; Majone, 1994; Majone, 1994, 1996, 1997; 
Thatcher, 2002a, 2002b). In addition, regulation and regulatory reforms have been 
the subject of countless works done within professional circles, especially within 
the OECD and the World Bank.
Within this body of literature, lot of attention has been placed, in particular, 
on  regulatory  reforms  of  infrastructure  –  that  is,  systems  for  widespread  and 
continuous public service provision that extend over a territory and that crucially 
depend on sunk investments in relatively large and networked physical assets that 
exhibit common good features2. Research in this area has largely focused on two 
main  issues,  namely  how  infrastructure  should  be  regulated  and  what  are  the 
performance  effects  of  infrastructure  regulation.  On  the  basis  of  a  wealth  of 
2 As highlighted by Tenbücken (2006), the term “infrastructure” partially overlaps with the one of 
“public  utilities”.  The  latter,  however,  is  generally  understood to  refer  to  sectors  which  are 
managed in  the  public  interest,  such  as  electricity,  gas,  postal  services,  telecommunications,  
waste disposal, water supply and sanitation services, but the term public utilities typically does 
not include the transportation sector, which falls into the category of infrastructure.
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evidence collected from episodes of infrastructure regulatory reforms carried out in 
various sectors (especially electricity, telecommunications, gas, highways, railways, 
and water) and countries, scholarly works highlighted what kind of regulation better 
suits the technological, economic, and social features of infrastructure industries, 
especially including specific concern towards whether the government should play 
an invasive role in the regulation of infrastructure or let the private sector be largely 
involved in infrastructure development and the provision of infrastructure-related 
services (Eberlein, 2000; Eberlein and Grande, 2000; Estache, 2001; Finger et al., 
2005,  2010;  Finger  and  Künneke,  2006,  2009;  Gómez  Ibáňez,  2003;  Kessides, 
2004; Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2005; Newbery, 2000). 
A brief  review  of  the  literature  on  infrastructure  regulatory  reform  is 
illustrative of the kind of studies that have been done so far in this area. Several 
works have been primarily  focused on developing theoretical  arguments for  the 
need to  regulate  infrastructure  on both social  and economic  basis3.  The general 
argument builds on the premise that infrastructure industries are typically conducive  
to  market  failure  for  reasons  related  to  the  natural  monopoly  features  of 
infrastructure (Joskow, 2005), such as presence of expensive and specialised assets, 
provision of services for which few substitutes exist, cost structures which tend to 
3 Social  regulation  is  concerned  with  the  protection  of  the  public  interest,  in  such  terms  as  
environmental preservation, safety, consumer protection, and achievement of social objectives 
(Groom et al., 2006). Economic regulation, instead, is concerned with providing a substitution 
for competition in relation to natural monopolies (Ogus, 1994; Joskow and Rose, 1989; Joskow, 
2005). Economic regulation aims to fix market failure by means of rules and organisations that  
set, enforce, and change the allowed tariffs and service standards for the operators of regulated 
industries.  A few authors  (Liou,  2001,  2007;  Hopkins,  2005)  also  distinguish  economic  and 
social  regulation  from  another  third  class,  named  administrative  regulation,  that  refers  to 
paperwork  and  administrative  formalities  (so-called  'red  tape')  through  which  governments 
collect information and intervene in individual decisions. In this thesis, however, we only refer to  
the more common distinction between economic and social regulation.
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favour  the  presence  of  one  operator  only,  and  network  externalities.  Firms  that 
operate  in  infrastructure  industries  tend  to  adopt  anti-competitive  practices,  for 
example by exploiting the high switching costs and lock-in effects of consumers in 
order to increase their market power (Farrell and Shapiro, 1988; 1989), restricting 
network  interconnection  and  access  to  new  entrants  or  minor  competitors 
(Economides and White,  1994), and charging consumers above marginal cost or 
cream-skimming the most lucrative segments of the demand (Gómez Ibáňez, 2003). 
The governments, therefore, should design regulatory systems in order to prevent 
firms'  opportunistic  behaviour  and  stimulate  investments,  cost  efficiency,  and 
service improvement. 
Several  works  have  been also  done  on alternative  options  for  designing 
regulatory systems. Gómez Ibáňez (2003), for example, widely discusses four main 
regulatory “models”, namely public ownership, franchise allocation, discretionary 
regulation, and private ownership in conjunction with liberalisation and regulation 
of access, prices, and quality. Why public authorities adopt any particular regulatory  
model and what are the relative strengths and weaknesses of alternative regulatory 
systems have been largely examined by several works (Amato and Conti, 2005; 
Baumol,  1982;  Beecher,  2001;  Bishop  and  Walker,  1999;  Christoffersen  and 
Paldam, 2003; Demsetz, 1968; Ferris, 1986; Ferris and Graddy, 1988; Finger and 
Allouche, 2003; Groom et al., 2006; Hefetz and Warner, 2004, 2007; Hirsch, 1995; 
Kay and Thompson, 1986; Littlechild, 1986; Lobina and Hall, 2003; Massarutto, 
2007; McGuire et al., 1987; Megginson and Netter, 2002; Merrett, 1997; Miranda, 
1994; Ogus, 1994; Rees, 1998; Schmalensee, 1979; Tenbüken, 2006; Vickers and 
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Yarrow, 1998; Warner and Hebdon, 2001; Williamson, 1976). Some authors hold 
that there may be no single “best way” to regulate infrastructure (Glachant, 2002; 
Goldberg, 1976), while others argue that the design of regulatory systems should 
follow  “standard  prescriptions”  (Joskow,  1996,  1997)  that  suggest  that  the 
potentially competitive activities in infrastructure industries should be disentangled 
(unbundled)  from  those  characterised  by  natural  monopoly  conditions  and  that 
regulations  should  be  tailored  in  order  to  facilitate  competition  in  the  former 
activities to restrain rent-seeking behaviour in the latter ones. 
Various other works have addressed issues related to the performance effects 
of infrastructure regulatory systems. Some of these studies focused on the criteria 
and methods for appraising the performance of infrastructure regulatory systems 
(Brown et  al.,  2006;  Stern  and Holder,  1999).  Others  were  concerned with  the 
assessment  of  performance  of  new  regulatory  systems  (Gönenç et  al.,  2000; 
Kessides,  2004).  Others  were  especially  focused  on  the  performance  effects  of 
changes  of  regulatory  systems  that  included  some  amount  of  privatisation  of 
infrastructure-related services (Estache,  2003;  Kirkpatrick et  al.,  2006;  Saal  and 
Parker, 2001). These works shed considerable light onto the issues as to whether 
and to what extent regulation bears any impact on the functioning of infrastructure. 
As we shall  discuss below, however,  this copious amount of studies have some 
limitations, that especially relate to a lack of attention towards the process through 
which a new regulatory system is put into place.
Among  the  various  infrastructure  industries,  water4 has  attracted 
4 We understand the water industry here as the economic and social system concerned with the  
production and delivery of water  supply and sanitation services,  i.e.,  the supply of drinkable  
water  to  urban  and  rural  users  and  the  management  of  sewage  and  wastewater  treatment 
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considerable interests because of its peculiar features and daunting challenges. The 
supply of safe drinking water and the proper functioning of sanitation services are 
essential  requisites  for  the  conduct  of  effective  economic  activities  and  decent 
human  existence.  The  performance  of  water  supply  and  sanitation  services, 
however,  is  far  from  satisfying  in  many  countries.  Many  water  infrastructure 
systems do not provide access to basic water services (e.g., according to UNICEF, 
2007, in the world about 884 million people do not use improved drinking water 
sources and about 2.5 billion people do not use improved sanitation services yet), or 
do  not  guarantee  safe  and  reliable  water  services  even  in  developed  countries. 
Additionally, the water industry presents, more clearly than any other infrastructure, 
conditions  which  make  the  industry  a  natural  monopoly5 such  as  high  capital 
intensity and economies of scale in each segment of the industry6 (Noll et al., 2000; 
Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1994), high sunk costs7 and excess capacity (Ballance and 
activities.  As  such,  the  water  industry  does  not  include  other  economic  and  social  systems 
concerned with the management of water resources for other purposes, e.g., irrigation, industrial 
uses, and recreational uses of water. 
5 Natural monopoly can be variously defined. A natural monopoly occurs when the industry is  
characterised by continuing economies of scale in production (Gómez Ibáňez, 2003). In a more 
articulate definition, Newbery (2000) considered the natural monopoly as being characterised by 
economies  of  scale,  high  capital  intensity,  non-storability  and  fluctuating  demand,  locational 
specificity, essentiality of its goods or services for a community, and direct connection to the 
customers. In a broader review of the concept, Joskow (2005) provided several definitions of 
natural monopoly, based on  technological features (e.g., the monopolistic firm enjoys increasing 
returns of scale), behavioural and market equilibrium considerations (e.g., the monopolistic firm 
supplies essential, non-storable goods from a favourable production location), and sunk costs. 
6 The water industry includes several segments or activities, including water collection in the form 
of  abstraction  from underground  and  surface  sources  (such  as  aquifers  and  rivers),  storage 
(natural or artificial), treatment (needed to remove natural and other pollutants), bulk transport 
(before  and  or  after  treatment),  local  storage  (which  covers  diurnal  variation  in  demand), 
distribution to consumers via a network of mains, customer interface or retailing (connections, 
billing, payment), collection in sewers, pumping to sewage treatment works (where solids and 
liquids  are  separated),  removal  and  incineration  of  solids  or  sludge,  or  dumping  at  sea  or 
converting into fertilisers  on agricultural  land,  and treatment  of liquids  (or  effluent),  usually 
through oxygenation before discharge to the estuarine environment (in rare cases liquids go into 
water  treatment  and  supply  to  customers).  In  a  simplified  way,  the  water  industry  is  often 
decomposed into the segments of water collection, storage, transport, distribution, sewage, and 
wastewater treatment.
7 Sunk costs in the water industry especially relate to infrastructure assets, that may account up to 
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Taylor,  2005),  high cost  of  water  transport,  negative  environmental  impact,  and 
information asymmetries (Massarutto, 2007). 
Because of these features, the need for regulation of the water industry is 
widely acknowledged.  Less consensus exists,  instead,  on  how  exactly the water 
industry is to be regulated (Ballance and Taylor, 2005). Various countries in the EU 
and  elsewhere  have  pursued  quite  different  models  of  regulation  of  their  water 
industries.  Several  regulatory  systems  in  the  world  primarily  attribute  full 
ownership and control of water firms to governmental authorities, especially at the 
sub-national level. Since the 1980's, however, various regulatory reforms that aimed 
to  improve  water  industry  performance  contained  provisions  to  liberalise,  re-
regulate,  and  privatise  the  water  industry  that  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  new 
regulatory systems especially centred on mechanisms of franchise allocation and 
discretionary regulation, both within the EU8 and elsewhere in the world (Rivera, 
1996; Shirley, 2002; Winpenny, 2003). Efforts to reform water regulation, however, 
generally fell short of fixing the performance gap of the water industry so far (Rees 
et al., 2008).
Regulating the water industry is particularly challenging because of various 
intertwined issues that relate to providing reliable, affordable, and environmentally 
sustainable services. One of such issues relates to how the territorial areas where 
water  policies  are  made  and  water  services  are  delivered  should  be  defined  – 
available  options  including  the  “municipal  model”  (i.e.,  the  level  of  local 
about 80-90% of total costs. 
8 It should be noted that, in the EU, the European Commission never issued any directive on the 
economic regulation of water services yet. Anyway, it did issue directives on related areas, such 
as water quality and water resource management, that bear some effects on the regulation of the 
water industry anyway, in such terms as quality standard setting and control and as the definition 
of watershed areas.
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governments)  and  the  “river  basin  management  model”  (i.e.,  the  level  of  the 
watershed river basin9)10. Another issue relates to whether and how segments of the 
water  industry  should  be  opened  to  competitive  pressures  –  alternative  options 
ranging  from  full  opening  up  of  the  water  industry  to  private  operators  and 
investors, to selective unbundling of segments of the water industry that could be 
tendered out to private operators, and to full public ownership and control of all 
water activities11.  Another  more issue relates to how water tariffs should be set, 
9 The watershed river basin is the whole geographical area drained by a river and its tributaries.
10 In the municipal model, water policies are mostly made and implemented at the level of local 
governments (e.g., on development of the local water network, on the water tariffs, and on the 
issue of permissions for water intakes and discharges), and water services are usually managed 
by firms operating in the territorial jurisdictions of local governments only (Rouse, 2007). In the 
municipal  model,  the  provision  of  local  water  services  may  be  contracted  out  to  business 
companies, as it often happens in France. Quite often, local governments directly manage the 
water services, either through local government departments or firms owned by the municipality, 
as it typically happens in Germany. When the municipal model is coupled with local government 
ownership,  several  problems typically arise.  Water tariff setting generally  lacks transparency,  
because  the  water  service  costs  are  usually  confounded  with  those  of  the  other  activities 
performed by the local government and no explicit link is made between water service cost and 
water tariff. Water tariffs, moreover, are often set lower than the water service full cost, because 
water service tariff increase usually is very unpopular and local governments prefer to subsidise 
the  water  services  from taxation.  By  setting  relatively  low  water  tariffs,  furthermore,  local 
governments often lack the financial resources for the infrastructure development needed to meet 
rising quality  standards and  to  replace  ageing assets.  In  the  river  basin management  model,  
instead,  water  policies  are made and implemented at  the level  of  the river  basin,  and water  
services are usually managed by firms operating in the territory of the river basin catchment area.  
In the river basin management model, all kinds of water-related policies made at the national and 
sub-national  level  (e.g.,  policies  regarding  water  supply  and  sanitation,  environmental 
preservation,  public  health,  flooding  and  other  hazardous  events,  and  coordination  between 
conflicting uses of water resources) are keyed to the scale of the river basin. The overall principle  
for  managing water  resources  in  the  river  basin is  the so-called 'Integrated  Water  Resources 
Management', that is, “a process that promotes the coordinated development and management of 
water, land and related resources in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare 
in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (Global 
Water Partnership, 2000). Accordingly, in the river basin management model water services are 
typically managed by vertically integrating all the segments of the water industry within the river 
basin area in one water firm only.
11 In general, in infrastructure industries it may be possible to distinguish activities which are open 
to competition, for which the regulatory system should set rules concerning market entry and 
requisites  of  the  operators  (so-called  regulation  for  competition  or  ex  ante  regulation),  and 
activities which could be open to competition if appropriate regulations are provided, for which 
the regulatory system should set rules regarding pricing, service quality, and consumers' access 
(so-called regulation of competition or ex post regulation) (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004). The 
very features of the water infrastructure and of water services, however, make unbundling the 
activities of the water production and management system relatively impractical for at least three 
reasons.  First,  the  water  industry  is  characterised  by  higher  operating  leverage  than  other 
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especially when water infrastructure and services are managed by private firms – 
alternative options typically including price-cap or rate-of-return mechanisms12. 
The design of water regulatory systems in the world does vary considerably. 
Within the EU, for example,  the water industry is  largely retained under  public 
ownership  and  control  in  Germany;  it  hosts  various  forms  of  public-private 
partnerships in France (especially in the form of water franchises that municipalities  
award to water business companies); and it has been largely privatised in England 
and Wales (Ballance and Taylor, 2005; Ménard and Saussier, 2000; Parker, 1990; 
Reimer,  1999;  Rouse,  2007;  Stoker,  1997;  Wackerbauer,  2007).  In  England and 
infrastructure,  such  as  gas  and  electricity  (i.e.,  there  is  higher  incidence  of  fixed  costs  than 
variable costs with respect to the other infrastructure industries), and therefore water firms tend  
to  benefit  from  large  scale  by  vertically  integrating  their  activities  more  than  in  the  other  
infrastructure  industries  (Finger  and  Allouche,  2003).  Second,  the  water  industry  is  also 
characterised by relatively high transportation costs, in comparison to gas and electricity, and 
therefore operators in the water industry tend to supply water services within very fragmented  
regional  water  grids  (Ballance and Taylor,  2005) rather  than  large markets.  Third,  the water 
industry is characterised by a technology which does not allow a clear-cut separation between 
upstream production and distribution, as is the case of gas and electricity (Kay, 1996). On the 
whole, then, there seems to be little scope for unbundling activities and benefit from competition  
in the water industry (Rees,  1998; Massarutto,  2007),  apart from some outsourcing of a few 
service activities (Kraemer, 1998).
12 As a system of tariff regulation, rate-of-return consists of the regulator setting the maximum rate 
of return on capital that the regulated water firms are allowed to earn. Once the dominant tariff  
regulation mechanisms in the U.S. for many years, later rate-of-return regulation was subjected 
to  intense  criticism because it  provided an  incentive  to  inefficiently  expand the  capital  base 
(Averch and Johnson, 1962) and because its application required a demanding amount of detailed 
and continuous information about the asset base and costs of the regulated companies. Price-cap 
regulation consists, instead, of the regulator setting a cap on water tariff increase for a specified  
period,  subjected  to  periodical  review.  In  between  the  tariff  reviews,  water  firms  have  an 
incentive to minimise their costs (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989), therefore they are expected to 
invest in cost-saving technologies. Price-cap regulation, however, is exposed to potential pitfalls. 
If the regulator believes that water firms earn excessive profits, then the regulator may anticipate 
the review of the tariff. Such violation of the implicit regulatory practice weakens the incentives  
to  minimise  the  water  firms'  costs  and,  by  introducing  some  regulatory  risk,  increases  the 
company's cost of capital (Alexander and Irwin, 1996). Moreover, the regulator may be inclined 
to closely monitor water firms' costs in order to reap the efficiency gains and pass them on to the 
customers as soon as possible. Because of this, the administration of the price-cap regulation may 
be as much intrusive as the rate-of-return regulation and quite demanding in terms of information 
from as many water firms as possible in order to better estimate the cost function of the regulated 
water firms and benchmark their performance (Ballance and Taylor, 2005). Furthermore, water 
firms may exploit the discretion in setting the detailed tariff basket in order to cross-subsidise 
selected services. This behaviour is likely to lead to allocative inefficiency and to be used anti-
competitively (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Armstrong et al., 1999). 
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Wales, the territorial organization of water services is based on ten relatively large 
jurisdictions of Water Authorities, while in France and Germany water services are 
generally provided by firms operating at the municipal level, in either individual or 
associated  form.  Rate-or-return  tariff  rules  have  been  generally  applied  in  the 
regulation  of  water  utilities  in  the  U.S.,  while  price-cap  mechanism  has  been 
adopted for tariff  setting by the Water Authorities in England and Wales.  Other 
countries  often  present  quite  unique  regulatory  systems  formed  through  the 
combination of  selected  features  of  different  regulatory models  (Gómez Ibáňez, 
2003; Groom et al., 2006). 
3. Limitations of existing research on infrastructure regulatory reforms.
The  literature  review  suggests  that  most  of  the  scholarly  literature  on 
regulation and regulatory reforms of infrastructure focused on either the design of 
regulatory systems or the performance effects of infrastructure regulatory reforms. 
Relatively  less  works  have  been made,  instead,  to  address  issues  related to  the 
process through which new regulatory systems are put into place and eventually 
result in a new regulatory regime that supplants another one that had been originally  
present. Yet, issues related to this how regulatory reforms are implemented deserve 
careful consideration. As already suggested by a few studies (Dinar, 2000; Durant, 
1984;  Gönenç  et  al.,  2001;  Hanf,  1982;  Vogel,  1998),  the  implementation  of 
regulatory reforms is important in order to account for the emergence of particular 
features  of  any  new regulatory  regime.  Decisions  and actions  made during  the 
implementation stage of regulatory reform policy cycles may divert – and possibly 
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significantly reshape – the design of the regulatory system originally provided by 
policy-makers.  Accordingly,  attention  to  regulatory  reform  implementation  is 
needed in order  to  fully  understand whether  and how the making of  regulatory 
reforms  results  in  any  change  of  regulatory  regimes  and  how  to  assess  the 
performance of regulatory systems of infrastructure industries. 
That  the  implementation  stage  of  regulatory  reform  policy  cycles  is 
important  should  not  obviously  surprise  any social  science  scholar.  Indeed,  the 
general scholarly literature on public policy implementation – conceived as a kind 
of process that includes the implementation of regulatory reforms as a particular 
type –  has  long  highlighted  the  political  nature  of  the  policy  process  in  the 
implementation  stage  of  the  policy  cycle  (Bardach,  1977;  Bunker,  1972;  Dror, 
1968;  Wildavsky  and  Majone,  1978).  It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  political 
confrontation between implementers and target group entails that the policy reform 
content is often recast in such a way as to modify, to a greater or lesser extent, the  
substance of the original formulation of the policy reform mandate. Accordingly, it 
would  count  as  a  reasonable  expectation  that  the  implementation  of  regulatory 
reforms implies some amount of “re-policymaking” of the original reform intent. 
This view of public policy implementation – one that places particular emphasis on 
the political confrontation that takes place between implementers and target groups 
resulting in some amount of deviation from the original policy mandate – is the one 
that is followed in this thesis.
Within  the  scholarly  literature  on  public  policy  implementation,  several 
works adopted theoretical frameworks that explicitly take into account the role of 
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the political confrontation between implementers and target groups. These studies 
generally hold the view that the implementation stage of the policy cycle should be 
seen as a “continuation of politics by other means” (Wildavsky and Majone, 1979) 
– that is to say, that the public policy implementation process should be conceived 
as no less exposed to political controversies than the policy-making stage, rather 
than as a bunch of mundane administrative activities that are executed in order to 
put a policy mandate into effects. An attention to the political nature of the public 
policy implementation process permeated, for example, the works of Mazmanian 
and  Sabatier  (1981,  1983,  1989),  Sabatier  (1986),  Berman  (1978),  and  Lipsky 
(1978). Among more recent works, those of Patashnik's (2003, 2008) are exemplar 
of the way in which the political confrontation between implementers and target 
groups  affects  the  “sustainability”  of  policy  reforms  in  the  implementation  (or 
“post-enactment”) stage, that is, “the capacity of any public policy to maintain its 
stability, coherence, and integrity as time passes, achieving its basic promised goals 
amid the inevitable vicissitudes of politics” (Patashnik, 2003: 207).
One  limitation  of  existing  theories  of  public  policy  implementation, 
however,  is  their  lack  of  attention  to  the  jagged  and  ineffectual  type  of 
implementation process that especially takes place when the execution of the policy 
reform mandate entails the  political confrontation between government authorities 
situated at different levels of a governmental system. The scenario of multi-level 
governance  bears  particular  traits  that  make  the  unfolding  of  the  public  policy 
implementation process fundamentally different from what is generally observed in 
the context  of  unitary countries.  As a distinctive trait  of multi-level  governance 
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systems,  sub-national  governments  play  an  influential  role  that  relates  to  their 
functions of direct  providers of public services within their  respective territorial 
jurisdiction, to their political responsibility towards local communities, and to their 
prerogatives such as the exercise of veto powers provided by the constitution and/or 
relevant  legislation,  the  right  to  appeal  to  supra-national,  constitutional,  and 
administrative courts, and exclusive competences on the regulation of local public 
services. Such role played by sub-national governments is unmatched by the one 
generally  attached  to  actors  –  like  governmental  agencies  or  branches  of  the 
executive – that are typically involved in implementing a policy reform in unitary 
countries.  Theories of public policy implementation do not look well equipped to 
account  for  the  political  economy  of  implementing  regulatory  reforms  of 
infrastructure in multi-level governance systems, for reasons that may be related to 
both  distinguishing  traits  of  the  type  of  policy  reform  implementation  under 
consideration and features of current public policy implementation research agenda. 
Existing  theories  of  public  policy  implementation  do  not  seem  to  be 
especially attentive to the technical, economic, and territorial characteristics of the 
target domain of the policy reform as factors that contribute explaining the path and 
outcome of the implementation process. Yet, infrastructure possess quite peculiar 
traits  that  typically  give  rise  to  conflicting  interests  between  the  consumers  of 
infrastructure-related services, on the one hand, and the providers of infrastructure, 
on the other one. The former are exposed to the possibility that the layout of the  
infrastructure network is not compatible with the delivery of infrastructure-related 
services at the place, time, and conditions of convenience. The latter confronts the 
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risk that investment in the construction and maintenance of infrastructure networks 
clashes  with  consumers’ (or,  in  their  behalf,  taxpayers’)  willingness  to  pay  for 
infrastructure-related  services  at  the  place,  time,  and  conditions  of  supply. 
Additionally, the territorial configuration of the infrastructure network may extend 
across the territorial organisation of sub-national governments' jurisdictions, with 
the  effect  that  the  political  interests  represented  at  the  sub-national  government 
level may collide with those of the providers of infrastructure or of the consumers 
based in other sub-national governments' jurisdictions. Because of these conditions, 
the  implementation  of  regulatory  reforms  of  infrastructure  in  multi-level 
governance  systems entails  a  complex  pattern  of  political  confrontations  whose 
effects  on  the  path  and  outcome of  the  implementation  process  are  difficult  to 
discern  through  the  “lenses”  of  existing  general  theories  of  public  policy 
implementation. 
It should be highlighted that, in the scholarly literature, there is no paucity of  
interest  towards  regulation  and  regulatory  reforms  that  take  place  in  countries 
characterised by a multi-layered system of governance.  Instances of such works 
especially include Eberlein (2000) and Eberlein and Grande (2000) on regulatory 
reforms  of  infrastructure  industries  in  Germany.  These  studies,  however, 
respectively focused on political  and regulatory management  structures after the 
reform had  been  put  into  place,  and  on  the  persistence  of  domestic  regulatory 
regimes in the context of the emerging EU regulatory framework. In contrast, the 
present  case study is  concerned with the process through which new regulatory 
systems are installed, including how they are affected by the political confrontation 
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between actors at different levels of the multi-layered governance systems, rather 
than with regulatory institutions and behaviour in relatively stable regulatory and 
ownership regimes.
Existing  theories  of  public  policy  implementation  also  tend  to  follow a 
research  agenda  that  seems  relatively  apathetic  towards  issues  related  to  the 
political  economy of implementing regulatory reforms in multi-level  governance 
systems.  Early  works  on  public  policy  implementation  primarily  explored  the 
causes of public policy implementation problems or failures and suggested ways for 
increasing the likelihood of obtaining compliance with the policy mandate (Barrett, 
2004;  Mazmanian  and  Sabatier,  1981,  1989;  van  Meter  and  van  Horn,  1979; 
Sabatier, 1986) or exposed the micro-level interactions that lead to the execution of 
a policy mandate within and between organisations (Berman, 1978; Hjern et al., 
1978; Hjern and Porter, 1980; Hjern, 1982; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Hull and Hjern, 
1987;  Lipsky,  1978).  Current  studies13,  instead,  have decisively moved on from 
efforts to synthesise top-down and bottom-up perspectives (Elmore, 1979; Goggin 
13 As an area of study, public policy implementation is fairly large and burgeoning, especially in 
about the last decade (Saetren, 2005; O'Toole, 2000; DeLeon, 1999; DeLeon and DeLeon, 2002; 
Lester  and Goggin,  1998; Barrett,  2004; Schofield,  2001; Hill  and Hupe,  2002; Lennon and 
Corbett, 2003). A complete review of the scholarly literature on public policy implementation 
lays beyond the scope of this thesis, however some general traits can be tentatively recalled here.  
Following the seminal work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), several studies were done with 
the aim of identifying barriers and obstacles that hampered the execution of policy mandates in 
either single organisation (Montjoy and O'Toole, 1979; Hjern and Porter, 1980; Milward, 1982) 
or inter-organisational settings (Bardach, 1977; O'Toole, 1993; 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; Hall and 
O'Toole, 2000; 2004; Meier and O'Toole, 2005). Then, over time public policy implementation 
studies gradually shifted their concerns towards also explaining possible sources of success in 
implementing  public  policies  and  programmes,  especially  in  relation  to  collaborative  efforts 
exerted within networks of implementers and target groups (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999, 2001; 
Bogason  and  Toonen,  1998;  Borgatti  and  Foster,  2003;  Börzel,  1998;  van  Bueren  et  al.,  
2003;Daugbjerg,  1998;  Grantham,  2001;  Hanf  and  O'Toole,  1992;  Hanf  and  Scharpf,  1978; 
Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Klijn, 1996; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; 
Klijn et al., 1995; McGuire, 2002; Mayntz, 1993; Merier and O'Toole, 2003, 2005; Milward and 
Provan, 2000; O'Toole, 1997a, 1997b; O'Toole and Montjoy, 1984; Provan and Milward, 1995; 
Scharpf, 1990; 1991; 1993; 1994; 1997; Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; 
Toke and Marsh, 2003; van Waarden, 1992). 
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et al.,  1990; Hupe, 1990;  Matland,  1995; Ryan,  1995) and embraced a research 
agenda keyed on developing “covering law” explanations for the performance of 
the  public  policy  implementation  process  (Goggin,  1986;  Goggin  et  al.,  1990; 
O'Toole,  2000).  Known  as  “third  generation”of  public  policy  implementation 
studies (Lester et  al., 1987), this stream of works largely focused on hypothesis 
testing through relatively large-n surveys of experiences of implementing public 
programmes (e.g., Meier and O'Toole, 2003, 2005; O'Toole and Meier, 2004). As 
such,  studies  that  follow  the  “third  generation”  approach  to  public  policy 
implementation  research  generally  neglect  paying  attention  to  the  detailed 
interaction related to the political confrontation between implementers and target 
groups that takes place during the process of putting a policy mandate into effect14.
While the research programme framed as “third generation” studies marked 
a move forward in theory development, it seems that it also diverted attention away 
from  the  issue  of  better  understanding  the  process  dynamics  of  public  policy 
implementation.  The  call  for  undertaking  large-n,  variable-oriented  empirical 
studies  –  while,  at  the  same  time,  picturing  case  studies  as  a  typical  “first 
generation” methodology that had been employed in the infancy stage of scholarly 
inquiry into public policy implementation for merely descriptive and exploratory 
purposes – possibly discouraged researchers from maintaining an interest towards 
disentangling  the  complexity  of  the  political  economy  of  implementing  public 
14 Lester  et  al.  (1987)  identified  three  stages  or  “generations” of  public  policy  implementation 
studies, each characterised by different theoretical issues and methodological approaches. First  
generation  studies  consisted,  “for  the  most  part,  [of]  detailed  accounts  of  how  a  single 
authoritative  decision  was  carried  out,  i.e.,  a  single  case  study.  This  body  of  research  was 
primarily  directed  toward  describing  the  numerous  barriers  to  effective  [public]  policy 
implementation”  (Lester  et  al.,  1987: 201).  Second generation studies  “were concerned with 
explaining [public policy] implementation success or failure” (Lester et al., 1987: 201). Third 
generation studies, finally, were directed toward 'theory development' (Lester et al., 1987: 201). 
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policies.  Yet,  theoretical approaches informed by the “third generation” research 
programme tend to  paper over  the issues  that  relate  to  apprehending the causal 
structure of the emergent properties of the public policy implementation process 
(Barrett, 2004; Schofield, 2001) – such as, for example, accounting for variation of 
the pace and direction of the trajectory of implementing a policy reform over time 
and across space. An alternative line of inquiry, that precisely takes into account the 
political confrontation between implementers and target groups and its impact upon 
the path and outcome of the policy reform implementation process, seems needed in  
order  to  provide  a  better  account  of  the  process  dynamics  of  public  policy 
implementation.
4. A processual approach to the study of policy reform implementation.
The  kind  of  research  issue  addressed  in  this  study  entails  to  adopt  a 
processual approach to researching regulatory reform implementation. A processual 
approach to the study of social phenomena has been largely followed in several 
fields  of  inquiry,  especially  sociology  and  organisational  sociology  (Pettigrew, 
1997). To some extent, a processual view has also characterised the very original 
research  on  public  policy  implementation,  in  the  sense  that  the  same  work  of 
Pressman  and  Wildavsky  (1973)  showed  a  theoretical  framework  that  was 
particularly  attentive  to  the  processual  nature  of  the  unfolding of  policy  in  the 
implementation stage – in such traits as, for example, the importance placed on the 
dynamics of negotiation,  on the sequenced order  of decision points,  and on the 
influence of context factors on situated interactions15. A processual approach to the 
15 The insertion of Majone and Wildavsky's (1979) piece on Implementation as Evolution and of 
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study of  public  policy  implementation,  however,  has  been relatively  ignored  in 
following decades, for reasons that appear related to the emergence of the research 
agenda of the so-called “third generation” of public policy implementation studies. 
A processual  approach  to  the  study  of  the  implementation  of  regulatory 
reforms in multi-level governance system can build on theoretical approaches that 
have been followed, within the political science discipline, in other areas of study. A 
processual approach to the study of international relations, for example, has been 
adopted by Alexander L. George in the terms that he labelled “process tracing” 
method  (George,  1979;  Bennett  and  George,  1997).  Process  tracing  aims  at 
identifying  the  intervening  causal  process  (i.e.,  “causal  chains”)  between  an 
independent variable (or variables) and the process outcome (George and Bennett, 
2005). The method focuses the attention on “the stimuli the actors attend to; the 
decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual 
behaviour  that  then  occurs;  the  effect  of  various  institutional  arrangements  on 
attention, processing, and behaviour; and the effect of other variables of interest on 
attention,  processing,  and  behaviour”  (George  and  McKeown,  1985).  In  the 
“process induction” variant of this approach (Bennett and George, 1997), process 
tracing also includes “the inductive observation of apparent causal mechanisms and 
the  heuristic  rendering  of  these  mechanisms  as  potential  hypothesis  for  future 
testing”.
subsequent chapters on public policy implementation as mutual adaptation and exploration by 
Browne and Wildavsky (1983) in later editions even strengthened the processual traits of their 
research.  Contemporary  studies  on  public  policy  implementation,  instead,  often  exhibit  a 
“structural-configurational” approach to researching public policy implementation, such as in the 
stream of works centred on the concept of policy network done in the so-called “Dutch school” 
(Schofield and Sausman, 2004; Klijn et al., 1995; Klijn, 1996; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; van 
Bueren et al., 2003) and in those based on actor-centred institutionalism undertaken in the so-
called “Max Plank School” (Börzel, 1998; Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1997). 
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Still  in  the  field  of  political  science,  John  Kingdon's  book  Agendas,  
Alternatives,  and  Public  Policies  (1984)  exemplified  the  quest  for  a  process 
understanding  of  the  public  policy  cycle  (especially  the  policy-making  stage) 
conducted  through  the  interrelation  of  processual  and  institutional  theories  of 
policy-making (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006). Kingdon's (1984) work showed how 
trajectory and outcomes of the policy-making process can be explained through a 
distinctive analysis of component sub-processes and the systemic understanding of 
influences  across  sub-processes  and  between the  context  and the  situation.  The 
theoretical framework included in his study, moreover, was social interactionist in 
character,  as  it  placed attention  to  ideation as  an interactive  social  process  that 
takes place  within a  certain temporal-relational  context  (Emirbayer  and Mische, 
1998). His study illustrated how a process understanding of public policy-making 
could  offer  analytical  generalisations  about  explaining  politically  visible 
authoritative decisions made by legislators or political officials.
By focusing on the effect of particular conditions that arise from the context 
of  multi-level  governance  systems  and  by  following  a  processual  approach, 
research  into  the  implementation  of  regulatory  reforms  of  infrastructure  can 
advance our understanding of how regulatory regimes emerge. Features related to 
multi-level  governance  systems  make  the  political  confrontation  between 
implementers and target groups particularly intense and evident, especially when – 
as it  is  typically  the case when regulatory reforms relate to infrastructure – the 
territorial scope of the regulated activities does not necessarily correspond to the 
territorial  jurisdictions  of  sub-national  governments  who  possess  the  functions, 
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responsibilities, and prerogatives to have a voice over the execution of the policy 
reform mandate. A processual approach, that is especially suited to highlight the 
social  interactionist  features of the political  confrontation between implementers 
and target groups, provides theoretical “lenses” that are especially suited to identify 
intervening causal processes that account for the path and outcome of the regulatory 
reform  implementation  process  –  particularly,  variation  in  the  implementation 
trajectory over time and across space. 
The analysis  of  the case will  be conducted by following two theoretical 
approaches in turn. First, the path and outcome of the implementation episode of 
the water reform will  be explained by following an institutional  rational  choice 
approach, in the form of the “analytic narrative” as illustrated in Bates et al. (1998, 
2000) and Levi (2002). Then, the same features of the trajectory of the episode of 
the water reform implementation  will be explained by following the institutional 
processualist approach, as developed in Barzelay (2003) and Barzelay and Gallego 
(2006). The use of two alternative theoretical perspectives for explaining features of 
the  same  case  evidence  is  primarily  intended  to  strengthen  the  explanatory 
argument by making it less dependent on any particular conceptual and theoretical 
“lenses” only. The two alternative theoretical perspectives, in particular, enable us 
to enlarge the repertoire of conceptual and analytical tools that can be used to better 
understand the nature of the interactions between implementers and target groups 
and  their  effects.  Moreover,  this  feature  of  the  research  design  also  allows  to 
contrast  and  compare  the  alternative  explanations  for  the  sake  of  assessing  the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the two theoretical approaches. In this sense, 
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this case study also aims to contribute to existing scholarly discussion about the 
relationships  between  alternative  theoretical  perspectives  in  social  science 
disciplines (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006; Hall  and Taylor, 1996;  Katznelson and 
Weingast, 2005; Lichbach, 2003; Thelen, 1999).
The  analytic  narrative  based  on  institutional  rational  choice  approach  is 
taken here as exemplar of a “structural-configurational” theoretical perspective to 
explaining policy reform implementation. As highlighted by Bates et al. (2000) and 
Levi (2002),  the institutional  rational  choice approach aims to show how social 
outcomes  consist  of  self-enforcing  equilibria  that  result  from  the  strategic 
interaction between actors.  This approach is  typically  applied  by extracting  key 
players,  their  goals,  and  the  features  of  the  environment  that  influence  actors' 
behaviour (especially the rules of interaction, the constraints, and the incentives) 
from narratives of social episodes, in order to define game theoretic models tailored 
to the specific situations (Levi, 2002: 112). Game theoretic models result in sub-
game perfect equilibria that are compared to the observed behaviour. In case of 
mismatch between the model equilibria and the observed behaviour, the researcher 
can revise the model in order to single out the features that better account for the 
observed pattern of choice. Following this method, the researcher proceeds “back 
and forth between the model and the data, testing our ideas against reality” (Bates et  
al., 2000: 700). The institutional rational choice approach, therefore, informs the 
explanation of trajectories of policy reform implementation episodes in terms of 
“shift  from  an  institutional  equilibrium  at  one  point  in  time  to  a  different 
institutional equilibrium at a different point in time” (Levi, 2002: 111). 
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The  institutional  rational  choice  approach  accounts  for  the  observed 
behaviour of the players in a way that attributes an important causal role to features 
of the choice settings. As highlighted by Levi (2002: 111), features of the choice 
setting,  such  as  the  distribution  of  bargaining  power  and  resources  among  the 
players,  contribute  explaining  what  originates  “the  shift  from  an  institutional 
equilibrium at one point in time to a different institutional equilibrium at a different 
point in time”. The researcher attains such explanations by engaging in an exercise 
of “comparative statics” (Levi, 2002: 112), that consists of building models that fit 
different portions of data in time, and contrasting and comparing what accounts for 
the  respective  sub-game  perfect  equilibria.  The  result  of  the  analysis  is  an 
explanatory  argument  that  places  particular  emphasis  on the  role  of  institutions 
understood as self-enforcing equilibria that coordinate behaviour (Levi, 2002). 
The institutional processualist approach is considered here as an alternative 
theoretical  perspective  to  explaining policy reform implementation  with  explicit 
processual  traits.  As  highlighted  by  Barzelay  (2003)  and  Barzelay  and Gallego 
(2006),  the  institutional  processualist  approach  aims  to  obtaining  historically-
grounded analytic generalisations of the policy process on the basis of explanations 
where  causation  arises  from  combinations  of  conditions  and  events  (under  the 
principle of “multiple conjunctural causation” as formulated in Ragin, 1989). This 
approach,  as  it  has  been  employed  in  various  works  so  far  (Barzelay,  2003; 
Barzelay and Fuechtner, 2003; Barzelay and Gallego, 2010a, 2010b; Barzelay and 
Jacobsen,  2009;  Cejudo,  2003;  Corbett,  2010;  Gaetani,  2003;  Gallego,  2003; 
Gallego and Barzelay, 2006, 2010; Malee, 2003; Mele, 2010; Moynihan, 2003), is 
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especially attentive to how process design features and process context conditions 
account  (together  with  other  theoretical  resources,  such  as  the  use  of  social 
mechanisms) for the observed trajectory of selected parts of the policy cycle. The 
institutional processualist approach, therefore, results in explanation of trajectories 
of policy reform implementation episodes where reform content  features,  policy 
process features, and characteristics of the context account for flows of efforts and 
their variations over time.
The  institutional  processualist  approach entails  the  formulation  of  causal 
reconstruction  of  implementation  episodes  with  the  employment  of  social 
mechanisms,  especially  “agency  mechanisms”16 (Barzelay  and  Gallego,  2006; 
Emirbayer  and  Mische,  1998).  Within  processual  theoretical  approaches,  social 
mechanisms play the important role of filling the knowledge gap on how social 
processes  work  in  detail  by  acting  in  a  similar  way  to  “intervening  variables” 
(George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and George, 1997) between causal factors and 
outcomes (Sayer, 1992; Stinchcombe, 1991). Following this approach, the analysis 
entails the identification of social mechanisms that help providing interpretations 
(Shelling,  1998) or  hypothetical  causal  models  (Gambetta,  1998;  Hedström and 
Swedberg,  1998)  for  explaining  particular  features  of  social  phenomena.  Social 
16 Social  mechanisms  can  be  variously  classified.  Coleman  (1986),  for  example,  distinguished 
between macro-to-micro mechanisms (in which a situation affects individuals), micro-to-micro 
mechanisms  (in  which  a  specific  combination  of  individual  desires,  beliefs,  and  action 
opportunities generate a specific action), and micro-to-macro mechanisms (in which individual 
actions are transformed into some collective outcome).  In a similar vein, McAdam et al. (2001) 
differentiated  between  environmental  mechanisms  (in  which  externally  generated  influences 
affect  social  life),  cognitive  mechanisms (in  which  individual  and  collective  perceptions are 
modified), and relational mechanisms (in which connections between individuals and groups are 
changed).   Hedström (2005),  instead,  classified mechanisms as  belief-mediated (those  which 
change one actor's beliefs), desire-mediated (those affecting an actor's desires), and opportunity-
mediated (those which influence the opportunities available for actors).
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mechanisms that  will  be employed for  explaining  the  path  and outcome of  the 
implementation  of  the  water  reform  in  Italy  include,  in  particular,  logic  of 
appropriateness (March, 1994; March and Olsen, 1989), committed interpretation 
(Weick, 2001), network diffusion (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998), and attribution 
of opportunities and threats (McAdam et al., 2001). 
The institutional processualist approach accounts for the observed events' 
trajectories in a way that places particular importance to the joint combination of 
initial  conditions,  policy  design  and  policy  process  features,  and  characteristics 
(including changed features) of the temporal context. As highlighted by Barzelay 
and  Gallego  (2006:  53),  these  component  parts  of  explanatory  arguments  are 
especially  relevant  for  explaining  “how  situated  interaction  (and,  in  this  way, 
human  agency)  can  feed  back  upon  context”.  The  researcher  attains  such 
explanations by drawing on different analytic models in a rather eclectic fashion – 
for example, the public management policymaking research programme (Barzelay 
and  Gallego,  2006)  variously  draws  on  the  models  of  Kingdon's  (1994), 
Baumgartner and Jones' (1993), and Levitt and March's (1988) depending on the 
empirical patterns of the cases of public management policy change in the research 
programme and the chosen  explanandum.  The result  of the analysis  is  typically 
characterised, within the literature related to this theoretical approach, as a pool of 
“historically grounded analytic generalizations” (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006: 538; 
Abbott, 2001; McAdam at al., 2001; Ragin, 1989, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
An  explicit  comparison  between  institutional  rational  choice  and 
institutional processualism has not been subjected to wide scholarly attention so far. 
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In one piece of work where such comparison is made, Barzelay and Gallego (2006: 
548) argue that “A major theoretical difference is that the institutional processual 
approach  seeks  to  explain  the  context  in  which  the  various  actors  made  their 
choices  and  interacted”,  and  that  “This  difference  suggests  a  more  general 
advantage  of  the  institutional  processualist  approach  over  the  rational  choice 
institutionalist one, when it comes to understanding public management reform”. It 
seems, however, that the advantage of the institutional processualist approach over 
the institutional rational choice one should not be literally understood as related to 
the breadth of what is included in the  explanandum, i.e., whether the explanatory 
argument should also account for features of the context that affect the trajectory of 
the policy process under consideration or whether it should take them as exogenous 
conditions.  Various  case  studies  conducted  by  following  the  institutional 
processualist approach rather suggest that the difference may be rather re-phrased in 
the sense that the institutional processualist approach provides an account of how 
features of the temporal context are brought to bear into the ways actors within the 
policy process under consideration make decisions and interact with each other. In 
this  sense,  institutional  processualism  suggests  an  understanding  the  process 
through  which  given context  conditions  may affect  the  trajectory  of  the  policy 
process  in  a  different  way but  the  one provided by institutional  rational  choice 
perspective.
The  relationship  between  institutional  rational  choice  and  institutional 
processualism can also be placed within a more general scholarly discussion about 
the characteristics of alternative varieties of new institutionalism in social science 
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(Hall  and  Taylor,  1996).  In  assessing  the  relative  strengths  and  weaknesses  of 
institutional rational choice with respect to historical and sociological varieties of 
new institutionalism, for example, some authors highlight that, albeit by making use 
of a relatively simplified view of human nature, the institutional rational  choice 
perspective  has  the  merit  of  providing  parsimonious  explanations  through 
propositions that are refutable (Bates et al., 2000; Levi, 2002). In contrast, others 
point out that explanatory arguments that are informed by the institutional rational 
choice perspective build on presuppositions about preferences (and possibly also 
about  payoff)  that  are  not  observable  and  about  hidden  or  unknown  utility 
calculations  (Boland,  1981;  Winter,  1964).  Katznelson  and  Weingast  (2005) 
highlighted that institutional rational choice has a good deal in common with other 
institutionalist  perspectives,  especially with respect  to  the general  argument  that 
actors make “choices about feasible alternative [that] are structured by determinate 
situations  regarding who the actors are  and which choices  are  in  fact  on offer” 
(Katznelson and Weingast, 2005: 5). Thelen (1999; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992), on 
the other hand, remarked the presence of sharp differences between institutional 
rational choice and other forms of institutionalism, especially related to the point 
that  preferences  are  treated  as  exogenous  in  the  former  while  interests  and 
objectives are created in institutional contexts in ways that make them inseparable 
from them in  the  latter  (Zysman,  1994).  Bates  et  al.  (2000),  finally,  offered  a 
complementary  view  of  institutional  rational  choice  and  other  theoretical 
perspectives,  by  suggesting  that  “an  initial  firm grip  on  rational  choice  models 
secures a solid analysis, which can be challenged or expanded by other theoretical 
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approaches” (Bates et al., 2000: 699).
5. Chapter summary.
By reviewing the scholarly literature on regulation and regulatory reforms, 
this chapter argued that relatively little attention has been placed, so far, on the issue  
of how regulatory reforms are implemented. This gap in the literature is related, in 
part,  to the substantive concern that is placed on issues related to the design of 
regulatory  systems  and  on  the  assessment  of  performance  effects  of  regulatory 
regimes,  rather than on understanding how a policy reform mandate  is  put  into 
place. Yet, the implementation of regulatory reforms bears important consequences 
on  the  way in  which  a  regulatory system in  installed  and,  consequently,  on its 
performance effects. Within the implementation stage of regulatory reform policy 
cycles,  the  political  confrontation between implementers  and target  groups  may 
significantly reshape the design of  the  regulatory system originally  provided by 
policy-makers.  This  political  confrontation  may  be  especially  relevant  in  the 
implementation of regulatory reforms of infrastructure in particular, because of the 
technical, economic, and territorial  characteristics of such type of target domain. 
Therefore,  if  attention  is  not  placed  on what  happens during  regulatory  reform 
implementation, we miss a full understanding of whether and how the making of 
regulatory reforms results in any change of regulatory regimes and how to assess 
the performance of regulatory systems of infrastructure industries. 
In part,  the lack of attention on regulatory reform implementation within 
scholarly  works  may  also  be  related  to  the  way  in  which  research  on  the 
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implementation of public policies in general is currently conducted. Since the call 
for  the  so-called  “third  generation”  of  public  policy  implementation  studies, 
research  in  this  area  focused  on  hypothesis  testing  through  relatively  large-n 
surveys of experiences of implementing public programmes. This research agenda 
diverted attention away from the issue of better understanding the process dynamics 
of public policy implementation.  An alternative line of inquiry seems needed in 
order  to  provide  a  better  account  of  the  process  dynamics  of  public  policy 
implementation.
As a way forward to try and fill this literature gap, this thesis addresses the 
issue of how infrastructure regulatory reforms are implemented within the context 
of a multi-level governance system. In this type of scenario, conditions related to 
the functions, responsibilities, and prerogatives of sub-national governments play 
the role of sources of causal factors that affect the path and outcome of the reform 
implementation process, as we shall see. The issue of how infrastructure regulatory 
reforms are  implemented  is  researched in  this  thesis  by  following a  processual 
approach, that places particular attention on such process features as the dynamics 
of negotiation, the sequenced order of decision points, and the influence of context 
factors on situated interactions. This thesis will contrast and compare the use of two 
alternative theoretical  perspectives for analysing the same empirical  evidence in 
turn, namely institutional rational choice and institutional processualism.
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Chapter 2
The Research Design
This chapter illustrates the research design of this thesis. At the core of the 
research  design  lays  the  research  question,  namely  how  should  generalised  
arguments  about  the  implementation  of  regulatory  reforms  of  infrastructure  be  
qualified  (or  otherwise  adapted)  in  order  to  reflect  evidence  of  diverse  causal  
tendencies within a multi-level governance context scenario? This research question 
is tackled through the analysis of a case of infrastructure regulatory reform in multi-
level governance system, that builds on the evidence provided by the episode of 
implementation of a regulatory reform of the water infrastructure that took place in 
Italy in the period 1994-2006. The trajectory of the case episode presents some 
particularly interesting  features,  especially variation in  the path and outcome of 
policy reform efforts over time (i.e., a period of relatively slow implementation was 
followed by one of more rapid execution of the policy reform mandate) and across 
space (i.e., policy reform efforts were more intense and faster in some areas of the 
country  than  others).  The  explanation  of  the  case,  that  will  be  provided  by 
following  two  alternative  theoretical  frameworks  in  turn,  will  be  precisely 
concerned with accounting for these features of the episode of regulatory reform 
implementation.
The chapter begins with a section that provides the rationale for the research 
question,  and  then  another  that  justifies  the  case  selection.  Section  three  will 
introduce the case episode of the implementation of the water reform in Italy in the 
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period  1994-2006,  including  an  overview  of  the  event  structure  and  a  brief 
description of the trajectory of the water reform implementation episode. Section 
four will discuss the boundaries of the case with respect to other stages of the policy 
cycle, the implementation outcome, and the context. Section five will describe the 
methods  employed  for  data  collection.  Finally,  section  six  will  illustrate  how 
narrative writing and analysis have been conducted.
1. The research question.
As highlighted in the literature review chapter, scholarly works done on the 
implementation stage of regulatory reforms in infrastructure industries do not place 
lot of attention on the process dynamics through which policy reforms are put into 
place.  This lack of attention seems surprising,  provided that the implementation 
stage of such regulatory reforms may be jagged and ineffectual, especially when the 
implementation  process  requires  political  confrontation  between  governmental 
authorities situated at  different  levels of the multi-layered governmental  system. 
The  presence  of  this  “blind  spot”,  however,  may  be  understood  if  taking  into 
account that systematic empirical research on regulatory reforms of infrastructure 
has  traditionally  focused  on  either  the  design  of  regulatory  systems  or  the 
performance effects of infrastructure regulation. The implementation of a regulatory 
reform mandate,  instead,  has  been often  regarded as  a  mere administrative  and 
technical matter, as it may be the case especially when the execution of the reform 
policy mandate takes place within unitary countries.
This thesis aims to contribute filling this gap by focusing on the process of 
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implementing regulatory reforms of infrastructure which takes place within context 
conditions that include multi-level governance features. As we shall see, this type of 
implementation process of regulatory reforms of infrastructure brings to the fore the 
role of high-intensity political confrontation between governmental authorities in a 
way  that  has  profound  consequences  for  the  path  and  outcome  of  the  reform 
implementation process, as we shall see. Within multi-level governance systems, 
regulatory  reform  of  infrastructure  typically  calls  into  play  sub-national 
governments that voice their concerns over the impact of the regulatory reform on 
the communities hosted within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Taking into 
account  the  functions,  responsibilities,  and  prerogatives  of  sub-national 
governments that are typically provided by the constitution or relevant legislation in 
multi-level  governance  systems,  the  implementation  of  regulatory  reforms  of 
infrastructure in multi-layered systems of governance is a type of scenario where 
the  regulatory  reform  mandate  is  deeply  exposed  to  the  possibility  of  being 
significantly reshaped during the implementation stage. 
The research question posed in this study is how should existing generalised  
arguments  about  the  implementation  of  regulatory  reforms  of  infrastructure  be  
qualified  (or  otherwise  adapted)  in  order  to  reflect  evidence  of  diverse  causal  
tendencies within a multi-level governance context scenario? 
This research question directs the inquiry towards the process dynamics of 
how a regulatory reform policy mandate is executed. This kind of inquiry is pursued 
through  a  case  study  because  this  method  is  particularly  suited  to  researching 
complex  social  phenomena  that  need  to  be  understood  as  wholes,  rather  than 
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dissected into sets of isolated cause-effect relationships (Ragin and Becker, 1992; 
Stake, 1994, 1995; Yin, 1994). As highlighted by Yin (1994), case studies allow the 
researcher to gain a deep historical understanding of the experience studied and to 
identify, track, and assess the role played by the concurrence of various factors in 
specific historical circumstances. These characteristics of the case study make this 
method fit to tackle the kind of knowledge gap that is addressed by the research 
question of this thesis, i.e.,  understanding “how” the process of implementing a 
regulatory reform of infrastructure industries unfolds17. 
2. The selection of the case.
The case selected for addressing the research question tackled in this thesis 
relates to the episode of the implementation stage of a policy cycle to reform the 
regulation of the water industry that took place in Italy in the period  1994-2006. 
The  case  is  selected  because  of  distinguishing  features  that  make it  suitable  to 
research  how regulatory  reform implementation  of  infrastructure  unfolds  within 
multi-level  governance  systems,  provided  that  the  episode  of  the  water  reform 
implementation in Italy took place within a context that includes a multi-layered 
structure of governance as provided by the constitution and relevant legislation of 
the country. Additionally, as we shall see, the episode includes a significant role 
17 The case study method is also regarded as appropriate for researching the working of regulatory 
regimes of infrastructure industries, in particular. In commenting on the use of casuistic method 
in his book Infrastructure Regulation, for example, Gómez Ibáňez (2003: 13-14) argued, “Cases 
are also valuable because they allow one to examine how the interplay of economics, politics and 
institutions  affect  regulatory  commitment  and  performance.  Some  researchers  have  tried  to 
examine this interplay using large data sets, and their results are reported here. Few such data 
sets exist, however, and they capture only a portion of the many variables that might be involved. 
To appreciate how regulation works in practice, there is simply no substitute for examining the 
evolution of a specific concession contract or the history of a particular regulatory agency”.
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played by sub-national governments in the execution of the water reform mandate, 
in such a way that the political confrontation between sub-national governments, 
regional governments, and the central government played an important role on the 
trajectory of the water reform implementation – especially, in the form of variation 
both  over  time  (i.e.,  a  first  period  of  slow  motion  was  followed  by  one  of 
acceleration in the execution of the implementation tasks) and across space (i.e., the 
execution of the implementation tasks was conducted more rapidly in some areas of 
the country than others and resulted in the emergence of heterogeneous forms of 
regulation across the country). The present case study, therefore, allows to extend 
the empirical range of studies on regulatory reform implementation in ways that 
have not been generally pursued in the existing scholarly literature so far.
The  selection  of  the  case  reflects,  in  other  words,  a  variation-centred 
strategy for researching the implementation of regulatory reforms of infrastructure. 
Existing studies on this area did not pay enough attention to the political economy 
of the implementation stage of the regulatory reform policy cycle. Instead, how a 
regulatory  reform  mandate  is  executed  bears  important  consequences  for  the 
establishment  of  a  new  regulatory  regime  and  for  the  performance  effects  of 
regulatory systems. Existing studies, moreover, did not especially focus on the role 
played by context conditions related to multi-level governance systems on the path 
and outcome of  the  regulatory  reform implementation  process.  Instead,  features 
attached  to  a  multi-layered  system  of  governance  –  such  as  the  functions, 
responsibilities, and prerogatives of sub-national governments – play an important 
causal role in the process dynamics of regulatory reform implementation, especially 
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when the territorial configuration of the regulated infrastructure network extends 
across  the  territorial  organisation  of  sub-national  governments'  jurisdictions. 
Because of the characteristics of the selected case episode, the execution of this 
research  design  in  the  form of  the  present  case  study yields  some explanatory 
arguments that have no clear counterpart in the existing literature on reforming the 
regulatory systems of infrastructure industries.
3. Overview of the case.
The case selected for this study is the episode of the implementation of the 
regulatory reform of the water industry in Italy conducted in the period between 
1994 and 2006. The episode begun in January 1994,  when a piece of legislation, 
that  had  been  made  with  the  aim  to  improving  the  dismal  state  of  water 
infrastructure and dissatisfying performance of the water industry (Act 36/1994), 
came  into  force.  Until  that  time,  the  water  industry  in  Italy  had  been  mostly 
regulated through public ownership and control of water firms, while a minimal 
part  of water services were provided by business companies.  The water reform, 
instead, provided that the water industry would be regulated through a new system 
which  combined  selected  features  of  franchise  allocation  and  discretionary 
regulation  models.  The  reform  content  provided  the  liberalisation  (i.e.,  water 
services would be assigned through competitive tenders for franchises rather than 
be retained under public ownership and control) and the re-regulation of the water 
industry (i.e., water firms would be subjected to tariff and quality regulation by a 
system that combined both local regulatory authorities – called Autorità d'Ambito – 
64
and a central regulatory authority – called  Comitato di Vigilanza per l'Uso delle  
Risorse Idriche).  Additionally,  the  reform entailed the  privatisation of  the water 
industry, provided that franchise allocation would open up the possibility for private 
operators and investors to enter the water business. 
The temporal structure of the episode of the implementation of the water 
reform can be conceived to include two events that relate to the liberalisation and 
re-regulation part of the implementation part of the policy cycle, namely aligning 
sub-national  legislation  with  the  national  reform  statute  and  establishing  new 
regulatory authorities,  and an event that  relates to the privatisation part,  namely 
awarding water franchise contracts. The liberalisation and re-regulation part of the 
process is characterised by a first period of slow motion (1994-1997) followed by 
one of acceleration to establish the new regulatory system (1997-2006), and the 
privatisation part is characterised as well by a first period of slow motion (1994-
2001) followed by one where water franchises were awarded at increasing speed 
across  the  country  (2001-2006).  Additionally,  the  implementation  of  the  water 
reform did not proceed at equal pace all over the country. In some areas of Tuscany 
called Alto Valdarno, local governments executed the implementation tasks required  
to liberalise, re-regulate, and privatise water services relatively faster than in other 
areas of Italy, as the local water regulatory authority was established in 1997 and 
the water franchise was awarded in 1999. As we shall see, this variation over time 
and  across  space  relates  to  a  complex  process  dynamics  of  water  reform 
implementation where an important role was played by the multi-layered structure 
of the country's governance. 
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The outcome of the implementation of the water reform in Italy was the set 
up of a new water regulatory regime in most of the country. By the end of the 
episode  in  2006,  the  execution  of  the  water  reform  mandate  resulted  in  the 
establishment of 91 local regulatory authorities (Autorità d'Ambito) in the country 
and the award of water franchises by 47 local regulatory authorities. According to a 
2009 survey, water franchises were eventually awarded in 67 watershed areas to 
102 firms in total. Most of these firms (58) were fully owned by local governments 
(so-called “in  house” firms),  27 were mixed public-private  ownership  firms,  11 
were public sector firms that enjoyed some special “incumbent's right” that made 
them  exempt  from  tender  offer  competitions,  and  6  were  business  companies 
selected through tender offer competitions. The implementation of the 1994 water 
reform in Italy, therefore, resulted in quite heterogeneous forms of water service 
management  at  the  local  level.  As we shall  see,  the  same process  dynamics  of 
implementing the regulatory reform of the water industry plays an important role in 
order to account for such heterogeneity of the implementation outcome.
The episode of  the implementation of  the water  reform in Italy presents 
quite specific features, with respect to both the country and sector context. Taking 
into account  these specific  features is  important,  in order  to clarify whether the 
particular context conditions place limitations to the generalisability of the research 
findings of the case study. At least two cautionary notes should be addressed. First, 
the episode happened in Italy, a country that traditionally experienced difficulties in 
implementing public policies in general, especially those which originate from EU 
directives (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993). As pointed out by Börzel (2001:819), for 
66
example, the group of countries which consistently infringed the transposition of 
EU legislation is  “led by Italy,  whose non-compliance record almost makes it  a 
class of its own!” (exclamation mark in the original). Such a negative record of 
performance in implementing EU policies might suggest  that Italy as a  country 
presents some “limit conditions” that relate to a country environment that is not 
particularly  supportive  of  public  policy  implementation,  at  least.  Rather  than  a 
limitation, however, this particular feature of Italy constitutes an opportunity, as it  
allows to  research the  implementation  of  regulatory  reform in  a  context  that  is 
expected to pose difficulties to substitute a regime of public ownership of service 
provision with one based on franchise allocation and discretionary regulation. In 
other words, if the case episode were selected in a case country context that plainly 
supports  the  implementation  of  public  policies,  then  we  would  miss  gathering 
evidence of how the process dynamics of the implementation stage matters in the 
execution of a regulatory reform mandate.
A second cautionary note is that the episode took place in the water industry, 
a sector which presents unique economic and social features with respect to other 
infrastructure (Rees, 1998). The water industry presents stronger traits of natural 
monopoly  than  other  infrastructure  industries.  Moreover,  the  water  industry 
provides services which are considered an essential requisite for human health and 
well-being, and whose delivery is often claimed to rest in the direct responsibility of 
the government. Because of this, the substitution of public ownership with some 
competition-based mechanism for regulating the water industry is  often strongly 
opposed in many countries, where the public generally favours public ownership of 
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water firms rather than exposing water services to the private interests of business 
companies,  in  particular  multi-national  ones  (Finger  and  Allouche,  2003).  This 
particular  feature  of  the  water  industry  might  suggest  that  implementing  water 
regulatory reforms presents quite specific  challenges which are not faced in the 
implementation of regulatory reforms in other infrastructure industries. Researching 
the implementation of the water reform in Italy, however, is particularly interesting 
exactly because of such difficulties. Indeed, the implementation of the water reform 
in Italy is exemplar of how regulatory reforms can take place also in an industry 
like water, which has been subject to liberalisation, re-regulation, and privatisation 
reforms  more  rarely  than  other  infrastructure  (Ballance  and  Taylor,  2005; 
Massarutto, 2007). 
4. The boundaries of the case.
Some care should be placed on the definition of the boundaries of the case 
episode. At least three issues, here, should be addressed. The first issue is how the 
case episode can be analytically distinguishable from the rest of the policy cycle 
related to the regulatory reform of the water industry, in particular from the policy-
making  stage  of  the  1994  water  reform.  It  is  well  known  that  the  distinction 
between  policy-making,  implementation,  and  evaluation  is  a  convenient,  albeit 
simplistic, “textbook” approach to disentangle the complexity of the policy cycle 
into stages (Barrett and Fudge, 1981). Such distinction papers over the fundamental 
continuity  between  policy  making,  implementation  and  evaluation,  and  the 
difficulties which arise, both conceptually and empirically, to define where policy 
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ends and implementation begins (Dunsire, 1978). Policy implementation, indeed, 
can be hardly separated from the rest of the policy cycle, in particular if we take 
into account that implementers may still  engage in making public policy and in 
evaluating  it,  and  that  policy-makers  may  intervene  during  the  implementation 
stage with supplementary policy actions (Hambleton, 1983; Hupe, 1990; Schofield, 
2004).
The view that the implementation of public policies goes hand in hand with 
its  making and evaluation  has  been endorsed,  among others,  by Wildavsky and 
Majone (1978: 408), who argued that “implementation will inevitably reformulate 
as well as carry out policy”. A similar point was made by Dror (1968: 191), who 
argued that “re-policymaking is needed during the execution of the policy”, and by 
Bunker (1972:72), who pointed out that in implementation “the [policy] content is 
re-assessed, interpreted, and recast sometimes with care to preserve the core of the 
original intent, sometimes, with thoughtful revision of the original assumptions and 
objectives,  and  sometimes  as  an  unreflective  response  in  terms  of  bureaucratic 
conventions or situational constraints which tend to counter the framers'  intent”. 
More recently, also Hill (1997: 375) highlighted that “there has been a dangerous 
tendency to separate implementation issues from policy-making issues, when what 
is  important  is  to understand their  inter-relationships”.  These views suggest that 
research  on  the  implementation  stage  of  policy  cycles  should  be  particularly 
attentive  to  anything going on in  the  temporal  context  where  the  public  policy 
implementation process is embedded.
Research on the implementation stage of a policy cycle, however, is also 
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conventionally characterised by precise temporal boundaries. The enactment of a 
policy reform, in particular, is an important “reference point” in time, because it is 
related  to  the  introduction  of  new  formal  institutions  into  the  regulated  policy 
domain. The implementation stage of a policy cycle is typically understood as a 
process that begins after a reform is enacted in a piece of legislation and then comes 
into force. Accordingly, the case episode of the implementation of the water reform 
in Italy includes the events that took place  after the coming into force  of Act no. 
36/1994 in January 1994. The events related to the drafting and approval of Act no. 
36/1994 by the Parliament  of Italy until  its  coming into force in January 1994, 
therefore, constitute part of the “background history” with respect to the episode of 
water reform implementation (background history to the 1994 water reform will be 
briefly narrated in Chapter 3). 
The  second  issue  to  discuss  is  what  is  the  outcome  of  the  case  of  the 
implementation of the water reform in Italy, conceived as an instance of the process  
of  implementing  an  infrastructure  regulatory  reform.  As  Pettigrew  (1997:344) 
argued, processual research should specify an outcome to explain, which is used “to 
create variability  in the research design and provide an anchor in the study – a 
constant simple repetitive question which keeps the researcher on track through the 
interactive cycles of deduction and induction”. The outcome of a regulatory reform 
implementation process is a multi-faceted construct. Within the present case study, 
it can be conceptualised along at least three dimensions. First, we can consider the 
extent to which the new regulatory system is put into place, i.e., how much of the 
country's water infrastructure resulted subjected to the new regulatory system by the 
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end of the case episode. Second, we can take into account the period of time needed 
to set up the new regulatory system, i.e., how long it took to execute the mandate 
contained in Act 36/1994. Third, we can also look at the extent to which the new 
regulatory regime differs from the original one, i.e., how much of the water industry 
resulted opened up to the participation of private operators and investors.
The outcome of the implementation of the water reform in Italy is defined 
along each of these three dimensions. With respect to the extent to which the new 
regulatory  system  is  put  into  place,  and  with  reference  to  2009  data,  the 
implementation of the water reform resulted in the award of water concessions by 
67 local regulatory agencies, out of 92 which had been established in the country. 
With respect to the period of time needed to set up the new regulatory system, the  
implementation of the water reform took a a period of about 12 years (1994-2006) 
until water services were subjected to the new regulatory system almost all over the 
country's territory (setting aside just 4 watershed areas). With respect to the extent 
to  which  the  new  regulatory  regime  differs  from  the  original  one,  the 
implementation of the water reform resulted in the entry of private operators and 
investors in part of the water industry only, in the form of water franchises assigned 
to mixed public-private ownership firms (27) and to business companies (6), while 
originally close to all water services were provided by firms owned and controlled 
by public authorities.
The third issue to discuss is how the case of the implementation of the water 
reform in Italy can be distinguished from the context. As Yin (1994) highlighted, 
the context is typically deeply intertwined with the case under investigation, yet 
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clear boundaries should be drawn between the two. As we shall see, the context of 
the implementation of the water reform in Italy includes previous events, such as 
the making of the 1994 water reform and the implementation of EU water-related 
directives (e.g.,  those on drinkable water and nitrate  pollution18,  on urban waste 
water treatment19, and on water management20), and contemporaneous events, such 
as  the  implementation  of  the  1994-2000  and  2000-2006  Community  Support 
Framework  (CSF)  programmes  (EU-funded  programmes  for  infrastructure 
development),  the  passing  of  legislation  for  funding  sewage  and  wastewater 
treatment infrastructure in 1997, a decision of the European Court of Justice in 
1999, the making of a constitutional reform which came to force in 2001, and the 
making of two reforms of local public services that were enacted in 2001 and 2003. 
As part of the context, all these events related to the process dynamics of the water 
reform implementation episode. It is not an explanatory task that is undertaken here,  
however,  to  account  for  the  process  dynamics  of  these  previous  and 
contemporaneous events, that are rather brought to bear into the analysis insofar as 
they  exerted  any  influence  on  the  path  and  outcome  of  the  water  reform 
implementation episode only.
5. Data collection. 
Data on the implementation of the water reform in Italy were collected from 
primary, secondary, and tertiary sources.  Primary sources included parliamentary 
minutes,  official  reports  and  other  documents  issued  by  the  national  water 
18 Directive 91/676/EC.
19 Directive 21/271/EC.
20 Directive 2000/60/EC.
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regulatory  agency  (Comitato  di  Vigilanza  per  l'Uso  delle  Risorse  Idriche or 
Supervising  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Water  Resources),  and  interviews21. 
Secondary sources included reports issued by the water research centres Proaqua, 
Astrid, and Utilitatis, proceedings of the conferences “H2Obiettivo 2000” organised 
by the water firms' association Federgasacqua (renamed Federutility from 2005), 
and articles  from the  press  Il  Sole 24 Ore and La Repubblica.  Tertiary sources 
included  various  scholarly  works  done  on  the  water  reform  in  Italy,  such  as 
Massarutto  (1993,  2005),  Barraqué  (1995),  Bigatti  et  al.,  (1997),  Guffanti  and 
Merelli  (1997),  Riccaboni  and  Grossi  (2000),  Muraro  (2003),  Gilardoni  and 
Marangoni  (2004),  Fraquelli  and Moiso (2004),  Anwandter  and Rubino (2006a, 
2006b), Citroni and Lippi (2006), Citroni et al. (2007), Lippi et al. (2008), Carrozza 
(2008), and Danesi et al. (2008). 
The  collection  of  data  from  primary  sources  mostly  relied  on  written 
documents, in particular those issued by the Supervising Committee on the Use of 
Water Resources. These included 13 yearly reports to Parliament issued between 
1996 and 2009, and 22 documents concerning the state of the water industry and the 
implementation of the water reform issued between 2000 and 2005. Other primary 
sources  included  the  parliamentary  minutes  regarding  the  making  of  the  water 
reform between 1992 and 1994, and 20 interviews with informants based in the 
Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources (4), in the local regulatory 
authorities  (11),  in  the  water  firms  (3),  in  the  association  of  water  firms 
Federgasacqua  (1),  and  in  the  research  centre  Istituto  Ricerche  Sociali  (1). 
Interviews  were  conducted  in  person  (9),  on  the  phone  (2),  and  by  email  (9). 
21 All sources in Italian that are quotes in this thesis were translated into English by the Author.
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Secondary sources included 23 reports of the water research centre Proaqua issued 
between 1995 and 2001, 546 articles from the press Il Sole 24 Ore and 60 from La 
Repubblica published between 1990 and 2006. The full list of data sources is in the 
Appendix of the thesis.
The  collection  of  data  from  interviews  deserves  some  additional 
qualifications.  Access to interviewees,  which were selected on the basis  of their 
positions in the main organisations of the water policy community in Italy, proved 
difficult  because  of  unavailability,  dispersion  of  the  potential  interviewees  over 
several  locations,  and  confidentiality  of  information  that,  at  the  time  when  the 
fieldwork was conducted, related to water franchises that were under administrative 
trials  or  investigation.  Several  cases  of  water  franchise  award,  in  fact,  were 
appealed  to  courts  by  applicants  that  had  lost  the  tender  offer  competitions  – 
including the very first instance of award of water franchise in the country, in Alto 
Valdarno.  Some  cases  of  water  franchise  award,  instead,  were  subjected  to 
inspection by Anti-mafia Investigation Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
because of suspicion of influence of crime organisations on water public contracts. 
Because of these reasons, part of the water reform implementation episode at the 
local level has not been investigated so deeply as it would be otherwise possible 
once investigations and trials are concluded.
Apparently, difficulty to access interviewees did not seriously compromise 
data  collection,  however.  Interview  data  were  mainly  used  to  complete  and 
triangulate data which were collected from other primary and secondary sources. 
The interviews provided confirmation of the information already possessed from 
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documentary  sources  and  strengthened  the  overall  understanding  of  the  water 
reform  implementation  episode,  while  they  offered  relatively  little  additional 
insights than was inferred from written sources. On a few occasions only did some 
interviewees  privately  disclose  some  information  concerning,  in  particular,  the 
coordination between local governments, local government-owned water firms, and 
the local regulatory agencies regarding the award of water concessions. These bits 
of information were provided off-records, therefore they have not been explicitly 
used  in  the  analysis  of  the  case  (although  they  contributed  to  clarifying  the 
understanding of details of the water reform implementation episode). 
6. Narrative writing and analysis.
The  collected  data  were  stored  and  coded  through  the  Nvivo  software 
package. Originally, the coding frame was based on theoretically-derived concepts 
and  constructs  that  originated  from  the  literature  review  on  regulation  and 
regulatory reforms. During the process of examining the empirical evidence, the 
coding frame was progressively amended and enriched in order to reflect the variety 
of the public discourse carried out in the water policy community in Italy in the 
period  between  1994  and  2006.  In  anthropological  terms,  the  evolution  of  the 
coding frame reflected  the  learning  of  the  emic  knowledge of  the  water  policy 
community,  while  at  the  outset  the  coding  frame  was  only  based  on  the  etic  
knowledge of the researcher22. In methodological terms, this evolution of the coding 
22 The distinction between emic and etic knowledge arose in the field of linguistics (Pike, 1954) 
and was later employed in anthropology (Harris, 1964). Emic knowledge refers to “accounts, 
descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories regarded 
as  meaningful  and  appropriate  by  the  native  members  of  the  culture  whose  beliefs  and 
behaviours are being studied. An emic construct is thus correctly termed emic if and only if it is 
in accord with the epistemological principles deemed appropriate by the insider’s culture. Thus 
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frame broadly follows the “grounded theory” approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1994) to data collection, which highlights the importance of 
progressively understanding the cognitive structures of the empirical social domain 
under study. The resulting coding frame is shown in the Appendix of the thesis. 
Coded data provided input sources for writing the narrative history of the 
episode of the water reform implementation. Writing the narrative history required 
to construct accounts of events on the basis of the information collected about who 
performed what actions, when, under which circumstances, and in relation to what 
rationales  or  intended  aims.  The  coding  process  provided  the  ordering  of  data 
according  to  code  categories  (i.e.,  nodes,  in  Nvivo  framework).  Writing  the 
narrative, however, entailed the arrangement and use of data about the episode of 
the  water  reform  implementation  in  relation  to  a  structure  of  events,  that  are 
understood as abstract entities that are intellectually constructed for making sense 
of history. In operational terms, the process of writing the narrative history required 
to formulate accounts of events in linear narrative form, while bits of information 
on the same events were possessed in the form of a hierarchical tree structure of 
nodes.  The result  of  the  writing effort,  therefore,  presents  itself  in  a  form of a 
narrative history that bears little resemblance of the coded data structure based on 
the validation of emic knowledge becomes a matter of consensus – namely, the consensus of the 
native  informants,  who  must  agree  that  the  construct  matches  the  shared  perceptions 
characteristics of their culture” (Lett, 1990: 130). Etic knowledge, instead, refers to “accounts, 
descriptions,  and  analyses  expressed  in  terms  of  the  conceptual  schemes  and  categories  as 
meaningful and appropriate by the community of scientific observers. An etic construction is thus 
correctly termed etic if and only if it is in accord with the epistemological principles deemed 
appropriate by science; in other words, any and all etic constructs must be precise, accurate, 
logical, comprehensive, replicable, falsifiable, and observer-independent. Thus the validation of 
etic knowledge becomes a matter of logical and empirical analysis – in particular, the logical 
analysis of whether or not the construct has been falsified and whether or not the conclusion has  
been replicated” (Lett, 1990: 131). The distinction between the two perspectives is also presented 
in Stake (1995). 
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the Nvivo tree structure of nodes.
The  process  of  writing  the  narrative  history  of  the  water  reform 
implementation was consonant with accounts of narrative writing in social science 
research.  Connelly and Clandinin (1990),  for example,  described the process as 
relatively unstructured and fragmented – one where “material written throughout 
the course of the inquiry often appears as major pieces of the final document”, and 
where “materials written for different purposes such as conference presentations 
may become part of the final document” (Connelly and Clandinin, 1990: 7). Writing 
the  narrative  history  proceeded  through  successive  stages  of  reformulation  and 
refinement of the text, that was provisionally incorporated in conference papers and 
working papers before reaching the final outlook contained in the present thesis. 
The  analysis  of  the  empirical  evidence,  as  anticipated  in  the  previous 
chapter, was conducted through the application of two theoretical frameworks in 
turn – namely,  institutional rational  choice approach in the form of the analytic 
narrative  (Bates  et  al.,  1998,  2000;  Levi,  2002)  and  institutional  processualism 
(Barzelay, 2003; Barzelay and Gallego, 2006). The first theoretical framework has 
been  applied  by  modelling  the  interaction  between  local  governments,  regional 
governments,  and  the  central  government  as  a  series  of  games.  Modelling  the 
interaction between actors as a series of games is a relatively common research 
approach adopted in current public policy implementation studies (Hill and Hupe, 
2002;  Klijn,  1996;  Klijn  and  Koppenjan,  2000;  Klijn  et  al.,  1995;  Meier  and 
O'Toole, 2003; O'Toole, 1997a, 1997b; Scharpf, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1997). Among 
these  works,  for  example,  O'Toole  (1997a)  encouraged to  make use  of  a  game 
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theoretic  approach for  researching policy making and implementation even in  a 
non-technical  sense,  i.e.,  through  an  explanatory  framework  which  uses  the 
assumptions, the logic, and the language of game theory as heuristics, even without 
any formal (mathematical) modelling. In a similar vein, Bates et al. (1998, 2000) 
and Levi (2002) suggest to conduct the analysis by identifying, first, the key players 
(e.g.,  central  government,  regional  governments,  local  governments),  their  goals 
(e.g., local governments' maximising expected utility from ownership and control of  
water firms), and features of the environment that influence actors' behaviour (e.g., 
local governments' choice options available in the execution of the water reform 
mandate) from the narrative history of the case. They advise, then, that the analysis 
should entail the definition of game theoretic models tailored to specific situations 
(Levi,  2002:  112),  where  “situations”  are  understood  as  choice  settings  where 
players take into account other players' choice options and payoff for determining 
their  own  strategies  (e.g.,  settings  where  local  governments  choose  whether  to 
cooperate with each other to define new water district jurisdictions or not). Game 
theoretic  models  are  fashioned  in  such  a  way  that  sub-game  perfect  equilibria 
parallel the observed behaviour of the players. 
The institutional processualist approach has been applied by formulating the 
causal  reconstruction  of  the  trajectory  of  water  reform implementation  through 
explanatory  arguments  that  place  particular  attention  to  how  initial  conditions, 
policy design features, and changing context conditions affect the flow of efforts of 
local  governments,  regional  governments,  and  central  government.  In  the 
formulation  of  these  explanatory  arguments,  hypothesised  social  mechanisms 
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perform the important function of providing rationales for any particular feature of 
the  water  reform  implementation  trajectory  that  is  explained.  Because  of  such 
important role, the identification of social mechanisms deserves some clarification. 
Within the social science literature, several social mechanisms have been defined23. 
An issue arises, then, concerning how to select – out of the “repertoire” of social  
mechanisms generally discussed in social science disciplines – those that can help 
detailing how the social  process  under consideration works and why. A general 
guideline for the identification of relevant social mechanisms that is followed in this  
study builds on the requirement that the selected mechanism should contribute to 
the explanatory argument by relating particular features of the explanandum under 
consideration  (e.g.,  inaction,  continuity,  or  change  with  respect  to  actors'  past 
behaviour)  to  causal  factors  that  are  included  within  the  present  case  process 
conditions.  For  instance,  as  we  shall  see,  the  mechanism  of  network  diffusion 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998, Coleman et al., 1957) is selected to help explaining 
the observed spreading of liberalisation, re-regulation, and privatisation of water 
services across the country, provided that process conditions include the presence of 
a  policy  community  of  water  experts  who  provided  connections  between  local 
governments and water firms through which ideas on the implementation of the 
water reform were conveyed from one site to another. In addition, guidelines for the 
23 A  tentative,  albeit  incomplete,  list  of  social  mechanisms  would  include,  for  example, 
instrumental  rationality  (Gambetta,  1998),  logic of  appropriateness  (March and Olsen,  1989; 
March, 1994); incentives (Cowen, 1998), belief formation (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998), self-
fulfilling prophecies (Merton, 1968), network diffusion (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, Coleman 
et al., 1957), threshold-based behaviour (Granovetter, 1978), contagion (Schelling, 1978, 1998), 
rational imitation (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998), wishful thinking and spillover (Elster, 1998),  
committed interpretation (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978; Weick, 2001), attribution of opportunities 
and  threats,  organisational  and  social  appropriation,  actor  certification,  brokerage,  category 
formation, identity shift, opportunity spirals, framing of the dispute, attribution of similarity, and 
emulation (McAdam et al., 2001).
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selection  of  social  mechanisms include  the  requirement  that  empirical  evidence 
should  not  contradict  the  hypothesised  causal  relationship  between  process 
conditions  and  the  explanandum under  consideration.  For  example,  empirical 
accounts of the spreading of liberalisation, re-regulation, and privatisation of water 
services across the country include an active role played by the policy community 
of water experts, who contributed to the diffusion of ideas concerning the viability 
and effects of implementing the water reform (especially building on the experience 
in Alto Valdarno) among local governments and water firms. 
7. Chapter summary.
This chapter presented the research question posed in this thesis, namely 
how should generalised arguments about the implementation of regulatory reforms  
of infrastructure be qualified (or otherwise adapted) in order to reflect evidence of  
diverse causal tendencies within a multi-level governance context scenario? This 
question is tackled through a case study of the episode of the implementation stage 
of a policy cycle intended to reform the regulatory system of the water industry in 
Italy  in  the  period 1994-2006.  This  episode  is  selected  because  of  its  features, 
especially a context that includes a system of multi-level governance. In addition, 
the  episode  presents  variation  both  over  time  (i.e.,  a  period  of  relatively  slow 
implementation was followed by one of more rapid execution of the policy reform 
mandate) and across space (i.e., policy reform efforts were more intense and faster 
in  some areas  of  the  country than others).  The explanation  of  the  case  will  be 
precisely concerned with accounting for these features of the episode of regulatory 
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reform implementation.
The rest of the chapter illustrated the sources of data collection, criteria for 
data  coding  and  principles  of  narrative  writing,  and  features  of  the  analytic 
frameworks.  Data  were  collected  from primary,  secondary,  and tertiary  sources. 
Data coding followed a “grounded theory” approach insofar as the coding frame 
was progressively enriched to mirror the variety of data content from informants 
and other data sources.  The process of narrative writing,  however,  followed the 
principle of adhering to the structure of events, with the effect that the resulting 
historical narrative bears little resemblance of the coded data structure based on the 
Nvivo hierarchical tree structure of nodes. Finally, the chapter illustrated how the 
two  analytic  frameworks  –  institutional  rational  choice  and  institutional 
processualism – have  been applied  for  explaining the  path  and outcome of  the 
episode of the water reform implementation in Italy.
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Chapter 3
Historical Background: Water Policy in Italy (1865-1994)
This chapter provides the historical background of the implementation of the 
water reform in Italy in the period between 1994 and 2006. The chapter will begin 
by narrating the evolution of water policy in Italy during the period between 1865 
and 1994 and it  will  focus,  in particular,  on three water reforms made in 1976, 
1989, and 1994. Then, it will describe the design of the 1994 water reform, with 
particular attention paid to illustrate the type of new regulatory tools for the water 
industry  in  the  country.  The content  of  this  chapter,  therefore,  does  not  strictly 
belong to the empirical focus of this thesis, by chronological criteria. How water 
policy  in  Italy  evolved  over  time,  however,  is  important  in  order  to  gain  an 
historical understanding of the context where the 1994 water reform was made. 
Moreover, the reasons for the making of the 1994 water reform – especially, those 
that account for the particular content of the policy design choices made by policy-
makers – are critical for comprehending the causal role played by features of the 
water reform design on the path and outcome of the water reform implementation 
process. 
This chapter is organised into five sections. The first one will narrate the 
evolution of water policy in Italy since the very origins of the country, in 1865, until  
the 1970s. Section two will illustrate the water reform that was passed in 1976, and 
section  three  will  focus  on  the  water  reform passed  in  1989.  Section  four  will 
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provide an account of the making of the 1994 water reform, including the rationales 
that led policy-makers to propose,  consider,  and eventually pass the reform bill. 
Finally, section five will describe the design of the 1994 water reform. 
1. The evolution of water policy in Italy (1865-1994).
During the period from 1865 and 1994, the regulatory regime of the water 
industry  in  Italy – that  is,  the “specific  constellations  of  ideas  and institutions” 
(Vogel, 1998: 20) regarding the structure, behaviour and performance of the water 
industry – went through a remarkable evolution (Goria and Lugaresi, 2002). At the 
beginning of  this  period,  in  1965 the  recently formed Kingdom of  Italy mainly 
focused  on  carrying  out  public  works  for  protecting  land  and  population  from 
water-related dangers (e.g., flooding) and constructing aqueducts for both civil and 
agricultural uses. By the end of this period, in 1994 the regulatory regime of the 
water industry was remarkably different. It included several regulations on various 
water-related  areas,  e.g.,  from  infrastructure  development  to  civil  and  soil 
protection,  from  environment  sustainability  and  preservation  to  pollution,  from 
health and sanitation to recreational uses of water. In that very year, moreover, a 
reform had been just enacted and would radically redesign the economic regulation 
of water services in the country.
During  the  early  decades  after  its  constitution,  the  Kingdom  of  Italy 
promoted the development of infrastructure for extending the provision of water 
supply and sewage services over the whole national territory, for protecting urban 
areas from flooding and other water-related dangers, and for exploiting water for 
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hydro-electric  power generation (Bigatti  et  al.,  1997;  Gilardoni,  1936;  Lugaresi, 
1995). Water regulation centred on Royal Decree 2248/1865, which drew a legal 
distinction between public and private water and provided that the latter (which 
originated from springs, rivers, and lakes) could be freely disposed by either the 
State or private citizens, only subjected to limitations to prevent conflicting uses 
(e.g., allowing free flow of water channels). The use of water was mainly regulated 
through a system of concessions, which were generally awarded by the Ministry of 
Public Works (Castelli Avolio, 1936; Vacchelli, 1940; Vitale, 1921; Vitta, 1930). 
Local  water  services  were  often  provided  by  privately-owned  firms, 
especially in the major cities where resident populations were steadily growing over 
time24. This feature of the water sector changed after the enactment of a reform of 
local governments (Act 103/1903, also known as “Legge Giolitti”), which allowed 
municipalities  to  own  local  public  service  firms.  After  Legge  Giolitti,  several 
privately-owned water firms were acquired by local governments, especially in the 
northern and the central  regions of the country. This so-called “municipalisation 
process”  of  water  services  resulted  in  the  diffusion  of  full  local  government-
ownership, that became the most common form of regulation of water services in 
the country. 
After the turn of the century, the growth of population in urban areas and the 
development of heavy and motor industry led to a sharp increase of demand for 
hydroelectric power generation.  In face of greater pressure for the use of water 
resources, in 1933 the king enacted Royal Decree 1775 (also known as “Unified 
24 As a rough indicator of the growth rate of major Italian cities, during the period between 1891 
and 1901 the population of Rome grew by 54%, the one of Milan 43%, the one of Turin 32%, the 
one of Palermo 27% and the one of Naples 14% (Spadoni, 2005).
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Code on Public Waters”), which provided that any water which was relevant for 
serving the “general public interest” was granted “public utility” legal status. The 
conferment of “public utility” status, which was sanctioned by royal decree (after 
1946, by decree of the President of the  Republic), marked a limitation of private 
claims on water on the one hand, and expanded the competences of the State on the 
regulation of water for the “public interest” on the other one (Caravita, 1990). 
After the constitution of the Republic of Italy in 1946, water policies were 
especially  keyed  to  developing  the  infrastructure  needed  to  support  post-war 
reconstruction and to promote the industrialisation of the whole country. In 1950, 
the  central  government  launched  a  large  public  infrastructure  development 
programme  targeted  to  the  infrastructure-poor  southern  regions  of  the  country, 
which was carried out by the special-purpose central  government-owned agency 
“Cassa  per  opere  straordinarie  di  pubblico  interesse  nel  Mezzogiorno d’Italia” 
(“Fund for special public works in the South of Italy”, also known as “Cassa per il  
Mezzogiorno”).  For  several  decades,  the  agency  played  an  important  role  in 
carrying  out  planning and construction  of  large  water  public  works  (especially, 
dams  and  long-range  aqueducts).  Until  its  termination  in  1992,  Cassa  per  il  
Mezzogiorno  played a fundamental role in  filling most of infrastructure deficit of 
southern regions, and contributed forming a class of engineers and managers with 
significant technical expertise and hydro-geographical knowledge (Gualini, 2004). 
Since the 1970s, Italy's water policies started to address issues related to 
environmental preservation and sustainability, pollution, health and sanitation. Most 
of  these  policies  originated  from  the  transposition  of  environmental  directives 
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issued by the European Community, especially in the area of quality standards for 
drinking and bathing waters and the discharge of particularly dangerous or polluting 
substances,  into the national  legislation.  At  that time,  the European Community 
lacked explicit competences to regulate environmental matters25, but the directives 
were  justified  on  the  basis  that  harmonised  environmental  standards  across  EC 
Member States served the goal of levelling competition in the common market26 
and generally were received favourably by the public within EC member states. The 
rise  of  environmental  concerns  in  the  public  domain encouraged the making of 
further standard-setting directives at the EC level (Knill and Liefferink, 2007) and 
triggered pressure for compliance in the Member States – albeit not so much in 
Italy, where the transposition of EC directives often lagged behind the set deadlines 
(Börzel, 2000, 2001; La Spina and Sciortino, 1993).
2. The 1976 water reform.
Since late 1960s, the public opinion in Italy became increasingly disturbed 
by the mounting evidence that people and the environment were not effectively 
protected from water-related dangers. In 1951, the flooding of river Polesine caused 
273 deads and the evacuation of more than 100,000 people from their houses27. In 
25 Originally, environmental, water, and health and sanitation policies had not been included in the 
domains of the European Community provided in the founding Treaty of Rome in 1957.
26 The issue of environmental directives was justified on the basis of articles 100 (“the Council  
“shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of 
such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market”) and 235 (“if action by the Community 
should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council 
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European  
Parliament, take the appropriate measures“) of the Treaty. 
27 Source, Sistema Informativo sulle Catastrofi Idrogeologiche, National Research Centre.
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1966,  the  flooding  of  the  river  Arno  resulted  34  deads  and  over  5,000  people 
becoming homeless (Lees,  2006),  and put the historical and cultural  heritage of 
Florence at  high risk. These events dramatically showed that the country lacked 
adequate  defence  from  water-related  hazards,  in  particular  in  highly  populated 
urban areas.  Following the  river  Arno flooding,  in  1966 the  Minister  of  Public 
Works and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry established an inter-ministerial 
committee, chaired by MP Professor Giulio De Marchi, which was charged with 
reviewing the state of the water sector in the country and proposing new policy 
measures for better protecting people, private property, and national heritage.
The  De  Marchi  committee,  which  concluded  its  works  in  1970  (the 
committee proceedings were published in 1974), advised that the problems of the 
national water system (in particular, the risks of droughts and flooding) should be 
tackled through a comprehensive approach to water resource planning at the level 
of the watershed river basin (Passino, 2005). The idea of managing water resources 
at the watershed river basin level had gained attention within international academic  
and  professional  water  community  circles  after  it  had  been adopted  by  various 
countries, in particular France, where six river basin agencies had been established 
in  1964. In 1974, the idea that watershed river basin management could be the 
solution to the problems of the water system in Italy was widely discussed at the 4th 
Conference  of  FNAMGAV,  the  main  national  association  of  local  government-
owned water and gas firms. During the conference, speakers from the academic and 
practitioners'  ranks  praised  the  watershed  river  basin  management  approach, 
especially  in  the  relatively  decentralised  “British  variant”  (i.e.,  referred  to  the 
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experience  of  England  and  Wales,  where  ten  independent  authorities  had  been 
established in 1973) rather than in the the more centralised French one.
After  about  six  years  of  parliamentary  works,  in  1976  the  government 
enacted a water reform (Act 319, titled “Norms on the protection of water from 
pollution”),  which  contained  a  new  regulation  for  water  resource  and  service 
management.  The  water  reform  partially  decentralised  the  competences  on 
regulating water resources and service management to the regions, the provinces, 
and local governments. The central government (precisely, a committee formed by 
the Minister of Public Works, the Minister of Health, and the Minister of Maritime 
Trade) would provide the criteria for surveying water resources, set and update the 
standards for wastewater discharges, and issue the general water restoration plan, 
which included all water infrastructure works needed in the sewage and wastewater 
treatment systems in order to contain pollution.  The regional governments were 
required to map water resources, to organise the monitoring system of wastewater 
discharges, and to issue, within three years (in agreement with local governments), 
regional  water  restoration  plans,  which  provided  the  reorganisation  of  water 
technical  and  administrative  offices,  detailed  the  quantitative  and  qualitative 
standards for wastewater discharges, and programmed water infrastructure works28. 
The provinces were required to maintain a registry of wastewater discharges and to 
monitor discharges quality.  Local  government were assigned the task to manage 
(either individually or jointly into consortia) local water service delivery – supply, 
sewage  and  wastewater  treatment  services.  Users  of  water  services  would  be 
28 The information provided by the mapping of water resources and the regional water restoration 
plans would be later used by the national government for drafting the general (country-wide) 
water restoration plan.
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charged two distinct tariff fees29, one for water supply and the other for sewage and 
wastewater treatment services.
The making of the 1976 water reform took place at a time when the EC 
Commission had just started to focus on environmental policy issues. In 1975, the 
EC  Commission  issued  the  so-called  “first  wave”  of  environmental  directives 
(Kallis  and  Nijkamp,  1999),  which  mainly  intended  to  harmonise  national 
environmental  laws in  order  to  remove trade  barriers  and  prevent  distortion  of 
competition in the Common Market, protect public health, protect and preserve the 
environment, and promote measures for dealing with regional and cross-national 
environmental problems. The “first wave” included, in particular, directives COM 
75/440  and  COM 76/464,  which  provided an  overall  regulatory  framework  for 
drinkable water and wastewater discharge. COM 75/440 required member States to 
monitor surface waters and undertake the actions needed to comply with drinkable 
water  quality  standards.  COM 76/464  required  member  States  to  undertake  the 
necessary  actions  to  eliminate  pollution  of  water  from  selected  dangerous 
substances, and set up a regime of wastewater discharge permits. The provisions 
contained in these directives partially contradicted the regulation contained in the 
1976 water reform. For example, COM 76/464 provided that wastewater discharge 
permits would expire after a given deadline, while Act 319/1976 did not set any 
expiry date nor any review of the water discharge permits. Since the very origin of 
EC water policy, therefore, a certain degree of “mismatch” was created between the 
29 A committee formed by the Minister of Public Works, the Minister of Health, the Minister of  
Maritime Trade, and the Minister of Finance issued the formula for calculating the sewage and 
wastewater treatment tariff fees in the Decree of the President of the Republic on 24 th May 1977. 
The actual  tariff,  articulated through users categories,  would be set,  within 180 days,  by the 
regions. 
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EC normative system and the national legislation. 
The implementation of the 1976 water reform delivered modest results, on 
the whole. Deadlines which had been set for complying with quality standards were 
repeatedly postponed by the central government. Delays occurred in drafting the 
regional  water  restoration  plans,  because  of  both  the  emergence  of  both  time-
consuming  technical  matters  and  political  issues  related  to  the  regulation  of 
competing  uses  of  water  resources.  Control  and  sanction  systems  were  not 
effectively enforced, with the effect that water quality standards were often violated 
by  both  local  governments  and private  users  alike.  No evidence  was  collected, 
moreover, about whether the water reform resulted in any improvement of water 
resource  protection  and  preservation,  environmental  pollution,  and  safety  for 
people, property, and national heritage.
3. The 1989 water reform.
During  the  1970-80s,  the  EC  Commission  issued  a  growing  number  of 
environmental directives. Part of these directives regulated water quality standards, 
like COM 80/778 (which set standards for water in the distribution network), COM 
76/160 (on water standards for bathing), and COM 78/659 and COM 79/923 (on 
water standards for supporting fish and shellfish life). Part of them, instead, were 
focused  on  regulating  pollution  control  and  wastewater  discharges,  like  various 
“daughter” directives which followed COM 76/464 (including a list of dangerous 
and polluting  substances  subjected  to  discharge  standards)  and COM 80/68 (on 
discharges to groundwater). 
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In Italy, most of these directives were transposed into the national legislation 
with  considerable  delays.  Between  1976  and  1989,  only  4  directives  were 
transposed (COM 75/440, 79/869, 80/778 and 86/290) out of 17 which had been 
issued (Lanz and Scheuer, 2001). The transposition of many directives (e.g., those 
on water standards for supporting fish and shellfish life) was deferred by appealing 
to presumed vagueness of the text. The pollution control and wastewater discharges 
directives  were transposed only partially  because  the  European Council  did not 
come to an agreement about the detailed list of substances subjected to regulation 
for  several  years  (still  two decades  after  the  COM 76/464,  standards  had been 
agreed on only 18 of about 130 substances originally listed). Despite the modest 
record of transpositions into the national legislation, however, these directives did 
affect the domestic policy debate on water and the environment. Politicians and the 
media started to devote more and more attention to issues like the control of water 
pollution and of wastewater discharges, which had been largely neglected in the 
past.  Public  opinion  came  to  gradually  develop  a  concern  with  water  and 
environmental problems and to favour the making of new public policies in this 
field,  especially  when,  in  1988,  a  massive  eutrophication  process  affected  the 
northern Adriatic sea and experts imputed the phenomenon to the poor wastewater 
treatment systems of the Po Valley.
Within this historical context, in 1989 the government came to enact a water 
reform (Act 183, titled “Norms on the organisational and functional reconfiguration 
of the protection of the soil”) that aimed to provide a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for pollution control and preservation of water resources. Act 183/1989 
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centred on the  concept  that  the  watershed river  basin  was the most  appropriate 
territorial unit for planning and managing water resources. The design of the water 
reform identified 11 watershed river basins of national relevance30, 18 watershed 
river  basins  of  interregional  relevance31,  and  provided  that  the  regions  would 
establish local watershed river basins for minor streams. It also provided that newly 
established River Basin Authorities (Autorità di Bacino) would formulate watershed 
river basin plans which contained the survey of water resources, the identification 
of water problems to tackle, and a plan of interventions on water infrastructure and 
of water resource management. 
The 1989 water reform provided that, at the national level, the Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers would issue the plans of the watershed river basins of 
national relevance (proposed by the Minister of Public Works and approved by the 
Council of Ministers32) and the national programme of interventions33. The Minister 
of Public Works would supervise the design and construction of water infrastructure 
works under the State competence. The Minister of the Environment, which had 
been  recently  instituted  by  Act  349/1986,  would  exercise  powers  on  pollution 
30 The 11 watershed river basins of national relevance were those of the rivers Isonzo, Tagliamento,  
Livenza, Piave, Brenta-Bacchiglione, Adige, Po, Arno, Tevere, Liri-Gaigliano, and Volturno.
31 The 18 watershed river basins of interregional relevance were those of the rivers Lemene, Fissao-
Tartaro-Canal  Bianco,  Reno,  Marecchia,  Conca,  Tronto,  Sangro,  Trigno,  Saccione,  Fortore, 
Ofanto, Bradano, Sinni, Magra, Fiora, Sele, Noce, and Lao. 
32 The Chairman of the Council of Ministers would issue the plans of the watershed river basins of 
national relevance after also hearing the so-called National Committee for the Protection of the 
Soil, which included representatives from various ministries, public agencies, regions, and local 
governments.  The  National  Committee  for  the  Protection  of  the  Soil,  however,  was  later 
abolished by Act 281/1997, and its functions were assigned to the Standing Committee for the 
Relationships between the State and the Regions. 
33 The national programme of interventions was proposed by a committee formed by the Minister 
of Public Works, the Minister of the Environment, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, the 
Minister for Coordination of Civil Protection, the Minister for the Extraordinary Intervention in 
the  Mezzogiorno,  the  Minister  for  Regional  Affairs,  and  the  Minister  for  Cultural  and 
Environmental Heritage. 
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prevention and waste disposal.  At the sub-national  level,  the 1989 water reform 
provided that the regions defined the watershed river basins of regional relevance, 
establish the regional watershed river basin committees, coordinate the surveying of 
water resources and the planning of water resource preservation and use, draft and 
issue  the  regional  watershed  river  basin  plans,  and  plan  and  carry  out  water 
infrastructure works and maintenance programmes in the regional and inter-regional 
basins.  Local governments were assigned a relatively minor role,  as the regions 
defined how they could take part in planning water resource preservation and use. 
Concerning the  management  of  water  services,  Act  183/1989 also  provided the 
possibility that  the  watershed river  basins  plans  could define so-called “optimal 
territorial areas” where local governments would form compulsory consortia for the 
joint management of water supply, sewage, and wastewater treatment services.
The  idea  that  local  governments  should  form  compulsory  consortia  for 
managing the water services had been debated for some time in water policy circles.  
Since the national meeting held in Trieste in 1977, the association of water and gas 
local government-owned firms (which was named FNAMGAV at that time and was 
later  renamed  Federgasacqua)  argued  that  water  firms  could  not  improve 
operational  efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness  because  of  the  relatively  small 
territories of the local governments,  and because  the legislation prohibited local 
government-owned firms to operate outside the municipal territory of the owner. 
The  formation  of  consortia  of  local  governments,  in  conjunction  with  some 
relaxation  of  legislative  constraints,  could  help  bypassing  these  limitations  to 
business growth. The idea of forming compulsory consortia, however, was opposed 
96
by the association of local government-owned firms operating solid waste disposal 
and wastewater treatment, which were concerned with the loss of control over local 
public services if they were pooled together with other municipalities. 
The 1989 water reform was enacted at about the time in which the European 
Union  came to  consolidate  its  “image”  to  the  public  opinion  as  a  “benevolent 
protector” of public health and the environment (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). After 
a  meeting  of  the  Ministers  of  the  Environment  of  EU  member  States  held  in 
Frankfurt in 1988, the EC Commission launched the IV Framework Programme for 
the Environment, which centred around the “prevention at source” principle (which 
led to COM 91/271 directive on urban and industrial wastewater treatment). A few 
years  later,  the  inclusion  of  environmental  policy  and  sustainable  development 
within the action domain of the European Union was definitively sanctioned by the 
Maastricht  Treaty  in  1992.  By  that  time,  EU  Member  States  and  sub-national 
governments  had  come  to  experience  the  role  played  by  EU directives  on  the 
national and local water domains, and had started, on the basis of the”'subsidiarity” 
principle, to call for a more decentralised approach to the implementation of the EU 
directives34.
34 On  the  reaction  of  sub-national  governments  to  the  implementation  of  EU  environmental 
directives, Kallis and Nijkamp (1999) commented: “Deregulation has been used together with 
subsidiarity as a response to the increasing costs of the water directives to generate a call for  
“repatriation” and “relaxation” of water standards. ... Subsidiarity was “designed” as a term in 
order to reconcile the debate between “federalists” and “anti-federalists” over the future of the 
Union, and was formally expressed in Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty. The central idea in the 
concept of subsidiarity is that action should be taken at an EU level when policy objectives can 
be best achieved at this level. In essence, this definition leaves its practical interpretation open to 
political  agreement and  definition  on  a  case  by case  basis  and therefore  the  way it  will  be 
perceived and implemented in the future, depends much on the wider dynamics of the European 
unification processes”. 
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4. The making of the 1994 water reform.
During  the  1980s,  water  firms  came  under  mounting  financial  pressure 
because of faltering revenues, growing demand for infrastructure development, and 
lack of financing sources35. During the 1970, changes of tariff regulation provided 
that water tariffs would be set locally by provincial prices committees (Comitati  
Provinciali Prezzi, CPP) on the basis of the actual costs, in order for the water firms 
to  achieve  financial  self-sufficiency.  Water  tariffs,  however,  were  set  relatively 
cheap  because  of  central  government's  policies  that  aimed  to  contain  inflation. 
Water firms, therefore, were not able to increase their revenues and kept asking the 
central government to subsidise their net cash outflow36. Water firms also needed to 
carry  out  investments  in  water  infrastructure  in  order  to  comply  with  rising 
environmental  and  quality  standards  set  by  EC  directives.  Access  to  financing 
sources,  however,  was hampered by the heavily  leveraged financial  structure of 
water firms,  that  had formed especially after  a  change of  legislation in  the late 
1950s that had allowed them to finance their net cash outflows through loans.
Among water firms, those owned by local governments as semi-independent 
organisations  (i.e.,  so-called  “municipalizzate”37)  became  particularly  active  in 
advocating the need for a reform of the economic regulation of the water sector. At 
the 1989 national conference of Federgasacqua that took place in Bologna on 20th-
35 The overall deficit of local government-owned water firms, in particular, raised from Lire 3.5 
billion in 1960 (about 2011 € 43 million) to Lire 800 billion in 1975 (about 2011 € 3.9 billion), to 
Lire 1,800 billion in 1980 (about 2011 € 4.1 billion) (Spadoni, 2005).
36 In the 1970s, public sector water firms followed cash accounting (rather than accrual or modified  
accrual  accounting)  rules.  Therefore,  subsidies  were  based  on  net  cash  outflows  rather  than 
losses.
37 The  term  “municipalizzate”  generally  referred  to  organisations  owned  and  controlled  by 
municipalities  and operating local  public  services,  including local  water  supply,  sewage,  and 
wastewater treatment, as well as gas supply, local public transports, waste disposal, local schools, 
pharmacies, and other kinds of services.
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22nd November, water policy professionals and delegates of the water firms widely 
discussed the economic problems of the water sector and the possible solutions. The 
conference participants came to agree that the water industry's performance was 
negatively affected by high fragmentation of the sector, lack of unitary management 
of water services, and inadequacy of the water tariff to cover full costs and return to 
investments. They claimed the need for a drastic reform of the whole water industry 
based  on  the  principles  of  integrated  watershed  management,  involvement  of 
private  operators  and  investors  in  the  water  industry,  cost-effectiveness,  and 
adequate water tariffs, if water firms were to improve their performance38.
Evidence  of  relatively  poor  performance  of  the  water  industry  had been 
recently provided by the national statistics office (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 
ISTAT).  Through a  survey conducted  in  1987,  ISTAT showed that  most  of  the 
country’s population suffered from relatively poor water services, supply shortages, 
leakage, unreliable service, and pollution (ISTAT, 1991). For example, the survey 
showed that more than 45% of the population experienced interruptions in water 
supply and was not served by sewage networks and treatment of water discharges. 
The share of population affected by poor water services was particularly high in the 
southern  regions  of  the  country,  where  unreliable  service  and  lack  of  proper 
sanitation affected more than 70% of the residents. The northern and central regions 
were  mainly  affected  by  inadequate  wastewater  treatment  of  water  used  for 
industrial and civil purposes. Investments in water infrastructure, in contrast, were 
38 It may be highlighted that, at  that time, gas firms of Federgasacqua were reputed to achieve 
better performance than water ones in terms of financial self-sufficiency and customer service. In 
the 1989 Federgasacqua conference, this performance gap was occasionally raised as a point to 
argue that water firms should aspire to the same level of performance that gas firms had been  
able to achieve.
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steadily declining during the 1980's and early 1990's (Figure 3.1; Ermano, 2012).
Figure 3.1.  Total  investments in water  infrastructure,  1954-1997,  constant  prices  2010 € million 
(source: ISTAT data elaborated in Ermano, 2012).
The ISTAT report also showed that the structure of the water industry was 
highly fragmented and differentiated across the country. The reported counted 5,500 
firms39 which managed the drinkable water supply, 7,000 which managed sewage 
services,  and  11,000  which  provided  water  treatment.  In  the  segment  of  water 
supply,  water  was directly  provided by local  governments  (that  delivered  about 
34.5% of water to households and businesses), local government-owned water firms 
(24%), consortia of local governments (18.5%) and other public bodies (17.7%) 
owned by either the regional or the central governments. Privately owned business 
companies played a relatively marginal role (about 4.5%) (Table 3.1). Based in the 
39 Firms  included  departments  of  the  local  governments  (directly  managing  water  services), 
consortia  of  local  governments,  local  government-owned  water  firms,  regional  government-
owned  water  firms,  central  government-owned  water  firms,  and  privately  owned  business 
companies. 
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southern regions of the country, the regional and central government-owned water 
firms were among the biggest players: the Ente Autonomo Acquedotto Pugliese, for 
example, served a user basin of about 4.6 million people through a network almost 
20,000 km long (the biggest aqueduct network in Europe). Some local government-
owned water firms based in  the largest  cities,  such as Rome, Milan,  Turin,  and 
Genoa were also relatively large players. 
Operators % number 
of operators
% water 
volume supply
% turnover
Local government branches 81.90% 34.50% 43.90%
Municipal companies 1.40% 24.00% 25.30%
Local government consortia 12.40% 18.50% 18.10%
Other public bodies 2.20% 17.70% 7.70%
Private business companies 2.10% 4.50% 4.90%
Table 3.1. Percentage of operators and percentage of water volume served, per type of water firm 
(Sources: ISTAT, 1991; Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources (1997, 1998). Report 
to Parliament on the state of water services. Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Rome).
The call for reforming the water industry took the form of a proper proposal 
to  the  Parliament.  In  1992,  the  Christian  Democrat  MP Giancarlo  Galli  filed  a 
reform  bill  which  aimed  at  changing  the  economic  regulation  of  the  water 
industry40. The task to draft  the bill was assigned to the VIII Standing Committee 
(Environment, Territory, and Public Works) of the House41, which (during the XI 
40 Galli submitted reform bill no. 512 together with the MPs Cerrutti,  Botta,  Filippini, Sartoris,  
Manfredi, Faraguti, Matarrese, uonsignore, Morgando, Mazzucconi, Azzolini, and Gualco.
41 The process of making laws in the Republic of Italy begins with proposals of bills to either the  
House or the Senate. Bills can be proposed by either voting citizens (at least 50,000), or the 
government, or members of the parliament, or the National Committee of Economics and Labour 
(Consiglio  Nazionale dell'Economia e del  Lavoro),  or  the regional councils.  The bill  is  then 
assigned to one of the standing committees of the House or the Senate, according to the subject. 
The committee discusses and drafts the bill, which is later discussed and eventually approved by  
the House or the Senate (depending on which branch of the parliament the bill was originally 
proposed to). After the approval, the bill is transmitted to the other branch of the parliament for  
approval or further discussion. If any amendment is made by this other branch of the parliament,  
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legislature of the Republic of Italy in the period 23.04.1992-14.04.1994) included 
MPs from the  parties  Movimento  Sociale  Italiano(MSI)-Destra  Nazionale,  Lega 
Nord,  Partito  Repubblicano,  Democrazia  Cristiana,  Partito  Socialista  Italiano, 
Partito Democratico della Sinistra, Verdi, and Rifondazione Comunista.  Also sub-
secretaries  of  Public  Works,  Agriculture  and Forestry,  and Finance  occasionally 
participated to the drafting process. Reviews of the bill were also conducted by the I 
(Constitutional affairs),  II  (Justice),  V (Balance),  VI (Finance),  VII (Culture),  X 
(Productive  Activities),  XI  (Work),  XII  (Social  Affairs),  and  XIII  (Agriculture) 
Parliament Committees. 
Because of the variegated composition of the VIII Standing Committee, the 
drafting of the bill was affected by quite diverse positions on water policy held by 
the MPs and the sub-secretaries. Nevertheless, the members of the VIII Standing 
Committee broadly shared a consensual view on the principles that the water reform 
should follow. Since the very first “drawing up” meeting of the committee, on 30th 
July 1993, Giancarlo Galli highlighted some of them: 
This  [bill]  is  an  attempt  to  dramatically  overcome  the  fragmentation  of 
current management systems in order to reorganise the water service at a 
scale  adequate  to  the  current  needs,  in  the  optimal  areas,  also  trying  to 
disentangle  the  management  system  from  competences  based  on  the 
administrative  jurisdictions.  [...]  Another  important  point  concerns  the 
then the bill  is  transmitted back to the first branch of the parliament for further  approval or 
discussion. The process terminates when both branches of the parliament approve the same text. 
Then, the bill is signed by the President of the Republic and issued in the Official Bulletin of the  
Republic of Italy (Gazzetta Ufficiale).
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public status of water. This is an essential element of the bill which allows 
the State to plan the whole resource cycle, although water is available for 
any use of the private business. [...] With this text we also aimed to provide 
an overall restructuring of tariffs [...]42. 
During the course of the discussion, the MP Rosa Filippini (Socialist Party) 
remarked that “apart from the general principles highlighted [by Galli], there is also 
the  one  of  the  financial  self-sufficiency of  the  water  management  cycle,  which 
needs to be based on the water tariffs, which should not be used to cover public 
finance deficit.  The overall objective, in fact, is the one to provide a direct link 
between the level of the tariff and the quality of the service, in such a way as to  
overcome an  outdated  idea  of  intermediation  of  the  State  in  collecting  and  re-
distributing  financial  resources”43.  The  MP Valerio  Calzolaio  (Left  Democrats 
Party) agreed that:
[The bill] incorporates the fundamental principles of the reform: conceiving 
water as a good to protect; adopting an efficient policy of scarce resource 
management;  linking  the  level  of  the  tariff  and  the  cost  of  service 
management; charging higher tariffs for non-essential uses; protecting water 
resources  and  granting  priority  to  drinking  uses;  planning  of  optimal 
territorial  areas and setting tariffs  in  relation to  the actual  quality  of the 
service provided44. 
42 House of Parliament – VIII Standing Committee minutes, 1993: 235.
43 House of Parliament – VIII Standing Committee minutes, 1993: 236.
44 House of Parliament – VIII Standing Committee minutes, 1993: 237.
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Also the MP Edo Ronchi  (The Greens) pointed out  that “The bill  under 
discussion is to be improved and completed, but the basic underlying concepts and 
institutions  should  not  be  changed”45.  After  some  months  of  works,  the  water 
reform was eventually approved46 by the House on 6th December 1993 and, with 
minor amendments, by the Senate on 16th December 199347. After the President of 
the Republic Oscar Luigi Scalfaro signed the bill on 5th January 1994, Act 36/1994 
(“Norms on the subject of water resources”) was enacted on 19th January 1994. 
5. The design of the 1994 water reform.
The design of the water reform built  on four key principles.  First,  water 
services  should  be  comprehensively  organised  and  managed  in  relatively  large 
territories (so-called  Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali, that is, Optimal Territorial Areas 
or OTA) in order to reduce the fragmentation of the industry and allow water firms 
to achieve economies of scale. Second, all the segments of water services should be 
45 House of Parliament – VIII Standing Committee minutes, 1993: 237.
46 The VIII Standing Committee was assigned the role of both drafting the water reform bill and  
discussing,  with  detailed attention on each  article,  the  text  which  was later  proposed to  the 
parliament  for  approval.  This  procedure  (so-called  'commissione  in  sede  redigente',  that  is, 
“drawing up committee”) was provided by article 72 of the Constitution of Italy. This provision 
allowed the standing committee to deal with “technicalities” (e.g., combining the texts of two or 
more similar bills which have been proposed on the same subject) while the parliament only 
voted  on  the  whole  text,  therefore  streamlining  the  law-making  process.  The  VIII  Standing 
Committee, therefore, could work to combine the bill presented by Giancarlo Galli (No. 512) 
with another one that had been presented on the same subject, shortly afterwards, by the MP 
Ferrarini (No. 1397). 
47 Following the amendments done by the Senate, the definitive version of the reform bill was 
eventually  approved  by  the  VIII  Standing  Committee  on  21st December  1993.  Also  this 
procedure (so-called “commissione in sede legislativa”, that is, “law-making committee”) was 
provided  by  article  72  of  the  Constitution  of  Italy.  This  provision  allowed,  in  special 
circumstances,  for  the standing committee to  vote  on the approval  of  a  law in place of  the  
parliament. In the final vote of the Committee, 23 voted in favour of the bill, 1 voted against it  
(the MP of Rifondazione Comunista) and 3 abstained (the MPs of Partito Repubblicano and the 
one of MSI-Destra Nazionale). 
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managed “under one roof”, i.e., by a solitary water firm that could better coordinate 
the stages of the water management cycle than multiple ones. Third, planning and 
control functions should be separated from those of operational management and 
service delivery (the former being assigned to  local  regulatory agencies,  named 
Autorità di Ambito, or OTA authorities, and the latter to the water firms) in order to 
improve  the  entrepreneurial  management  of  water  firms.  Finally,  water  tariffs 
should cover the full cost of water services (i.e., including investment depreciation 
and return on capital invested) in order to allow water firms to achieve financial 
self-sufficiency  (Massarutto  and  Fontana,  1994;  Fazioli  and  Massarutto,  1998; 
Malaman and Cima, 1998). 
These  principles  were  broadly  reflected  in  the  detailed  institutional 
arrangement  contained in  Act  36/1994.  The regions were required to  define the 
OTAs (either within their own territories or across regional borders), where water 
services would be comprehensively managed. Local governments located in each 
OTA  would  establish  local  regulatory  agencies  (OTA  authorities).  The  OTA 
authorities would plan local water infrastructure development and set the tariff that 
water firms should charge. The OTA authorities would also award water franchises 
to water firms. As a general rule, one water firm only would manage water services 
in  each  OTA,  although  Act  36/1994  also  contained  some  exemptions  for 
safeguarding  the  position  of  incumbent  water  firms  which  satisfied  criteria  of 
efficiency,  cost-effectiveness,  and  economy48.  After  the  award  of  the  water 
48 In the early nineties, ideas about public management reform broadly inspired by the “New Public 
Management” doctrine had started to affect public management policy-making as well as other 
public sector reforms in Italy. These ideas contained, in particular, the normative argument that  
public services should be managed in accordance with the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, 
and economy (i.e., financial self-sufficiency) – also commonly known as the “three Es” in the 
national public management policy discourse (Borgonovi, 1996).
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franchises,  the OTA authorities would regulate the water firms by enforcing the 
tariff  regulation  and  monitoring  the  implementation  of  water  infrastructure 
development plans. 
The  details  of  this  regulatory  design  also  partially  reflected  political 
compromises and institutional constraints that had affected the making of the 1994 
water reform. During the drafting of the bill at the VIII Standing Committee of the 
House, four main issues attracted MPs' attention. The first issue was how the OTAs 
should  be  designed.  In  principle,  the  VIII  Standing  Committee  agreed  that  the 
OTAs should  include  relatively  large  territories  of  about  500,000 water  users49, 
which was believed by water policy experts to be the minimum size for achieving 
economies of scale. The VIII Standing Committee also agreed that the OTAs should 
be designed according to the hydro-geographical features of watershed river basins, 
rather than on administrative jurisdictions50. However, the VIII Standing Committee 
could not single-handedly define the boundaries of the OTA territories on the basis 
of  these  principles,  because  it  would  violate  local  governments'  autonomy 
(sanctioned by the Constitution) on the organisation of local public services. The 
VIII Standing Committee, then, agreed to require local governments to define the 
OTA authorities through a consultative process.
The second issue  was how local  governments  should establish  the  OTA 
authorities. Members of the VIII Standing Committee generally shared the view 
that local governments should cooperate in order to centralise their water planning 
49 Therefore, about one hundred OTAs would be established in the country,  which at that  time 
counted about 56.7 million inhabitants (ISTAT population survey, 1991).
50 This principle, which was commonly accepted in water policy circles, had been already followed 
in the design of Act 183/1989, which had provided the territorial boundaries of 11 national basins 
and 18 inter-regional basins. 
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and regulatory functions into the OTA authorities. Early drafts of the reform bill 
provided that local governments were mandated to establish compulsory consortia 
for  pooling  their  water  planning  and  regulatory  functions  together.  During  the 
review  of  the  reform  bill,  however,  the  I  (Constitutional  Affairs)  Standing 
Committee  pointed  out  that  requiring  local  governments  to  establish mandatory 
consortia for jointly regulating water services was not constitutionally legitimate. 
The VIII Standing Committee,  therefore,  agreed that the regions would select  a 
local government in each OTA charged with the task of leading the negotiations for 
centralising the water planning and regulatory functions51. 
The third issue concerned the choice of the criteria for the selection of the 
water firms that would be awarded the water franchises. In principle, the members 
of  the  VIII  Standing  Committee  broadly  agreed  that  water  services  should  be 
managed with an “entrepreneurial spirit”. Anecdotal evidence, instead, suggested 
them that public officers in local governments often administered water firms with 
the aim of gaining the electoral support of a local “clientele” made of job-seekers 
and  small-medium  construction  firms  rather  than  pursuing  good  service 
performance. Local governments, however, could not be authoritatively excluded 
from managing local water services. As pointed out by the I (Constitutional Affairs) 
51 The final decision of the Committee resulted from the anticipation that the local governments 
would oppose any reform which would threaten their autonomy. Some years later, the Chairman 
of the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources, Gilberto Muraro, commented on  
the design choice made by the VIII Standing Committee in these terms: “At the roots of the  
reform there is clearly a political compromise, that can be described in this way: the national  
legislator considered that, without any amendment to the Constitution, it would be necessary to 
respect the municipal authority on this field [of local water management], and that, in any case,  
the reform could not be carried out without the [collaboration of the] municipalities. [...] In order 
for the reform to be approved [by the Parliament], therefore, local governments were accepted as 
main players  in the new organisation [of the water  regulatory system],  by requiring them to 
cooperate and establish together the OTA authorities to which water service planning would be 
assigned, choose the firms which would manage the water services, and monitor the conduct [of  
the water firms]” (Muraro, 2003).
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Standing Committee during the reviews of the reform bill, local water services had 
to  be  managed  according  to  any  of  the  forms  provided,  at  that  time,  by  Act 
142/1990,  that  offered  local  governments  the  options  to  provide  local  public 
services  (including  water)  by  either  tendering  out  the  franchise  to  business 
companies, or by awarding it to mixed public-private ownership firms52 or to local 
government-owned  special  statute  organisations  or  (in  special  cases)  to  local 
government  departments.  The  VII  Standing  Committee  agreed  that  local 
governments could not be compelled to withdraw from directly managing water 
service provision, but they limited the range of option choices for awarding the 
water franchises to two only: either to business companies selected through tender 
offer competition, or to mixed public-private ownership firms53. Pressed by local 
governments'  lobby,  the  VIII  Standing  Committee  agreed  to  exempt  from 
privatising  water  service provision  those incumbent  water  firms which matched 
criteria of effectiveness, financial self-sufficiency, and economy54. 
52 Originally, Act 142/1990 provided that local governments should retain majority ownership of 
the firms. In 1992, Act 498 removed this constraint, hence local government could also give up 
the majority of firms' shares.
53 In other words, the VIII Standing Committee blocked the option to award the water franchises to  
local government-owned special statute organisation and local government departments, which 
were  considered  inadequate  to  manage  relatively  large-scale  water  firms.  The  options  were 
blocked by framing the attribution of water service provision as a franchise contract, hence local  
governments  could  not  directly  manage  water  service  provision  through  special-statute 
organisations or own departments.
54 The design of Act 36/1994, therefore, allowed local governments to choose whether to retain 
ownership  and  direct  management  of  local  water  services  or  to  centralise  the  planning  and 
regulatory functions in the OTA authorities while decentralising the operational management to 
business companies. This design partially contradicted public management policies which had 
been generally followed in the early nineties. Some years later, the Chairman of the Supervising 
Committee on the Use of Water Resources, Gilberto Muraro, commented on the design choice  
made by the VIII Standing Committee in these terms: “A new political culture had emerged since 
1992, when, under financial pressures, the government led by Giuliano Amato aimed to establish 
a clear-cut separation between the regulatory and monitoring activities [on the one hand] and the 
management activities [on the other one] [...] [In the making of Act 36/1994,] in order to reduce 
the opposition [to the reform], and even to gain the broadest support from the political, technical 
and administrative ranks of public sector companies, which are particularly diffused especially in 
the centre  and  north of  the  country,  the  legislator  accepted the  compromise  of  an  “optional 
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The last issue was how water tariff should be set. Most of the members of 
the VIII Standing Committee shared the view that users should be fairly charged for 
the water services in order to cover full costs, including asset depreciation and fair 
return to investment55. Water tariff setting was designed as a “two stage” system, 
according to which (a) at the central level the Minister of Public Works would issue 
(according  to  a  proposal  of  the  Supervising  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Water 
Resources) the criteria for setting water tariffs (the so-called metodo normalizzato  
or  “normalised  method”,  which  was  based  on  an  econometric  model  which 
estimated the water industry average production costs), and (b) at the local level the 
OTA authorities would set the water tariff according to a calculation based on the 
normalised  method,  on  the  tariff  charged  in  the  past  (the  so-called  tariffa  di  
riferimento or “reference tariff”), and on the tariff proposed by the water firm (the 
so-called  tariffa di progetto  or “project tariff”). In order to provide incentives to 
improve performance over  time,  the VIII Standing Committee also decided that 
yearly  water  tariff  increase  would  be  subjected  to  a  cap  based  on  econometric 
estimates  of  average  efficiency  improvements  in  the  industry.  The  price-cap 
privatisation”, thus [it] granted to the public sector the opportunity of retaining involvement in  
the [direct] management [of water services]”. This design of Act 36/1994 was criticised, at the 
time, by the national association of business companies (Confindustria), which complained about 
the possibility granted to the local governments to prevent business companies from entering the 
water industry. In an interview to the business press Il Sole 24 Ore on 10 th  October 1993, the 
Chairman of  Confindustria  Giancarlo Piombino said:   “We need  some clarity about  whether 
water services are open to the market or not. At the moment, we cannot see any clear attitude in 
this direction. Rather, the House introduced some provisions which allow the local governments,  
the provinces, and their consortia to directly award the concession to manage the water services  
to their own water firms without any tender offer competition. The tender offer competition,  
instead, is required in the case of awarding the concession to any third party business company. 
There is  an unfair  impartiality here, which lacks any legal or  economic ground. There is  no 
equality, and we cannot accept that anyone gains a position of privilege”.
55 Within  the  VIII  Standing  Committee,  only  the  Communist  Party  generally  criticised  the 
“commercialisation” of water, according to which – its members claimed – water firms could 
profit from the supply of such a basic resource for human life.
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mechanisms would also take into account a fair return on capital invested, in order 
to elicit water firms to invest in infrastructure development projects.
In terms of allocation of tasks, responsibilities, and powers, the 1994 water 
reform involved entities placed at all levels of the multi-layered governance system 
of  Italy  (Table  3.2  summarises  the  implementation  and  regulatory  activities 
provided by Act 36/1994). The central government was required to establish a semi-
independent  authority  called  the  Supervising  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Water 
Resources and to issue regulations concerning, in particular, water tariff setting (the 
normalised method) and eligibility for the award of the water service franchises 
through  tender  offer  competitions.  The  regions  were  required  to  define  the 
boundaries  of  the  OTAs,  the  legal  terms  of  collaboration  between  local 
governments,  the  procedure  for  awarding  water  franchises,  and  the  template 
franchise  contract  between  the  OTA  authorities  and  the  water  firms.  Local 
governments  were required to  collaborate  to  define the  OTA boundaries  and to 
establish the OTA authorities. Finally, the OTA authorities were required to plan 
water infrastructure development and service management improvement, award the 
water franchises, and monitor the compliance of water firms with the infrastructure 
development and tariff plan.
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References Provisions Public authorities involved Deadlines
Art. 2, par. 2 The Minister of Environment issues a decree which regulates human 
interventions on the natural water cycle.
The Minister of Environment, in concert 
with the Minister of Public Works.
Within six months after  
the law coming into 
force.
Art. 4, par. 1 The Chairman of the Council of Ministers issues decrees which regulate: 
a) general guidelines about the census of water resources, water economy, and 
protection of water from pollution;
b) general methodology about planning the rational use of water resources and 
guidelines for multiple competing uses of water resources;
c) criteria and guidelines about planning the transfer of water for human 
resources between regions (ruled in article 17);
d) methodology and criteria for the revision and update of the general aqueduct 
regulatory plan (regulated by the law 129/1963);
e) guidelines and technical standards for mapping the territories subject to risk 
of drought with the aim of preventing water emergencies;
f) criteria for the management of the integrated water service, made up of the 
public services of water catchment, distribution, sewage, and treatment;
g) minimum service standards which are to be guaranteed in each optimal 
territorial area, and criteria and guidelines for water transfer, catchment and 
storage but for human consumption;
h) financial mechanisms and rules for settlement of water transfers between 
basins;
i) existing systems which allow achieving the objectives of water transfer 
between regions (ruled in article 17).
The Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, following the initiative of the 
Committee of the ministers for the 
national technical services and 
interventions in the protection of the 
soil, having heard the Standing 
Committee for the Relationships 
between the State, the Regions, and the 
Autonomous Provinces of Trento and 
Bolzano.
None.
Art. 5, par. 2 The Minister of Public Works issues a decree which regulates the definition of 
the criteria and methods for measuring the leakage from aqueducts and sewage 
networks.
The Minister of Public Works. .
Art. 6, par. 1 The Minister of Environment issues a technical guideline which regulates:
a) the type of wastewater which can be recycled; the type of wastewater which 
can be reused; quality and consumption standards; technological requisites of 
the treatment process;
b) the ways of using treated water, taking into account hygiene and health;
c) the ways of building, managing and upgrading treatment plants and 
wastewater distribution networks.
The Minister of Environment, having 
heard the Ministers of Health, Public 
Works, and Industry, Commerce and 
Handicraft.
Within one year after 
the law coming into 
force.
Art. 7, par. 1 The Minister of Environment issues a decree which lays out a national plan 
containing the guidelines and requirements for the implementation of the 
91/271/CEE directive.
The Minister of Environment, in concert 
with the Ministers of Health, Public 
Works, and Industry, Commerce and 
Handicraft, after having received the 
Within one year after 
the law coming into 
force
binding opinion of the Standing 
Committee for the Relationships 
between the State, the Regions, and the 
Autonomous Provinces of Trento and 
Bolzano.
Art. 7, par. 2 The Minister of Environment issues a decree which regulates the 
implementation of the 91/271/CEE directive.
The Minister of Environment, in concert 
with the Ministers of Health,  Public 
Works, and Industry, Commerce and 
Handicraft.
Within eighteen months 
after the coming into 
force of the law.
Art. 8, par. 2 The Regions formally establish the optimal territorial areas. The Regions, having heard the 
provinces affected, and the competent 
River Basin Authority.
Within six months after 
the coming into force 
of the law.
Art. 8, par. 5 The Regions approve rules about the control of sewage drainage, pre-treatment 
equipment, and the detection of compliance with the licensed drainage and 
equipment. 
The Regions. None.
Art. 9, par. 3 The Regions regulate the forms and ways of cooperation between the local 
governments among those provided in law 142/1990 and included in the same 
optimal territorial area.
The Regions. Within six months after 
the coming into force 
of the law.
Art. 10, par. 
5
The Minister of Public Works regulates the reorganisation of the water firms 
under State control.
The Minister of Public Works, in 
concert with the Minister of Treasury, 
having heard the Minister of 
Environment and the Regions affected, 
and the competent Parliamentary 
Committees.
Within twelve months 
after the coming into 
force of the law.
Art. 10, par. 
6
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers issues a decree which lays out a plan 
about the transfer of the aqueducts, sewage and water treatment plants managed 
by the consortia of the areas of industrial development  to the firm managing the 
integrated water service.
The Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, following the initiative of the 
Minister of Public Works, in concert 
with the Minister of Environment, 
having heard the Regions, the provinces, 
and the agencies affected.
None.
Art. 11, par. 
1
The Regions approve a template contract for regulating the relationships 
between the local governments setting up the integrated water services. (The 
same contract also included the conditions for the activation of substitutive 
powers against the local governments and the provinces, if they did not set up 
the integrated water service within the set deadline, art. 19, par. 3)
The Regions. None.
Art. 12, par. 
3
The Regions regulate the forms and ways for transferring the personnel which 
worked in the incumbent water firms owned and controlled by the local 
The Regions. None.
governments to the firms managing the integrated water service.
Art. 13, par. 
3
The Minister of Public Works defines the normalised method which determines 
the cost components to be taken into account and the formulation of the 
reference tariff.
The Minister of Public Works, in 
concert with the Minister of 
Environment, following the initiative of 
the Committee of Supervision of the 
Use of Water Resources, having heard 
the River Basin Authorities, and the 
Standing Committees for the 
Relationships between the State, the 
Regions, and the Autonomous Provinces 
of Trento and Bolzano.
None.
Art. 22, par. 
5
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers issues a decree which determines the 
staff and management positions of the technical secretary of the Committee of 
Supervision of the Use of Water Resources and the Observatory of Water 
Resources.
The Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, following the initiative of the 
Minister of Public Works, in concert 
with the Ministers of Treasury and of 
Public Function
None.
Art. 30 The Inter-ministerial Committee of Economic Planning regulates:
a) the production  and transfer of desalinated water by coastal electricity 
generation plants;
b) the use of water stored in dams for electric generation plans in the case of 
water emergencies;
c) the protection and reclaim of quality and quantity of water stored in dams for 
electric generation plants.
The Inter-ministerial Committee of 
Economic Planning, following the 
initiative of the Committee of Ministers 
for the national technical services and 
interventions in the protection of the 
soil, having heard the River Basin 
Authorities.
None.
Art. 32, par. 
3
The government adopts one or more regulations which identify the rules 
contained in other laws and incompatible with those of law 36/1994, and sets 
the deadlines for their abrogation in relation to the stages of implementation of 
the law 36/1994 in the various optimal territorial areas.
The government, following the initiative 
of the Minister of Public Works, in 
concert with the Ministers interested in 
the various subject matters affected by 
the law 36/1994, having heard the 
competent Parliamentary Committees..
None.
Table 3.2. The tasks provided by Act 36/1994.
In essence, the 1994 water reform both provided the centralisation of the planning 
and regulatory functions in the OTA authorities and assigned the management of 
water services to water firms selected by the OTA authorities. Local governments 
were expected to pool together planning and regulation of water services. The OTA 
authorities were expected to award water concessions to one only water firm within 
each OTA, either a business company selected through tender offer competition or a 
mixed public-private ownership firm. The reformed regulatory system, therefore, 
included both policy tools intended to liberalise water service provision (i.e., the 
OTA  authorities  could  choose  water  service  providers  through  tender  offer 
competitions),  re-regulate  the  water  industry  (i.e.,  by moving from a system of 
direct public ownership and control of water firms to one where water firms would 
be subjected to tariff regulation by local regulatory authorities), and privatise water 
firms (i.e.,  private  operators  and investors  could enter  the  water  industry  either 
through water firms selected through tender offer competitions or through mixed 
public-private ownership water firms). 
6. Chapter summary.
This chapter provided the historical background of the implementation of 
the 1994 water reform in Italy. After outlining the evolution of water policy in Italy 
in the period between 1865 and the 1970s, it  described the content of the water 
reforms passed in 1976, 1989, and 1994. The 1976 water reform, which especially 
focused  on  issues  of  water  planning,  environmental  protection,  and  water 
administration, provided some decentralisation of water functions to the regions and  
local governments. The 1989 water reform, which was particularly concerned with 
issues of pollution and environmental protection, introduced some centralisation of 
water functions at the watershed river basin level. The 1994 water reform, lastly, 
mainly intended to improve the financial  performance of the water sector, water 
service performance,  and efficiency of water firms by separating ownership and 
control of water firms from water regulatory functions.
The  design  of  the  1994 water  reform contained  policy  tools  that  would 
stimulate the liberalisation, re-regulation, and privatisation of the water sector in the 
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country. The liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform provided that 
local  governments  would  define  new  water  districts,  called  Optimal  Territorial 
Areas (OTAs), and would establish local regulatory authorities (OTA authorities) 
within  each  of  them.  Local  regulatory  authorities  would  negotiate  water 
infrastructure  development  and  tariff  plans  with  water  firms,  monitor  the 
investment programme, and enforce the tariff regulatory system. The privatisation 
part  of  the  water  reform provided  that  the  OTA authorities would  award  water 
franchises to either business companies selected through tender offer competition or 
to mixed public-private ownership firms. 
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Chapter 4
The Implementation of the Water Reform in Italy (1994-2001)
This chapter narrates the implementation of the 1994 water reform in Italy 
in the period between 1994 and 2001. During these years, early efforts to transpose 
the national water legislation to the regional level accomplished relatively modest 
results.  Setting aside some parts of Tuscany (in the area named Alto Valdarno), 
generally local governments' early reaction towards the water reform was to resist 
collaborating to define the boundaries of the new watershed service areas – the 
Optimal Territorial Areas or OTAs. From 1997 onwards, instead, OTA boundaries 
started to be defined all over the country and the regions started to pass the required 
regional legislation for making the water reform enforceable at the regional level. 
Most of local governments, however, kept proceeding relatively slowly to establish 
the OTA authorities. In 2001 the implementation of the water reform still lagged 
much behind expectations and – to any external observer at that time – it could 
appeared inescapably doomed to failure. 
This chapter is organised into five sections. The first one will provide an 
overview of the 1994 water reform implementation in the period between 1994 and 
2001. The second section will narrate the event of aligning the regional legislation 
to the national water reform in the period 1994-1997. Section three will focus on 
narrating the event related to the implementation of the water reform in the Alto 
Valdarno area in Tuscany in the period 1994-1999. Sections four will go back to 
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narrating the alignment of regional legislations to the national water reform in the 
period 1997-1999. Sections five and six, then, will shift the narration towards the 
events of establishing OTA authorities in the period 1997-2001 and of awarding 
water franchises in the period 1999-2001. The sixth section, finally, will provide an 
assessment  of  the intermediate  results  achieved by the efforts  to  implement  the 
water reform at the end of the period between 1994 and 2001.
1. The implementation of the water reform in Italy (1994-2001): an overview.
After Act 36/1994 came into force, in January 1994 officers working in both 
the central and regional governments begun parallel efforts to set up the new water 
regulatory  system.  At  the  central  government  level,  attention  focused  on  the 
formulation of the rules for the eligibility to manage the integrated water service, 
for the award of water concessions,  and for water tariff  setting.  At the regional 
governments  level,  the  main  task  at  hand  consisted  of  drafting  bills  for 
“transposing”  Act  36/1994  into regional  legislations  and thus  making the  water 
reform enforceable at the regional level. The water reform provided that regional 
legislations should include, in particular, the definition of the territorial boundaries 
of the OTAs and the specification of some parts of the new regulatory system, such 
as, for example, providing the eligibility criteria for applying the exemption regime 
to incumbent water firms. 
At the local government level, instead, the water reform did not stimulate 
much efforts to put the new regulatory system into effect. Local governments were 
generally reluctant to take part to the consultations on the definition of the OTAs, 
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and  rather  regarded  the  water  reform as  threatening  their  established  positions 
within the local water industries. Inertia prevailed for a few years, until in 1997 
changed features of water infrastructure policy – namely, new subsidies provided 
for improving wastewater and sewage networks – awoke sub-national governments 
from their torpor. Slowly but decisively, from 1997 onwards a growing number of 
local governments came to agree on the OTAs, an increased number of regions 
passed  the  required  legislations,  and  a  larger  number  of  water  infrastructure 
development plans were prepared. By 2001, relatively little of the new regulatory 
systems had been put into place,  but actions made by sub-national governments 
suggested that the course of the reform implementation could not be reversed or 
blocked anymore.
While  the  establishment  of  the  new  regulatory  system  was  under  way, 
various incumbent local government-owned water firms embarked in operations of 
massive  restructuring  and  consolidation.  In  Tuscany,  for  example,  several  local 
government-owned water firms reincorporated as business companies and merged 
together into new entities, especially Nuove Acque (established in 1999 and serving 
the area around Arezzo) and Publiacque (established in 2000 and serving the area 
around Florence and Pisa).  In  other  regions,  the  local  government-owned water 
firms of various major cities, such as Rome (served by ACEA), Genoa (served by 
AMGA), and Turin (served by SMAT), increased their size through mergers and 
acquisitions  and  expanded  the  range  of  their  activities  outside  the  municipal 
territories. As a result of these operations, by 2001 several local government-owned 
water firms had positioned themselves as credible candidates for the award of water 
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franchises, once the new regulatory system would be fully put into place. 
The implementation of these parts of the water reform proceeded at different 
pace in various regions of the country. The region Tuscany, in particular, promptly 
transposed the water reform into the regional legislation in 1995 – remarkably faster 
than any other region. Within Tuscany, some local governments, especially located 
in the Alto Valdarno area, came to establish OTA authority relatively quickly, and 
their OTA authority came to approve water infrastructure development and tariff 
plans already since 1998 and to award the water franchise in 1999. During the same 
period, most of the OTAs in the rest of the country had not been defined yet, nor  
had  other  local  governments  established  any  OTA authority.  Setting  the  Alto 
Valdarno  experience  aside,  therefore,  by  2001  the  implementation  of  the  water 
reform had proceeded slowly in most of the country.
2. Aligning regional legislation to the national water reform (1994-1997).
In  January  1994,  the  regional  governments  invited  local  governments  to 
participate to the process of drafting the regional legislation, which was required to 
enforce the water reform at the regional level56. According to Act 36/1994, local 
governments were expected to make proposals on the definition of the territorial 
boundaries of the OTAs. Defining the boundaries of the OTAs would determine 
which local governments were to collaborate with each other to establish the OTA 
authorities  and  pool  together  their  water  management  and  water  regulatory 
56 All the twenty regions of the country were originally required to transpose Act 36/1994 into their 
respective  regional  legislation.  The  autonomous  provinces  of  Trento  and  Bolzano,  however, 
appealed to the Constitutional Court, which on 7th December 1994 ruled that the Alpine region 
Trentino-Alto Adige was not obliged to comply with Act 36/1994 because of the terms of the 
region's special statute.
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functions. The design of the OTAs, therefore, bore important implications for the 
rest of the water reform implementation. Larger OTAs implied that several local 
governments would pool together their water functions into relatively bigger firms. 
Smaller  OTAs,  in  contrast,  meant  that  water  services  would  be  provided  by 
relatively small water firms, which would focus their operations in tiny user basins.
When  called  to  take  part  to  meetings  with  regional  governments,  local 
governments  contended  that  they  were  incapable  to  make  any  decision  on  the 
definition of  the OTAs.  They typically  claimed that,  since  Act  36/1994 did  not 
detail the rules about how the water tariff would be set and what eligibility criteria  
would be applied for exemption of incumbent water firms from the application of 
the water reform, they missed some important pieces of the new regulatory system 
that they would take into account in order to design the OTAs. Such argument, 
however, only papered over the diffused local governments' deep-seated aversion 
towards the core principles of the water reform – especially the overturn of the 
“municipal  model”  of  water  service  provision.  In  a  later  commentary  on  the 
attitudes that local governments held towards the new water regulatory system, the 
Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources noticed that, at the local 
level, there was “a widespread belief that direct management was the best possible 
way to manage [water services], and that spoiling [local governments] of the direct 
management of water services was a sort of offence, the effect of a 'self-conscious 
act  of  violence':  some  local  governments  even  referred  to  it  as  a  'robbery'” 
(Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources, 1998). 
Generally, local governments tended to rely on the “municipal model” of 
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water  service provision  for  reasons that  were  profoundly  rooted in  the  political 
economy of the local water industries. Some insights into the role that water played 
in  local  governments'  politics  was  provided,  in  an  interview  held  during  data 
collection for this thesis, by Francesco Bosco, manager of ACEA (the water firm 
serving the city of Rome), who commented on the behaviour of local governments 
in this way: “The Galli law affected the vicious circle between politicians, water 
firms' managers, and the voters. The mayor loses power if water is managed by 
someone else outside the local government, as water has always been important for 
electoral purposes. We can even quote a movie, 'The Postman' [1994], where a local 
politician gains the votes for his election by promising to bring water supply to the 
town. [Local government-owned] water firms were afraid to lose their role and not 
to be protected, while local politicians perceived that the Galli law could spoil them 
of  their  power”57.  Rather  than  defining  the  OTA  boundaries,  generally  local 
governments  were  concerned  with  obstructing  the  establishment  of  the  new 
regulatory system, and they tried to either delay the implementation process, or to 
exploit the exemption clauses in order to allow their incumbent water firms to keep 
their position in the water industry, or both.
In April 1995, the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources, 
which had been established on 21st December 199458, advised Minister of Public 
Works, Paolo Baratta59,  that at that time no region had passed any legislation to 
57 Interview conducted in September 2001, Rome.
58 The  Supervising  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Water  Resources  was  established  under  the 
government chaired by Silvio Berlusconi, which lasted from 10th May 1994 until 17th January 
1995.  In  1995,  the  government  of  Berlusconi  terminated  because  of  conflicts  within  the 
government coalition parties, in particular between Berlusconi's Forza Italia and the Lega Nord 
(Northern League). 
59 Paolo Baratta was Minister of Public Works in the government chaired by Lamberto Dini, which  
lasted from 17th January 1995 until 17th May 1996. The government terminated because new 
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implement the water reform yet. After the notification, Baratta could exercise the 
substitutive powers of the central government by sending special commissioners to 
the regions that had missed the deadline set by Act 36/1994, which had expired in 
June  1994.  Baratta  chose  not  to  pursue  this  option,  on  the  basis  that  most  of 
regional  governments  were  still  regaining  stability  after  the  corruption  scandals 
which took place in 1992-199360 and taking over their competences could send a 
potentially destabilising signal to the local political environments61. He rather tried 
to  encourage  the  regions  to  pass  the  required  legislation  through  more  indirect 
means,  however.  In  August  1995,  he  led  the  Committee  of  Ministers  for  the 
National Technical Services62 to approve various regulations concerning the criteria 
for the definition of the OTA territories, for the organisation and management of 
water  services,  for  planning  water  infrastructure  development,  for  drafting  the 
general regulatory water plan, and for sharing water resources between conflicting 
uses.  After that, he expected that local governments would have no more excuses 
for not defining the OTA boundaries. As he said in an interview to the press in 
August 1995: “We have quickly recovered the time lost and completed issuing the 
elections had been called on 21st April 1996.
60 The  1992-1993  corruption  scandals  (known  as  “tangentopoli”,  or  “city  of  bribes”)  had 
dramatically  reshaped  the  national  political  environment.  Influential  traditional  parties,  like 
Democrazia Cristiana, Partito Socialista, and Partito Comunista Italiano, dissolved, demerged, 
and changed their most influential leaders and higher ranks. 
61 The political “spirit of the time” can be partially grasped from the words of Paolo Baratta in an  
interview with the business press (Il Sole 24 Ore, 19.07.1995): “We cannot put all of Italy under  
commissioners,  it's  time  to  finish  talking  about  making  use  of  commissioners  and  prefects. 
Governing the territory cannot be solved with extraordinary means, which are only useful to 
overcome temporary obstacles”.
62 Established by law 183/1989, paragraph 4, the Committee of Ministers for the National Technical 
Services included the Chairman of  the Council  of Ministers  (chairman) and the ministers of 
Public Works, of the Environment, and of Agriculture and Forests. Its responsibilities included 
issues  related  to  coordination  of  civil  protection,  extraordinary interventions  in  the  southern 
regions of the country, regional affairs and institutional matters, and cultural and environmental 
heritage.
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required  regulations.  Now it's  the  turn  of  local  governments.  We have  already 
solicited them and we are available for everyone who needs a technical support on 
this  matter.  I  hope  that  it  is  not  necessary,  but  if  it  is,  we  will  activate  the 
substitutive powers which are provided by the law and we will eventually propose 
new rules to facilitate the transition to more effective water service management” 63.
No substantive action was undertaken until a change of government, that 
took place in May 1996. After coming to office, the newly appointed Minister of 
Public Works of the Romano Prodi government64, Antonio Di Pietro, reviewed the 
state  of national  infrastructure development  programmes and realised that  water 
infrastructure works had been carried out with considerable delay with respect to 
the schedule. The southern regions of the country, in particular, risked losing the 
appropriation  of  funds  made  available  by  the  1994-1999  Community  Support 
Framework (CSF), a EC programme for funding infrastructure development, if they 
did not speed up submitting funding applications. On 1st June 1996, then, Di Pietro 
sent a letter to regional governments urging them “to transmit the projects related to 
new or ongoing infrastructure development works within 30 days”. He also invited 
the regional governments to a meeting at the Minister of Public Works on 25th June, 
where  they  would  jointly  review  the  state  of  the  implementation  of  the  water 
reform.
At the 25th June 1996 meeting, Di Pietro recognised that the implementation 
of the water reform had been largely neglected. At that time, regional legislations 
63 La Repubblica, 15.08.1995.
64 Romano Prodi chaired the Italian government from 17th May 1996 until 21st October 1998. The 
government of Prodi terminated because of conflicts within the government coalition parties, in 
particular between Prodi's Ulivo centre-left aggregation and the Communist Party. 
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had  been  passed  in  Tuscany  and  Lazio  only.  Some  of  the  regions  (Basilicata, 
Calabria, Piemonte, and Umbria) were still debating bills in the respective regional 
councils. Others (Abruzzo, Campania, Emilia Romagna and Marche) had not even 
started any debate yet, although the respective regional governments had submitted 
some bill proposals. In other regions (Friuli Venezia Giulia, Molise, Sardinia, Sicily 
and Veneto) a proposal had just been drafted by the relevant technical committees. 
In Lombardy and Puglia, no substantial action had been taken at all65.  Di Pietro 
urged  the  regional  governments  to  move  on  faster  in  passing  the  required 
legislations, otherwise – after a deadline that he set on 31st December 1996 – he 
would exercise the central government's substitutive powers.
As the regional governments objected that they could not progress in the 
implementation of the water reform because no regulation of the new tariff system 
had been issued yet, Di Pietro turned to speed up the accomplishment of this task66. 
On 1st August 1996, he issued the regulation of the new water tariff system (the so-
called  “normalised  method”),  that  included  a  formula  based  on an  econometric 
model  of  the  average  efficiency  of  water  firms  in  the  country  and  some 
discretionary parameters, especially the yearly return on capital invested that water 
firms were allowed to earn67. The normalised method would play a key role within 
65 Some decisions which had been made in the definition of the OTA territories also seemed to  
contradict the very principles of the reform. For example, Di Pietro criticised the size of the OTA 
territories established in Abruzzo, because they were too small with respect to the size which was 
generally believed to allow water firms to achieve economies of scale. 
66 A proposal  of  water  tariff  regulation  had  been  drafted  by  the  Supervising  Committee  and 
transmitted to Baratta on 31st July 1995. Baratta, however, had preferred to postpone the issue of 
the water tariff regulation after the approval of other pieces of regulation to which he granted 
priority (e.g., those on surveying water resources, on water resource planning, on the minimum 
water service standards,  and on the criteria for managing the integrated water service,  which 
were issued under the Dini government on 4th March 1996). 
67 The  Chairman  of  the  Supervising  Committee,  Walter  Mazzitti,  welcomed  the  issue  of  the 
normalised method in an interview to the press Il Sole 24 Ore on 1st August 1996: “with the issue 
of  the  normalised  method for  the  calculation  of  the  reference  tariff  of  the  integrated  water  
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the  water  infrastructure  development  and  water  service  management  plans.  Its 
function was illustrated by Giancarlo Galli, member of the Supervising Committee, 
in an interview to the press Il Sole 24 Ore on 12th August 1996:
We have decided a methodology for calculating operating costs, and also we 
set the criteria for the maximum allowed increase of the water tariff over 
time,  on  the  basis  of  the  reference  tariff  of  the  specific  watershed  river 
basin. The [increase of water tariff] takes into account the production costs, 
but it is also limited by a price cap in order to protect the users, based on the 
British model.  For example,  let's think of a watershed river basin which 
needs to build new treatment plants and new distribution networks; the local 
authority  may decide  to  repay  the  investment  in  20  years,  by  gradually 
increasing the water tariffs, or to increase water tariffs up to the maximum 
cap allowed and repay the investment faster. The price of water is going to 
increase,  but  in  relation  to  the  improvement  of  the  service  and  the 
remuneration of the investment  made. In the Supervising Committee,  we 
decided to set a 7% return on capital invested.
Even after the issue of the new water tariff regulation, the regions did not 
progress much further in passing the required legislations, however. While the 31st 
December  1996  deadline  was  approaching,  Di  Pietro  repeatedly  reminded  the 
regions of the pending threat. In an interview  to the press La Repubblica on 5th 
service,  we  made  the  first  important  step  for  the  creation  of  a  water  market  and  the 
industrialisation of water services in the country”.
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November  1996,  for  example,  he  said:  “The  law  gives  me  the  possibility  to 
intervene and I am willing to use the substitutive powers on those regions – most of 
the regions – which have not established the Optimal Territorial Areas yet, which 
are needed for the management, control and rationalisation of water resources. (...) 
On 1st January 1997, I'll personally take care of those regions which do not comply 
with the task of establishing the Optimal Territorial Areas as required by the law. 
One day only will be enough for me to bring this game to an end”. Di Pietro's 
threat, however, could not materialise because, on 14th November 1996, he resigned 
from his office68. 
In  February  1997,  Di  Pietro's  successor  Paolo  Costa,  who  had  been 
appointed Minister of Public Works on 20th November 1996, asked the Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers to send an intimation to the regions that had missed the 31 st 
December deadline – that is, all the regions except for Tuscany, Lazio, Basilicata 
(that  had established the  OTAs with  Regional  Act  63  issued on 23rd December 
1996), Piemonte and Abruzzo (whose regional laws were, at the time, under the 
scrutiny of the government commissioner) – to comply with the transposition of the 
water reform by the new deadline set on 15th March 1997. The intimation seemed to 
generate  a  sense of urgency for  transposing the  water reform69,  but  only  a  few 
regional  governments  came to  pass  the  required  legislations,  namely  Piemonte, 
Abruzzo, Calabria, Campania, Sardinia, and Umbria.  After the expiry of the 15th 
March  1997  deadline,  Costa  initiated  the  procedure  for  commissioning  the 
68 After quitting his career as magistrate, Di Pietro had been subjected to investigation because of  
allegations of  graft  while  in  office.  Despite  the supposed victim of the extortion denied the 
accusation, political pressure persuaded Di Pietro to give up his position. 
69 The “sense of urgency” generated by Costa's intimation was highlighted in the 1998 Report to  
the Parliament of the Supervising Committee, which contained an account of the apparent surge  
of efforts to draft the required legislations at the regional level.
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defaulting regions. 
3. Implementing the water reform in Alto Valdarno (1994-1999).
Differently from the rest of Italy, in part of Tuscany the implementation of 
the water reform proceeded at relatively fast pace. In one such areas, called Alto 
Valdarno,  local  governments  had  been  negotiating  the  centralisation  of  water 
service provision since 1990 (Lobina, 2005). At that time,  the gas firm Coingas, 
owned by the municipality of Arezzo, had proposed to the mayor of the same city, 
Valdo Vannucci, to let the firm develop into a multi-utility company operating in 
both  the  gas  and water  industries.  Having gained the  support  of  the  centre-left 
parties that backed the city executive, in October 1992 Coingas submitted a plan 
that provided that the firm would be reincorporated as a municipal company and 
would be assigned the water concessions of Arezzo (which directly managed water 
services at that time) and of 24 other neighbouring local governments. The Coingas 
plan was approved, first, by the Arezzo city council in December 1992 and, later, by  
all the other 24 local governments by October 1993. 
Within  this  historical  context,  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the  water 
reform local governments of this part of Tuscany carried out the task of defining the 
OTA boundaries  relatively  fast.  Local  governments  of  Alto  Valdarno  area  had 
already agreed to centralise their water management functions in one water firms 
only,  that  would  service  a  larger  territory  than  those  of  single  municipalities. 
Following the lead of Alto Valdarno, moreover, also local governments of other 
areas of Tuscany had already taken into consideration the merger of their  water 
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service providers. More generally, local governments of Tuscany were prepared to 
define the OTA boundaries, in the sense of having already gone through part of the 
negotiations  needed  to  agree  on  the  territorial  organisation  of  centralised  water 
service provision. Having received the required input from local governments, the 
region Tuscany came to pass the regional legislation already in 1995 (Regional Act 
81/1995).
In 1995, the support for the Coingas plan dissolved after the formation of a 
new centre-left coalition executive in Arezzo, chaired by the mayor Paolo Ricci. 
Following the political orientation of the regional branch of the leftist Democratici 
di Sinistra (DS) of that time, Ricci favoured the formation of mixed public-private 
ownership companies rather than municipal companies for the management of local 
public  services.  The  Coingas  plan  was  overruled  on  the  basis  of  the  lack  of 
transparency that would arise from cross-subsidisation between the gas and water 
activities, and of the modest experience of Coingas in managing water services. In 
February 1996, the city council of Arezzo approved, instead, Ricci's proposal  to 
establish  a  local  government  majority-owned  water  company70,  to  whom  local 
government would assign the management of their local water services. 
Local  governments  seemed  to  prefer  establishing  mixed  public-private 
ownership companies, rather than municipal companies, for a variety of reasons. 
First,  a  mixed  public-private  ownership  company  allowed  a  clearer  separation 
between  the  planning  and  control  functions  (retained  by  local  authorities)  and 
operational  management (carried out by the firm),  as provided by Regional Act 
70 The local government of Arezzo would hold 95% of the water firm, while the remaining 5% 
would be owned by one or more banks. 
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81/1995.  Second,  the  company  laws  regulating  mixed  public-private  ownership 
companies allowed more managerial flexibility than the administrative laws which 
regulated municipal companies. Third, mixed public-private ownership companies 
could allow local governments to benefit from the expertise of the private owners in 
managing water services, especially if they included other water companies. Fourth, 
mixed  public-private  ownership  companies  could  more  easily  access  financial 
resources, which were needed to fund local water infrastructure development, than 
municipal companies. For all these reasons, the organisation of local public services 
through  mixed  public-private  ownership  companies  elicited  the  appreciation  of 
several local governments in Tuscany, and, during next years, in other regions too. 
In the national academic and professional water community circles, it became to be 
addressed as “the Tuscany model”, because of its very first conception and practical 
application in this region of the country (this form of organising water services was 
later adopted in all the 6 OTAs established in Tuscany). 
The  decision  of  the  city  council  of  Arezzo  could  not  be  implemented, 
however, because of violation of the terms of the water legislation. In March 1996, 
the  Regional  Control  Committee (the  regional  branch of  the  Court  of  Auditors, 
charged with the task of verifying the legitimacy of the decisions of the regional 
and local governments) declared that Arezzo's city council was not entitled to award 
any water franchise, because the water reform had assigned this prerogative to the 
OTA  authorities.  Promptly  reacting  to  the  decision  of  the  Regional  Control 
Committee,  Arezzo  and  the  other  local  governments  included in  the  OTA Alto 
Valdarno  established  the  OTA Authority  just  the  day  after  Arezzo  city  council 
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decision was annulled71. After the region Tuscany completed all the details of the 
transposition of the water reform in April 199772, in July 1997 local governments of 
the OTA Alto  Valdarno decided that  the OTA Authority  would award the water 
concession to a mixed public-private ownership company and that a minority share 
of this company would be tendered out to private operators and investors73. 
Within a couple of years, the OTA Alto Valdarno Authority progressed to 
complete  the  implementation  of  the  water  reform  by  awarding  the  first  water 
franchise in the country. After the approval of the water infrastructure development 
and  tariff  plan  in  June  1998,  on 3rd October  1998  local  governments  of  Alto 
Valdarno published a call for tender offer for selecting the private partner for the 
water company that they would form by merging their incumbent water operators. 
The  call,  that  set  relatively  demanding  requirements74,  was  answered  by  three 
applicants  only:  one  bid  was  submitted  by  a  syndicate  led  by  the  French 
multinational  Suez-Lyonnaise  des  Eaux,  another  by  the  French  multinational 
Vivendi, and another by the water company owned by the municipality of Rome, 
71 The OTA Alto Valdarno Authority was established as a consortium of local governments, where  
each municipality participated in proportion to the respective population. The local government 
of Arezzo, for example, accounted for 31.02% of votes and capital contribution.
72 Passed  in  April  1997,  Regional  Act  26/1997  provided  the  procedure  for  surveying  water 
infrastructure, the criteria for the exemption regime, the transfer of personnel from the incumbent 
water firms to the new solitary operator in each OTA, and the template contract for the water  
concessions between the OTA authorities and the water firms. 
73 In April 1997, Coingas tried to regain political support for being assigned the water concession 
by circulating a plan according to which Coingas could jointly manage the water services with 
the local government-owned firm CIGAF, that provided water supply, sewage, and wastewater 
treatment services in eight local governments included in the OTA Alto Valdarno. The plan failed 
to  attract  political  support,  however  local  governments  decided  that  the  OTA Alto  Valdarno 
Authority would collaborate with Coingas in some limited areas, such as customer relationship 
management.
74  The call for tenders required the that the bidders had experience of providing water, sewage and 
wastewater treatment services to at least 400,000 people in the preceding two years, of which at 
least 200,000 had to be served on the basis of the same contract, and to have an annual turnover  
of  at  least  Italian  lire  150 billion  (about  2009 €  93.6  million)  (Lobina,  2005;  Drusiani  and 
Nilberto, 2001). 
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ACEA. On 14th January 1999, the OTA Authority's selection committee ruled that 
the tender offer competition had been won by the syndicate led by Suez-Lyonnaise 
dex Eaux (that held a share of 51%), which included AMGA (35%), a local artisans 
association Iride (10%), and the banks Banca Popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio and 
Monte  dei  Paschi  di  Siena  (2%  each).  After  local  governments  finalised  their 
negotiations for merging their incumbent water operators, on 21st May 1999 they 
made the  OTA Alto  Valdarno Authority  award a  25-year  water  franchise  to  the 
mixed public-private  ownership  firms called Nuove Acque,  owned by the  local 
government (54%) and by the Suez-led consortium (46%). 
The award of the first water concession in the country marked an event of 
important symbolic relevance. The business press praised the implementation of the 
water reform in the OTA Alto Valdarno as the “showcase” of innovative practices 
for water regulation and governance75, arguing that local governments of the OTA 
Alto Valdarno would benefit  from the award of the water  franchise in terms of 
prestige, attractiveness of investors, and high consideration from the regional and 
the  central  government.  The  regional  government  of  Tuscany had  succeeded  in 
showing  that  local  public  services  could  be  awarded  to  mixed  public-private 
ownership companies. Most of all, water policy experts heralded the award of the 
water  franchise  to  Nuove  Acque  as  evidence  that  the  water  reform  could  be 
implemented, eventually. 
4. Aligning regional legislation to the national water reform (1997-1999).
The implementation  of  the  water  reform abruptly  accelerated  from 1997 
75 Il Sole 24 Ore, 21.06.1999 and 02.08.1999.
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onwards, when the central government took the initiative to improve the quality and 
capacity of sewage and wastewater treatment systems in the country. The policy 
initiative led to the enactment of a piece of legislation (Act 344/1997) that allocated 
public funds for a programme intended to improve the sorry state of the sewage and 
wastewater  treatment  infrastructure.  The  programme  was  mainly  intended  to 
comply with the environmental standards set by 91/271/CE directive, that the EC 
Commission  had  issued  in  1991  and  that  the  Italian  government  had  not 
implemented  yet76.  The  legislation  passed  in  1997  provided  that  the  central 
government would assign funds to the regions on the basis of plans prepared on an 
OTA-by-OTA basis. The definition of the OTA boundaries, then, was an essential 
requisite  for  the  appropriation  of  shares  of  the  budget  for  infrastructure 
development.
The 1997 legislation  also  included the  provision  that,  in  the  event  local 
governments  did  not  come  to  an  agreement  on  the  definition  of  the  OTA 
boundaries, these water administrative areas would correspond to the territories of 
the  provinces.  This  provision  was  included  in  the  bill  by  the  Environment  and 
Environmental Goods Committee of the Senate, who might have considered that the 
implementation of the legislation under consideration could be blocked by the same 
constellation of factors that had hampered the implementation of the national water 
reform77. At that time, senators had been informed that local governments were not 
76 The 91/271/CE directive was fully transposed into the national legislation with the legislative  
decree no. 152/1999. This decree also slightly amended law 36/1994, by decentralising some 
tasks on pollution control, water saving, and infrastructure development to the regions.
77 Unfortunately, minutes of the works conducted at the Territory, Environment and Environmental 
Goods Committee of the Senate are extremely sparing. No explicit evidence was found regarding 
the rationales that  led legislators  to insert  the “default”  definition of the OTA boundaries as  
equalling the provincial territories. The narration here is based on reasonable inference supported 
by interviews conducted with Drusiani, chairman of Federgasacqua. 
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collaborating to define the OTA boundaries by the Supervising Committee on the 
Use  of  Water  Resources,  that  had  recently  presented  to  the  Parliament  its  first 
yearly report on the state of water services and the implementation of the water 
reform.  To  prevent  this  same  source  of  prospective  implementation  failure,  the 
Environment  and  Environmental  Goods  Committee  adjusted  the  proposed 
legislation, so that resistance of local governments could be bypassed by imposing 
the territory of the provinces as “default” definition of the OTA boundaries.
After  the  enactment  of  the 1997 legislation,  the issue of  OTA formation 
quickly raised up in local governments' agenda. Local government were generally 
eager to appropriate funds for infrastructure development within their jurisdictions. 
They  were  also  interested,  however,  in  asserting  their  prerogatives  on  the 
organisation of local water services rather than letting the regions sanction the OTA 
boundaries as corresponding to the territories of the provinces. For some time, local 
governments engaged in lengthy and fruitless negotiations concerning the design of 
OTA authorities according to watershed criteria. Eventually, however, they came to 
agreements by generally resorting to criteria related to the mere territorial extension 
of the existing administrative jurisdictions. In twelve regions, the OTA boundaries 
resulted equal (or very proximate) to those of the provinces, while in five other 
regions they were set as corresponding to the whole regional boundaries. Only in 
Tuscany and Campania  (that  had progressed relatively fast  in  the design of  the 
OTAs  in  ways  similar  to  Tuscany)  were  OTAs defined  according  to  watershed 
areas.
Special attention to the issue of the definition of the OTA boundaries was 
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placed in the southern regions of the country, where particular conditions applied. 
In 1998, the central government issued regulations for the appropriation of funds 
provided by the 2000-2006 Community Support Framework, which established a 
link between the funding scheme and the implementation of the water reform. The 
regulation provided that extra  funds would be granted if  the regions passed the 
regional  legislations  for  transposing  the  water  reform,  if  local  governments 
established  the  OTA authorities,  and  if  the  OTA authorities  formulated  water 
infrastructure development and tariff plans. In order to fulfil these requirements, 
local  governments  located  in  the  southern  regions  became especially  concerned 
with speeding up the definition of the OTA boundaries with respect to their central 
and northern counterparts.
Once sub-national governments settled agreements on the definition of the 
OTAs, the number of legislations passed by the regions quickly increased. While 
three  regional  legislations  only  had  been  passed  by  1996,  the  total  number  of 
regional laws that transposed the water reform grew up to nine by the end of 1997, 
13 by the end of 1998, and 18 by the end of 1999. In the north-eastern border region 
Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  only  was  not  the  water  reform  transposed  into  regional 
legislation  until  2005.  Within  the  couple  of  years  1997-1999,  then,  the  regions 
recovered the lost ground with respect to the original water reform implementation 
schedule. 
5. Establishing the OTA authorities (1997-2001).
After the regions passed the required legislations, the issue of establishing 
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the OTA authorities gained attention in local governments' agendas. Establishing 
the  OTA  authorities  entailed  that  local  governments  included  in  each  OTA 
negotiated  the  terms  for  pooling  together  their  water  planning  and  regulatory 
functions.  Local  governments  should  choose  whether  to  establish  the  OTA 
authorities  as  a  reciprocal  contractual  obligation  (“convenzione”)  or  as 
organisations  jointly  owned  by  local  governments  (“consorzi”),  and  what  rules 
would affect the management of the OTA authorities, the mechanisms for financing 
them, the terms for awarding the water concessions, and the regulatory powers that 
the OTA authorities would exercise. 
Local  governments'  attention  towards  the issue  of  establishing  the  OTA 
authorities grew as they became increasingly exposed to information about other 
parts  of  Italy  where  OTA authorities  had  been  already  established.  The  early 
experiences of implementing the regulatory reform in Tuscany, in particular, were a 
common  reference  within  the  ongoing  discourse  of  the  national  academic  and 
professional water community circles. In Alto Valdarno and neighbouring OTAs, 
local governments had progressed relatively fast in the establishment of the OTA 
authorities. Since then, water policy experts, who maintained contacts with each 
other  especially  through the  association  of  municipal  water  and  gas  companies 
Federgasacqua, channelled accounts of Tuscany's  experience as an advantageous 
one  for  local  governments78.  In  Alto  Valdarno,  indeed,  local  government-owned 
firms had merged into a relatively large business company partially owned by the 
78 Water policy experts placed lot of attention to the experiences of establishing OTA authorities in 
Tuscany, as witnessed by the yearly water conference H2Obiettivo 2000 proceedings, several  
business press articles, and a stock of publications issued in the period 1996-1997. Experiences 
such as the establishment of the OTA Alto Valdarno were commonly referred to as “success  
stories” that showed the viability of pooling water service provision within watershed areas.
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multinational corporation Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and local financial investors. 
Far  from  losing  their  influence  on  local  water  industries,  local  governments 
understood that they had rather gained the opportunity to generate job appointments 
and  public  contracts  at  a  much  larger  scale  than  the  municipal  service  areas79, 
setting aside the prospects for a more efficient and effective water service delivery.
The establishment of the OTA authorities proceeded rapidly especially in the  
southern regions  of the country. As already told, in 1998 the central government 
issued regulations  for  the  appropriation  of  funds  for  infrastructure  development 
provided by the 2000-2006 Community Support Framework which provided extra 
funding if local governments established the OTA authorities. Local governments in 
the southern regions,  then,  anticipated that,  by establishing the OTA authorities, 
they could benefit from stimulating further infrastructure development within their 
municipal jurisdictions. Such material incentive made sub-national governments in 
the southern regions favourably inclined towards establishing the OTA authorities, 
although  such  task  was  generally  performed  as  an  act  of  fulfilment  of  an 
administrative requirement rather than as a component part of a deliberate strategy 
to re-regulate water service provision.
All in all, the number of OTA authorities established in the country grew 
steadily  from 1997 onwards.  After  the  establishment  of  the  OTA Alto  Valdarno 
Authority in 1997, the total number of OTA authorities raised to 20 by the end of 
1998, 30 by the end of 1999, to 48 in 2000, and 74 in 2001 – out of 89 OTAs which 
79 In general, consensus about centralising local governments' planning and regulatory functions 
was not easily attained. As in many countries in the world, also in Italy the liberalisation and  
regulation (not to mention, of course, privatisation) of water service provision was (is) a highly 
politically  sensitive  issue.  Ideological  positions  in  favour  of  public  ownership  as  the  only 
regulatory system of water service provision characterised both right-wing and left-wing parties 
(e.g., Lega Nord and Partito Comunista Italiano). 
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had been defined by that time (Figure 4.1). Within a few years' time, then, most of  
local  governments  had  come  to  centralise  their  water  planning  and  regulatory 
functions. While the establishment of the OTA authorities had languished during the 
initial period 1994-1997, after a “turning point” in 1997 the process speeded up and 
resulted in a partial satisfactory outcome by 2001. 
Figure 4.1. Total number of regions which passed regional laws for transposing the national water 
legislation  (grey  bars)  and  total  number  of  OTA authorities  established  (white  bars),  per  year. 
Source: Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources (1996–2000). 
6. Awarding water franchises (1999-2001).
After their establishment, the OTA authorities slowly started to be concerned 
with  their  statutory  duties,  especially  the  award  of  water  franchises.  As  a 
preliminary task, OTA authorities first embarked in the survey of the installed water 
infrastructure.  Since  the  newly  established  OTA  authorities  generally  lacked 
adequate resources, surveys were often carried out by local governments or by the 
regions or, on a few occasions, by the same incumbent water firms. In the southern 
regions  of  the  country,  the  survey of  water  infrastructure  was  accomplished by 
Sogesid, a central government-owned agency which had been established in 1993 
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and charged with the task of managing the water infrastructure formerly developed 
within the “Cassa per il  Mezzogiorno” programme. By 2001, surveys had been 
completed in 54 OTAs – 10 located in the northern regions, 19 in the central ones, 
and 21 in the southern ones. 
Once the surveys of the installed water infrastructure was completed, the 
OTA authorities  moved  on  to  draft  water  infrastructure  development  and  tariff 
plans.  Different OTA authorities confronted with particular issues: generally, the 
OTA authorities  based  in  the  southern  regions  of  the  country  planned  water 
infrastructure development in order to improve water catchment, transportation, and 
sewage networks; those in the central and northern regions, instead, mostly planned 
investments in sewage networks and wastewater treatment plants in order to tackle 
pollution issues related to more intense population density and manufacture. The 
water infrastructure development plans typically provided that the new investments 
would  be  financed  by  bank  loans  to  be  repaid  from  operating  cash  inflows 
originating from gradual increases of the water tariff over time. Tariff setting rules 
(issued  in  accordance  to  the  so-called  “normalised  method”  prepared  by  the 
Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources), however, placed stringent 
constraints on the extent to which water tariffs could be increased, at least in the 
short term.
When drafting  the  water  infrastructure  development  and tariff  plans,  the 
OTA authorities tried to accommodate conflicting pressures from water firms and 
local governments. The former were generally interested in investing in the water 
infrastructure and charge capital depreciation and remuneration in the water tariff, 
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while  the latter  typically aimed to contain water  tariff  increases in order  not  to 
alienate the support of the local communities. Water firms were broadly supported 
by  Federgasacqua,  which  conducted  various  campaigns  aimed  at  changing  the 
public  perception  of  “fair”  water  charges.  Local  governments,  instead,  were 
supported by the central government, that generally aimed to contain inflationary 
pressures by setting relatively low tariffs for public services. Before the issue of the 
“normalised  method”,  the  Inter-Ministerial  Committee  on  Economic  Planning 
(CIPE)80 used to set water tariff increase caps up to a maximum of 2.5% per year. 
Higher water tariff increases could be conceded only if water firms demonstrated 
that they would not be able to cover full cost81 of water service provision at a lower 
tariff level. 
Over time, the OTA authorities slowly reconciled the conflicting pressures 
which originated from water firms and local governments by containing water tariff 
increase  within  presumably  affordable  rates.  By  the  end  of  2000,  12  OTA 
authorities had completed drafting their water infrastructure development and tariffs 
plans. Out of  these OTA authorities, 10 were based in the central regions of the 
country (6 of them in Tuscany and 4 in Lazio), one in the north (OTA “Valle del  
Chiampo”  in  Veneto)  and  one  in  the  south  (OTA  “Sarnese  Vesuviano”  in 
Campania). Seven of these OTA authorities (those of the OTA “Valle del Chiampo” 
and “Sarnese  Vesuviano”,  plus  five  OTAs in  Tuscany) had also approved these 
plans, that provided a gradual increase of water tariff of about 27.1% on average 
80 The CIPE had been charged with competences on water tariff setting by DPR 373 on 20 th April 
1994, which had abolished the Inter-Ministerial Price Committee (CIP). 
81 Differently from the water supply tariffs, the yearly maximum and minimum increase of tariffs 
for  sewage  and  wastewater  treatment  were  set  by  the  regions.  The charges  for  sewage  and 
wastewater treatment service, anyway, had been kept traditionally very low, even with respect to 
the water supply tariff.
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after  5  years,  50.1%  after  10  years,  and  58.9%  after  20  years  (Supervising 
Committee on the Use of Water Resources, 2001).
While water infrastructure development and tariff plans were prepared, local 
governments did not really urged the OTA authorities to move further towards the 
award of water franchises. Apart from Alto Valdarno and a very few other areas82, 
most of the OTA authorities did not undertake any action to open up the local water 
industries  to  private  operators  and investors.  Generally,  local  governments  were 
reluctant to  make the OTA authorities call tender offer competitions for selecting 
business company that would replace the incumbent water providers, because local 
governments would then lose much of their  influence on local  water industries. 
Somehow, local  governments  were more inclined  towards  considering awarding 
water franchises to mixed public-private ownership firms, that was considered as an 
ownership  structure  that  allowed  them  to  both  retain  some  control  of  water 
management and get  private capital  and entrepreneurial  skills  involved in water 
service provision. The awarding of water franchises was kept on hold, then, while 
several local governments devoted themselves to restructure their water firms in 
order  to  be  prepared  to  fit  the  requirements  for  forming  mixed  public-private 
ownership firms. 
The restructuring of local governments' water firms entailed various efforts 
82 Among OTA authorities, the one based in the OTA “Latina” in Lazio regions was especially 
active. In April 2000, local governments of the area (which included 32 municipalities of the 
province of Latina, 2 of the one of Rome, and 4 of the one of Frosinone) called a tender offer 
competition for the minority stake (49%) of Acqualatina, the water firm that they had formed by 
merging their incumbent providers. In July 2001, the minority share of Acqualatina was sold to a 
syndicate formed by the central government-owned water firm Acquedotto Pugliese, the French 
multi-national  company  Vivendi-Générale  des  Eaux,  and  the  water  subsidiary  of  the  main 
national  electricity  company,  Enel  Hydro.  Acqualatina  was  eventually  awarded  the  water 
franchise on 2nd August, 2002.
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to  reincorporate,  merge,  and  diversify  the  range  of  activities  of  their  water 
providers.  Several  local  government-owned  water  firms  were  reincorporated  as 
public limited companies, whose statute granted more freedom of action from local 
government  councils  than  other  organisational  forms  (i.e.,  local  government 
departments  and  municipal  companies).  Many  of  these  firms  (for  example,  the 
Turin-based firms Acqua Metropolitana, operating water supply, and Po Sangone, 
operating sewage and wastewater treatment) merged with each other or acquired 
other providers in order to secure the size and capabilities needed to be able to 
manage the whole water services within the OTAs. A number of these firms (for 
example, ACEA, based in Rome, and AMGA, based in Genoa) also pursued the 
diversification  of  their  activities  into  related  utility  business  areas,  such as  gas, 
electricity, and telecommunications, in order to gain additional revenue sources and 
economies  of  scale  from complementary services.  All  in  all,  these  restructuring 
operations firms gradually reshaped the traits of the water industry, especially by 
reducing the long-dated fragmentation of water service providers.
Three examples may illustrate the kind of changes that are described here. 
In Tuscany, in 1997 the  42 local governments located in the provinces of Prato, 
Pistoia, and Empoli started negotiating the merger of their water firms. These local 
governments intended to create a water company that could be awarded the water 
franchises  in  the  two  most  populated  OTAs in  Tuscany,  the  “Medio  Valdarno” 
(which  included  Florence)  and  “Basso  Valdarno”  (which  included  Pisa).  Their 
strategy was expressed  succinctly  by the  mayor of  Pistoia,  Lido Scarpetti,  who 
argued that “we want to pool together the resources and the managerial capabilities 
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that we accumulated in the past, in order to enter the market in a strong position, 
and be ready for the opportunities arising from the institutional  changes [in  the 
regulation of  the  water  sector].  Nowadays  there is  a  trend towards  overcoming 
particularism83 and achieving economies  of scale  in  order to  optimise costs  and 
services”84. In 1999, the water firms of these local governments merged together 
and were reincorporated into Publiservizi, a holding company that diversified into 
water  (through  the subsidiary  Publiacqua),  energy  (Publienergia),  and  waste 
management (Publiambiente). A few years later, in 2002, Publiacqua was awarded 
the water franchises by both the OTA authorities of “Medio Valdarno” and “Basso 
Valdarno”.
In Liguria,  in 1995 the water  and gas municipal company owned by the 
local  government  of  Genoa,  AMGA,  was  reincorporated  as  a  public  limited 
company, whose shares were floated in the Milan stock exchange in 1996. In 1997, 
AMGA launched  a  hostile  takeover  bid  on  the  business  company  De  Ferrari-
Galliera, which served about 60% of Genoa's water supply system. The offer was 
not accepted because of a syndicate pact between the major shareholders of the 
target  firm,  but  the  search  for  new  business  ventures  intensified,  both  in  the 
domestic and the international markets. For a few years, the expansion of AMGA 
was  constrained  by  the  adverse  decisions  of  regional  administrative  courts.  In 
Liguria, in 1997 the administrative court ruled that the award of water franchise that 
AMGA had received from the small municipality of Ventimiglia was illegitimate 
83 The interview literally referred to particularism as the application of 'logiche di campanile', that 
is, 'bell-tower logics'. This expression refers to the inclination, attributed to local governments, to 
narrowly focus on their own local affairs only, typically in conjunction with a mixed attitude of 
mistrust and competition against neighbouring municipalities. 
84 Il Sole 24 Ore, 24.4.1997.
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because AMGA should not operate outside the territory of Genoa. AMGA appealed 
against  this  decision,  and in  June 2001 the Council  of  State  restored  the  water 
franchise  award  because  it  acknowledged  that  AMGA  operated  as  an 
entrepreneurial entity with relative autonomy from the municipality of Genoa, and 
therefore its operations should not be limited to the territory of the owner. After this 
decision of the Council of State, AMGA (as well as other local government-owned 
firms across the country) intensified their initiatives outside the territories of the 
local government owners.
In  Lazio,  in  1998  the  water,  gas,  and  electricity  company  of  the  local 
government  of  Rome,  ACEA,  was  reincorporated  as  a  public  limited  company, 
whose shares were floated in the Milan stock exchange in 1999. In order to expand 
its  water  business,  in  1999  ACEA acquired  a  minority  stake  in  the  business 
company De Ferrari-Galliera, and later in 2000 it launched a friendly takeover bid 
for both De Ferrari-Galliera and Nicolay, another business company managing part 
of Genoa's  water supply system.  AMGA reacted to  the entry of ACEA into the 
Genoa water market by acquiring the shares of De Ferrari-Galliera and Nicolay held 
by its business partner  Vivendi-Générale des Eaux. In turn,  ACEA increased its 
ownership stake in AMGA by buying shares on the stock exchange85. The friction 
between  ACEA  and  AMGA  was  settled  when  the  management  of  the  two 
companies came to agree on a joint strategy for managing the water supply system 
of Genoa, which would lead to the merger of De Ferrari-Galliera and Nicolay. The 
collaboration  between  the  two  companies,  however,  deteriorated  from  2001 
onwards,  and  while  AMGA regained a  prominent  role  in  the  water  industry  in 
85 Il Sole 24 Ore, 5.4.2000.
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Genoa, ACEA dismissed its stakes in De Ferrari-Galliera and Nicolay and diverted 
its interest towards other areas of the country. 
7. An assessment of the partial water reform implementation outcome (2001).
How  would  an  observer  of  the  national  water  sector  assess  the 
implementation of the water reform in 2001? In an OECD report issued on 25 th 
September  2001,  the  Supervising  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Water  Resources 
provided an answer to this question86.  In the report,  the Committee summarised 
what the implementation efforts had achieved so far in these following lines:
At which stage is the implementation of the law, more than seven years 
after it was issued? Out of the 89 basins into which the national territory has 
been divided by regional  laws, only 48 have an official  governing body 
already constituted. They include 49% of the Italian population and 44% of 
the 8,102 municipalities of Italy. The situation is very uneven throughout 
the country: the percentage of ATOs constituted with respect to those that 
have been planned is 100 in the Centre, 66 in the South and only 30 in the 
North.  In  8  regions  (Valle  d’Aosta,  Lombardia,  Friuli  Venezia  Giulia, 
Liguria, Molise, Puglia, Sicilia, Sardegna), no ATO is fully constituted. The 
average population of the planned ATOs is around 692,000 inhabitants, with 
a maximum of more than 4 million in Puglia, where the ATO coincides with 
the geographical region. As far as the number of associated municipalities is 
concerned, there is an extreme variability range from a maximum of 377 
86 Memorandum for the OECD ERP mission, Rome, 25th September 2001.
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municipalities in the ATO Sardegna, to a minimum of one municipality for 
the  ATO  Milano.  Out  of  89  ATOs  planned,  41  have  not  started  the 
infrastructure survey yet, 23 are carrying it out and 25 have completed it. 
Again, central Italy is the leader, followed at a distance by the south, while 
in the north the process is still at the beginning. At the planning level, 12 
plans  have  already been completed  [...];  6  in  Tuscany,  4  in  Lazio,  1  in 
Veneto and 1 in Campania. Seven of these plans have been approved by the 
respective ATO authorities.
The Committee argued that, on the whole, the implementation of the water 
reform had achieved disappointing results. The Committee highlighted, however, 
that  the  pace  of  the  implementation  efforts  had  relatively  increased  in  the  last 
couple of years. The report concluded:
How to evaluate the implementation process of this reform? We repeat the 
sequence  of  figures:  89  ATOs  planned,  48  constituted,  25  infrastructure 
surveys carried out, 12 plans prepared, 7 plans approved, 2 tenders under 
way  and  2  concessions  granted.  It  looks  as  if  a  perverse  geometric 
progression at a rate of 0.5 has been in action, with the consequence that 
half  of the subjects  were lost  at  every subsequent  step.  Therefore,  given 
where we are now, after seven years from the passing of the law, it seems 
legitimate  to  speak  of  failure  of  the  reform,  especially  since  the  law 
established a time span of 12 months for its full implementation. However, 
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the evaluation changes if we consider the dynamics of the events that have 
taken place in these seven years. Indeed, in the last two years there has been 
a reassuring acceleration of the process.
The  assessment  of  the  implementation  of  the  water  reform,  therefore, 
included both a positive and a negative side. On the negative side, the intermediate 
outcome of the water reform implementation in 2001 was a failure in at least two 
respects.  First,  the  tasks  provided  by  Act  36/1994  (i.e.,  passing  the  regional 
legislations, establishing the  OTA authorities, and awarding the water franchises) 
had  been only  partially  executed.  In  2001,  most  of  the  institutions  of  the  new 
regulatory system had been established (i.e., regional legislations had been passed 
and  several  OTA authorities  had  been  established),  but  no  further  substantive 
change of the regulatory system of the water industry had taken place yet. Secondly,  
the tasks provided by Act 36/1994 had been systematically delivered later than the 
deadlines set by the water reform statute, or, for certain activities (e.g., passing the 
regional legislations), by the Minister of Public Works.
On the positive side,  the intermediate 2001 outcome of the water reform 
implementation  was  a  partial  success  in  at  least  two  respects.  First,  as  the 
Supervising Committee highlighted in the 2000 Report to the Parliament, passing 
the regional legislation after the definition of the OTA boundaries marked a “point 
of no return” within the implementation process. The formation of new regulatory 
institutions (in particular, the establishment of the OTA authorities) started to affect 
decisions bearing important long-term consequences for the organisation of water 
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service provision (e.g., the award of the water franchise in the OTA Alto Valdarno) 
and the design of public policies for the water industry (e.g., the requirement to 
implement  the  water  reform  in  order  to  access  funds  for  water  infrastructure 
development). 
Secondly, the pace of the water reform implementation had clearly increased 
from 1997 onwards. The number of established OTA authorities grew from 20 by 
the end of 1998 to 74 by the end of 2001. In 1998, just a few OTA authorities were 
drafting water infrastructure development and tariffs plans,  while, by the end of 
2001, 18 such plans had been formulated. In 1998, no water franchise had been 
awarded yet, while, by the end of 2001, several OTA authorities were preparing 
themselves to award the water franchises according to the new regulatory system. 
All in all, in 2001 there were encouraging signals that an irreversible process had 
been  put  in  motion  for  changing  the  regulation  and  governance  of  the  water 
industry in the country. Resistance to privatise water service delivery from the side 
of local governments, however, still questioned the extent to which the water policy 
domain would be substantially affected by the implementation of the 1994 reform.
8. Chapter summary.
In  sum,  the  implementation  of  the  water  reform  in  Italy  in  the  period 
between 1994 and 2001 was relatively hesitant first, while later steadily accelerated.  
Passing the regional  legislations which were required to make the water reform 
enforceable at the regional level was especially faltering, at the beginning of this 
period.  After  the  central  government  passed  a  legislation  which  established  a 
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linkage between the implementation of the water reform and access to extra funding 
for infrastructure development in 1997, local governments intensified their efforts 
to  define  the OTA  boundaries  and  cleared  the  way  to  passing  the  regional 
legislations. By 2001, regional legislations had been passed almost close to all the 
regions of the country.
Also establishing the OTA authorities progressed relatively slowly in the 
early years after the water reform was enacted. As for the passing of the regional 
legislation, after the central government tied the implementation of the water reform 
to funding infrastructure development in 1997, local governments intensified their 
efforts to establish the OTA authorities. By the end of 2001, 74 OTA authorities had 
been established in the country – out of 89 OTAs which had been provided by 
regional legislations at that time. Several of the OTA authorities started to carry out 
their statutory duties by drafting water infrastructure development and tariff plans. 
By the end of 2001, 18 such plans had been formulated, while many others were 
being drafted and close to completion at that time. 
Awarding water franchises, instead, progressed relatively slowly. Apart from 
the  OTA Alto  Valdarno,  in  the  rest  of  the  country local  governments  generally 
restrained the OTA authorities from progressing to award the water franchises, and 
they rather focused on preparing their incumbent water firms to become eligible to 
manage  water  service  provision  in  the  OTAs.  Several  local  government-owned 
water firms were reincorporated, merged with other water firms in order to gain the 
size  and  competences  to  fit  the  requirements  for  being  awarded  the  water 
franchises,  and  diversified  into  other  utility  business  areas.  This  process  was 
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particularly evident in the water firms of the main cities in the country, like Rome, 
Florence, Pisa, and Genoa, whose restructuring contributed to deeply reshape the 
traits of the water industry.
The Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources assessed the 
outcome of the implementation of the water reform in 2001 as mostly a failure and 
partially  a  success.  On  the  negative  side,  no  substantive  change  of  regulatory 
regime of the water industry had taken place yet. The intermediate results of the 
water  reform  implementation  had  been  systematically  delivered  later  than  the 
deadlines originally set by the reform statute or central government officers. On the 
positive  side,  however,  the  water  reform  implementation  process  seemed 
irreversible.  The  formation  of  regulatory  institutions  started  affecting  long-term 
decisions about the organisation of water service provision and the design of public 
policies. The pace of the implementation process, moreover, had clearly accelerated 
from 1997 onwards. At that time, however, the opening up the water industry to 
private operators and investors seemed beyond easy reach.
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Chapter 5
The Implementation of the Water Reform in Italy (2001-2006)
This chapter narrates the implementation of the 1994 water reform in Italy 
in the period between 2001 and 2006. During these years, the privatisation part of 
the  water  reform,  which  had  been  largely  neglected  beforehand,  steadily 
accelerated. After 2001, an increasing number of OTA authorities awarded water 
franchises to mixed public-private ownership firms. From 2003 onwards, the total 
number of awards of water franchises continued to grow, although generally the 
OTA authorities assigned water service provision to fully local government-owned 
firms (“in house”) rather than opening up the water industry to private operators 
and investors. By 2005, water franchises had been awarded in 47 OTAs – out of 91 
OTAs which had been defined in the country by that time. 
The chapter is organised into four sections. The first one will provide an 
overview of the 1994 water reform implementation in the period between 2001 and 
2006. Next two sections will focus, in turn, on awarding the water franchises in the 
periods 2001-2003 and 2003-2006. The fourth section of this chapter, finally, will 
provide an assessment of the results achieved in implementing the water reform in 
Italy in 2006. 
1. The implementation of the water reform in Italy (2001-2006): an overview.
Until  2001,  the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform  had  been  fully 
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implemented in the OTA Alto Valdarno only. In late 2001, instead, the privatisation 
of water service provision abruptly accelerated. Several OTA authorities completed 
the  surveys of  the  installed water  infrastructure,  formulated  water  infrastructure 
development and tariff plans, and awarded water franchises to mixed public-private 
ownership firms. These efforts took place especially from December 2001, when 
the  Parliament  passed  a  reform  of  local  public  services  –  a  category  of  local 
governments'  field of action which comprised local water services together with 
others, such as urban waste collection and local gas distribution. The 2001 local 
public services reform provided the general rule that water franchises should be 
awarded  to  business  companies  selected  through  tender  offer  competitions. 
Alternatively, special provisions allowed to bypass this regulation and award the 
water franchise to mixed public-private ownership firms,  if certain requirements 
were met within a deadline. In order to exploit these special provisions, a number of 
OTA authorities  speeded up the  privatisation  process  and came to  assign water 
service provision relatively fast. 
In  2003,  the  central  government  passed  another  reform  of  local  public 
services  which  brought  about  further  stimuli  to  the  privatisation  of  the  water 
reform. The 2003 local public services reform restated the general rule that local 
public services should be assigned to business companies selected through tender 
offer competitions. In the water sector, however, this reform also allowed the OTA 
authorities  to  directly  assign  water  franchises  to  either  mixed  public-private 
ownership firms or to fully local government-owned firms, if they serviced their 
proprietors only and if they were were controlled by local governments as tightly as 
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local  government  departments –  the  so-called “in house”  kind  of  firm.  The “in 
house” provision  clearly offered the opportunity for  local  governments  to make 
their  water  firms  retain  their  positions  in  the  local  water  industries  rather  than 
opening up access to the water sector through tender offer competitions for the 
water franchises. After the 2003 local public services reform, indeed, several OTA 
authorities directly assigned water franchises to “in house” water firms that were 
established through the merger of incumbent local government-owned water firms.
On the whole, the implementation of the water reform led, by the end of 
2006, to the set  up of the new regulatory system in most of the country and to 
considerable consolidation of the water industry. In the report to the Parliament in 
July 2006, the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources highlighted 
that the water reform implementation had resulted in the establishment of 87 OTA 
authorities,  out  of  91 provided in  the  regional  legislations  at  that  time87;  in  the 
approval of 80 water infrastructure development and tariff plans; and in the award 
of  water  concessions  in  47  OTAs88.  The  fragmentation  of  the  sector  had  been 
largely reduced through the formation of relatively large water companies, although 
the Supervising Committee estimated that water service provision was still directly 
managed by at least about 1,480 local governments.
The water regulatory system which had been put into place failed to deliver 
some  expected  benefits,  however.  In  the  2006  report  to  the  Parliament,  the 
Supervising Committee highlighted that water firms had not carried out the planned 
87 Originally, the regional legislations provided 89 OTAs. The number of OTAs later increased to 
91, after the region Friuli Venezia Giulia established 4 OTAs in 2005 and the merger of some 
OTAs in other regions. In 2009, the number of OTAs increased to 92, because Veneto and Friuli  
Venezia  Giulia  established  a  new  OTA named  “Lemene”  which  spanned  between  the  two 
regions.
88 In 2009, the total number of awarded water franchises increased up to 67.
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investments in water infrastructure and that the water industry had failed to attract 
private  operators  and  investors.  The  amount  of  money  spent  in  infrastructure 
development projects in the OTAs was significantly lower (-22.7%) than what had 
been included in the  water infrastructure  development  and tariff  plans.  Funding 
these investments mostly originated from public sources (national budget and EU 
programmes)  rather than from private  capital  ones,  which were not  offered any 
attractive  return  because  of  the  relatively  low  water  tariff  and  persistent 
inefficiencies in the management of water operations. Only six out of all the OTA 
authorities had awarded water franchises to business companies selected through 
tender offer competitions. In all the other OTAs, instead, local governments had 
been able to prevent opening the water industry to competition and to protect the 
position of their water firms in the local water industries.
2. Awarding water franchises (2001-2003).
In May 2001, the Minister of the Environment and the Safeguard of the 
Territory of the Berlusconi government, Altero Matteoli, realised that some OTA 
authorities had directly awarded water franchises to local government-owned firms 
in  apparent  violation of the water reform statute.  In  his  view,  the water reform 
strictly implied the application of EU regulations on tender offer competitions for 
public  sector  contracting89.  Local  governments,  instead,  claimed  that  the  direct 
award of water franchises was legitimate, according to general rules concerning the 
provision  of  local  public  services  contained  in  Act  142/1990,  which  the  water 
89 The  reference  to  EU regulations  on  public  sector  contracting  was  mentioned  in  Article  20, 
paragraph 1, of the Act 36/1994.
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reform explicitly recalled. Determined to impede any further direct award of water 
franchises,  on 17th October 2001 Matteoli  issued a directive where he urged the 
OTA authorities to award the water franchises through tender offer competitions 
and to limit the application of direct awards only to firms which qualified according 
to criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, and financial self-sufficiency90. A warning to 
initiate  an infraction procedure against the government  of Italy,  sent by the EU 
Commission on 8th November 2000 on the basis that some provisions contained in 
Act 142/1990 violated EU directives on public sector contracting and the general 
EU Treaty rules on non-discrimination and transparency, provided Matteoli some 
ground for publicly justify his efforts to steer local governments' actions. 
After a few days, Matteoli filled a gap which had been left still open in the 
new regulatory system. On 22nd November 2001, he issued the regulation of the 
procedure  that  the  OTA authorities  should  follow  for  conducting  tender  offer 
competitions for awarding water franchises (the regulation was required according 
to article 20 of Act 36/1994, but former Ministers of Public Works and Ministers of 
the Environment had never approved earlier  drafts91).  On the same day, he also 
issued another directive where he recommended that the OTA authorities should 
apply the regulation of tender offer competitions for awarding the water franchises. 
In  this  directive,  he  also  reminded  that  the  EU  Commission  had  warned  the 
government of Italy to start an infraction procedure because of mounting evidence 
90 The direct award of water concessions was provided by Act 36/1994 as an exemption regime 
(usually called “safeguard rule”), ruled in article 9, par. 4. 
91 Until that time, the OTA authorities actually lacked a regulation on how to conduct the tender  
offer competitions for the award of water concessions. The regulation should have been issued, 
as  originally  provided  by  Act  36/1994,  by  the  Minister  of  Public  Works,  having  heard  the 
Minister of the Environment. After a reform of the structure of the executive in 1999 (Legislative 
Decree  no.  300),  the  task  of  issuing  the  regulation  had  been  given  to  the  Minister  of  the 
Environment and Safeguard of the Territory.
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of  non  compliance  with  EU  competition  rules  in  the  area  of  public  sector 
contracting. 
Local governments reacted to these directives by questioning the legitimacy 
of  the  Minister of  the  Environment  to  regulate  how water  franchises  should be 
awarded. In an interview to the business press, for instance, Leonardo Dominici, 
Chairman  of  ANCI,  the  national  association  of  local  government,  said:  “the 
directives  [provided  by  the  Minister  of  the  Environment]  are  confusing  and 
contradictory.  The laws currently in force do not compel  to do any tender offer 
competition. We need to distinguish the award of the water franchise to a public 
sector-owned firm from the selection of a business company. In the second case 
only is a tender offer competition required”92. More generally, local governments 
claimed  that  the  OTA  authorities  had  the  right  to  directly  assign  the  water 
concessions to local government-owned water firms, as the tender offer competition 
rule only applied in the case they wished to award of the water franchises to fully 
privately owned business companies.
Shortly  after  Matteoli  issued  these  directives,  in  December  2001  the 
Parliament passed 2002 Budget Law (Act 448/2001), which contained, in article 35, 
a reform of local public services. Until that time, the organisation of local public 
services  had been ruled by Act  142/1990 (later  amended by Legislative Decree 
267/2000), which provided that local governments could assign them to either local 
government  departments,  or  to  municipal  firms,  or  to  mixed  public-private 
ownership  firms,  or  to  business  companies  selected  through  tender  offer 
competitions. The 2001 local public services reform, instead, provided the general 
92 Il Sole 24 Ore, 5.12.2001.
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rule  that  local  public  services  should  be  contracted  out  through  tender  offer 
competitions only. Special  provisions, however, allowed to apply exemption and 
transition regimes, under special conditions, to the water industry. These exemption 
and transition  regimes  had been introduced in the  reform package  by the  most 
conservative  wing  of  the  Berlusconi-led  coalition,  which,  lobbied  by  local 
government-owned water firms, was concerned that incumbent water firms might 
not  win  the  tender  offer  competitions  if  challenged  by  business  companies  – 
especially, water multi-nationals.
The application of the exemption and transition regimes provided by the 
2001 local public services reform required that specific conditions were met. The 
exemption regime consisted of the possibility to postpone tender offer competitions 
for a period from 3 up to 9 years, if water services were managed by relatively 
small firms which operated in local governments with up to 5,000 inhabitants only. 
The  transition  regime  provided  the  possibility  to  postpone  the  tender  offer 
competitions if water firms were restructured into bigger size operators. According 
to this regime, the OTA authorities could directly award water franchises lasting 5 
years within 18 months after the enactment of the reform (i.e., by 30th June 2003) to 
companies entirely owned by the local governments of an OTA, provided that local 
governments select a private operator or investor as a partner in the ownership of 
the water firm within 2 years  after  receiving  the franchise.  The duration of the 
franchise could be increased one year if the local government-owned firms merged 
with other firms to form a new company which would double the user basin. The 
duration could be further increased two more years if the new companies operate in 
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at least one provincial territory, one further year if at least 40% of the companies is 
owned by private investors, and one additional year if 51% of the companies is 
owned by private investors. These extensions could be accumulated – so that the 
direct  award  of  water  franchises  to  local  government-owned  water  firms  could 
extend up to 10 years (Petretto, 2001)93.
As soon as the Parliament passed the 2001 local public  services reform, 
some local governments urged their OTA authorities to speed up the procedure for 
awarding water franchises before Act  448/2001 came into force94.  Within a few 
weeks in December 2001, then, most OTA authorities based in Tuscany rushed to 
award water franchises to  local  government-owned water firms,  whose minority 
shares would be later tendered out to private operators and investors. In this way, 
local governments could preserve the position of their water firms in the local water 
industries while bypassing the tender offer competition rule for awarding the water 
franchises, and they could also avoid complying with the strict requirements set in 
order  to  benefit  from  the  transition  regime  provided  by  the  2001  local  public 
services reform. As a result of this acceleration of the awarding process, by the end 
of 2001 water concessions had been granted in 5 out of 6 OTAs in Tuscany.
After the 2001 local public services reform came into force, several local 
governments sensed the opportunity to protect the incumbent position of their water 
firms in the local water industries by exploiting the exemption and – mostly – the 
93 The  local  government-owned  water  firms  which  benefited  from the  transition  regime  were 
subjected  to  some  limitations  to  their  operations,  however.  For  example,  they  could  not 
participate in tender offer competitions if  they had received direct concessions without tender 
offers (the same rule applied to their subsidiaries or controlling entities). This rule, however, only 
applied at the end of the transition period.
94 Generally, within the Italian juridical systems laws come into force 15 days after their 
publication in the Official Bulletin (Gazzetta Ufficiale).
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transition regimes. In order to accomplish this objective,  local governments first 
required the OTA authorities to speed up the completion of water infrastructure 
development and tariff plans. While only 11 such plans had been formulated by the 
OTA authorities by the end of 2001, the number of approved  water infrastructure 
development and tariff plans increased to 38 by the end of 2002 and to 55 by the 
end of 2003. Local governments also made their water firms restructure in order to 
match  the  requirements  set  to  apply  the  transition  regime.  Several  local 
government-owned  water  firms  were  reincorporated  as  business  companies, 
including  those  based  in  Milan,  Brescia,  Monza,  Parma,  Verona,  Modena,  and 
Bologna. Some of these companies also floated their  shares on the Milan stock 
market, like Brescia's ASM in July 2002 and Bologna's Hera in June 2003. 
After the water infrastructure development and tariff plans were formulated 
and the water firms had been restructured, several OTA authorities proceeded to the 
award of water franchises. While only 6 water concessions had been awarded by the 
end of 2001, their number went up to 9 by the end of 2002 and to 17 by the end of 
2003. All but one of the new water franchises were awarded to local government-
owned water firms. Only in the OTA “Frosinone” in Lazio the local OTA authority 
launched, in May 2001, a tender offer competition for the selection of a business 
company to which the water franchise would be awarded. In April 2002, the OTA 
Frosinone Authority  granted the water  franchise to  a  consortium led by Rome's 
water firm ACEA. 
The direct award of water franchises according to the terms provided by the 
transitory regime was opposed by the Minister of the Environment Matteoli. In an 
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interview to  the business  press,  he  said:  “From Piemonte to  Campania,  passing 
through Tuscany, there are many instances of firms that define themselves as the 
legitimate  operators  in  the  OTAs  in  accordance  with  law  36/1994,  but  their 
franchises have been awarded through procedures that have bypassed the tender 
offer  competitions,  made  possible  by  the  presumption,  contrary  to  the  law and 
counter-productive for the citizens, that public sector-owned companies have the 
right of exemption [from the tender offer competition rule]”95. Despite Matteoli's 
concern,  during  next  months  local  governments  persisted  in  making  the  OTA 
authorities directly award the water franchises to local government-owned firms. 
The  direct  award  of  water  franchises  was  strongly  supported  by  local 
governments,  by  the  the  association  of  local  government-owned  public  service 
firms (Confservizi), and by the association of local government-owned water firms 
(Federgasacqua). These organisations justified the direct award of water franchises 
on the basis of four arguments96. First, they argued that the EU Commission had 
never issued a directive on the liberalisation of water services (while it did so for 
other infrastructure industries), and that the EU directive on liberalisation of service 
contracts  (which  Matteoli  had  invoked)  regulated  competition  between business 
companies rather than public services delivered to the citizens97. Second, the 2001 
95 Il Sole 24 Ore, 21.11.2002.
96 The positions of local governments, Confservizi and Federgasacqua were expressed on several 
occasions,  including,  in  particular,  the  yearly  H2Obiettivo  2000  conferences  on  the  water 
services organised by Federgasacqua. An illustration of the position of these associations was 
also expressed in two articles that Fulvio Vento, Chairman of Confservizi, and Andrea Lolli,  
Chairman of Federgasacqua, published in the business press Il Sole 24 Ore on 21 st November 
2002. 
97 In the article  published in Il  Sole 24 Ore on 21 st November 2002, Fulvio Vento wrote: “We 
should remember that there have not ever been [EU] directives on the liberalisation of the water 
services, contrary to what happened in the fields of telecommunications, electricity, and gas, just  
to mention the main ones. Furthermore, we generate confusion if we claim that we should apply 
the general directives on competition of service contracts, because these communitarian rules 
have  been  issued  to  guarantee  the  competition  within  the  EU  between  business  service 
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reform of local public services ruled out the application of the provisions contained 
in the national water reform that referred to tender offer competitions, which should 
no longer be considered enforceable. Third, the Minister of the Environment and 
the  Safeguard  of  the  Territory  did  not  have  competences  on  regulating  water 
services, because a reform of the Constitution of Italy, which came into force on 8 th 
November 2001, limited the State's competences to a strict list of subjects which 
did not include the water domain98.
Lastly, the direct award of water concessions was justified because domestic 
water firms did not want to be exposed to the threat of competition from foreign 
companies,  while  other  countries  did  not  provide  equal  opportunities  to  expand 
their business. In an article published in the business press Il Sole 24 Ore on 21 st 
November 2002, Andrea Lolli, Chairman of Federgasacqua, wrote: 
If the Parliament decides to open up the [water] market, the water firms will 
not  withdraw  from  competing  [for  the  franchises].  However,  we  [as  a 
country] should not be the “only and unique in Europe” following this route. 
It would be better, as we can learn from foreign experiences, to allow the 
time  needed  to  favour  the  construction  of  national  competitors  through 
mergers  and  public-private  partnerships.  [...]  There  is  the  real  risk  of  a 
companies, and they do not refer to the public services delivered to the citizens, rather to the 
services that might operate in monopoly regime”.
98 In the article  published in Il  Sole 24 Ore on 21 st November 2002, Fulvio Vento wrote: “We 
should remember that  an article  of  the constitution,  numbered  117,  which has  been recently 
modified [by the November 2001 reform], does not explicitly give to the State the competences 
on water  services,  therefore  it  assigns them to the regions.  Then we should deduce  that  the 
Minister  of  the  Environment  and  the  Safeguard  of  the  Territory  is  spoiled  of  any  such 
competence. We should also remind that local governments enjoy an autonomy acknowledged by 
the constitution”.
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colonisation  of  the  national  water  market  –  affected  by  large  size  firms 
based in countries where there is actually no competition. 
Thus, local governments' efforts to preserve the position of incumbent water firms 
was also related to the public discourse concerning the industrial development of 
the domestic water firms with respect to other EU countries. 
3. Awarding the water franchises (2003-2006).
In September 2003, the central government passed another reform of local 
public  services.  The 2003 local  public  services  reform originated,  in  part,  from 
pressures of the most conservative wing of the governmental coalition, which was 
interested to provide local governments with legal ways to bypass the application of 
tender offer competition rules after the expiry of the 30th June 2003 deadline. The 
reform also  originated,  in  part,  from a  request  to  amend the  2001 local  public 
services reform sent by the EU Commission, that, on 26th June 2002, had warned 
the government of Italy to start an infraction procedure against some cases of direct 
award of water franchises that violated EU legislation on public sector contracts (in 
particular, directives 92/50/CEE and 93/38/CEE, and general rules of the EU Treaty 
on  non-discrimination  and  transparency,  that  contradicted  the  transitory  regime 
provided  by  the 2001  local  public  services  reform  in  the  part  that  allowed 
postponing tender offer competitions for several  years).  In relatively short  time, 
then, the central government drafted a revised regulation of  local public services, 
and the new reform was approved by the Council of Ministers with the Legislative 
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Decree no. 26999.
The 2003 reform restated the general rule that local public services should 
be awarded through tender offer competitions. It also provided that all franchises 
that had been awarded without any tender offer competition would automatically 
expire on 31st December 2006. However, the reform also allowed, in accordance 
with EU legislation, that franchises for local public services could be legitimately 
awarded in a direct way either to mixed public-private ownership firms, where the 
private partners were selected through tender offer competitions, or to firms fully 
owned  by  local  governments,  provided  that  these  firms  deliver  most  of  their 
services  to  the  same local  governments  and that  local  governments exercise  on 
these firms a control as tight as the one exerted on their own divisions (the so-called 
“in house” arrangement).
The  automatic  expiry  of  franchises  awarded  without  any  tender  offer 
competition on 31st December 2006 alarmed several local government-owned water 
firms,  which  had  directly  received  the  water  franchises  in  accordance  with  the 
transition regime provided by the 2001 local public services reform. Pending the 
threat to lose their water franchises, local government-owned water firms lobbied 
the central  government to amend the 2003 reform and, in December 2003, their 
efforts succeeded in making the central government introduce an exemption rule to 
the expiry of franchises100. The exemption rule provided that no automatic expiry on 
31st December 2006 would apply to those franchises that had been awarded before 
1st October  2003  to  firms  whose  shares  had  already  been  floated  in  the  stock 
99 Later converted into law by Act 326 on 24th November 2003. 
100 Act 350 issued on 24th December 2003, article 4, paragraph 234.
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exchange.  Furthermore,  the  December  2003  amendment  also  contained  the 
provision  that  the  firms  which  had  been  directly  awarded  local  public  service 
franchises  could  take  part  in  tender  offer  competitions  for  other  local  public 
services, an option that the 2003 reform had banned.
After the 2003 reform and the December 2003 amendments, several OTA 
authorities started to award the water franchises in accordance with the new rules. 
Most  of these franchises were granted to “in house” firms,  which secured local 
governments' influence on the local water industries. The provision concerning “in 
house” firms, whose origins within the juridical system originated from a decision 
of the European Court of Justice taken in 1999101, was introduced in the 2003 local 
public  services  reform as  a  way  of  providing  legitimacy  to  franchises  already 
awarded  to  fully  local  government-owned water  firms102.  From December  2003 
onwards, instead, the OTA authorities started to apply the “in house” provision for 
awarding  new water franchises to fully local government-owned firms. It became 
apparent, then, that the “in house” provision was exploited as a way to bypass the 
tender offer competition rule or the requirement to partially open the ownership of 
the water firms to private operators or investors. 
101 The “in house” arrangement had been ruled legitimate by the European Court of Justice in the 
case C-107/98 Tekal vs. local government of Viano (Italy) on 18 th November 1999. The case 
originated from the appeal of Tekal, a business company, against the direct award of heating 
services for  certain municipal  buildings from the local  government of  Viano to a fully  local 
government-owned business company. The Court ruled in favour of the local government, on the 
basis  that  the  local  government  can  contract  out  the  local  public  service  to  a  third  party, 
juridically distinct from itself, without any tender offer competition and in derogation to sector-
specific rules, if the local government is able to exercise a control on the entity analogous to the  
one on its own departments, and the other entity delivers most of its services to the controlling 
local government.
102 The Italian Council of State, Section V, in the sentence 19/2004, n. 679, explicitly commented 
that the provisions contained in the 2003 reform of the local public services had been written  
with the aim to safeguard the legitimacy of local public service franchises awarded to fully local 
government-owned firms and to those awarded in accordance with the special transition regime 
provided in the 2001 local public service reform.
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The diffusion of “in house” water firms eventually attracted the attention of 
the  Minister  of  the  Environment  Matteoli.  On 6th December  2004,  he  issued  a 
directive which aimed to constrain the applicability of this kind of water franchise. 
The directive ruled that the OTA authorities could apply the “in house”  provision 
only  if  three requirements were met.  First,  the  statute  of  the  local  government-
owned water firms had to explicitly limit the company's objectives to serving the 
proprietors (hence, the directive limited the possibility that local government-owned 
water firms could be awarded concessions in other OTAs). Second, all (and only) 
the local governments included in the OTAs had to own stakes in these water firms.  
Third, the OTA authorities had to provide an explicit rationale for applying the “in 
house” provision in the deliberation of the direct award of the water franchise, and 
they could extend the franchise duration only for a reasonable time needed before 
the launch of tender offer competitions103. On the whole, Matteoli regarded the “in 
house”  provision  as  a  scheme  for  awarding  water  franchises  to  use  “only  in 
exceptional and residual cases”, and on the basis of “a justified and proved reason 
of public interest that objectively prevents any possibility to make use of a tender 
offer competition”104.
103 On 6th December 2004, Matteoli also issued a second directive, that ruled that water franchises  
could be directly awarded to mixed public-private ownership firms only after local governments 
had selected a business partner through tender offer competitions. Generally, the OTA authorities 
had  directly  awarded the  water  franchises  to  local  government-owned firms whose  minority 
share were later tendered out or floated in the stock exchange. This procedure, for example, had 
been followed for  the selection of  the  business  partners  of  water  firms  in  the  OTA “Medio 
Valdarno” and “Basso Valdarno” in Tuscany, and in the OTA of Rome. By issuing this second 
directive,  Matteoli  intended  to  make  water  franchises,  that  had  been  awarded  to  local 
government-owned water firms without any prior tender offer competition, illegitimate.
104 Directive of the Minister of the Environment and the Safeguard of the Territory, 6 th December 
2004.  The  stringent  conditions  when  the  “in  house”  provision  could  be  applied  were  later 
restated by the European Court of Justice in the sentence C-458/03 Parking Brixen vs.  local  
government of Bressanone (Italy) on 13th October 2005. The sentence originated from the appeal 
of Parking Brixen against the direct award of the parking services from the local government of  
Bressanone to a fully local government-owned business company. The Court ruled against the 
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Despite  Matteoli's  directive,  the  OTA  authorities  persisted  in  directly 
awarding  water  concessions  to  “in  house”  firms.  Local  governments  and  OTA 
authorities effectively contented that the 2003 local public services reform did not 
explicitly  limit  the  applicability  of  the  “in  house”  provision  to  any  condition. 
Matteoli's  efforts  to  influence  the award of water franchises were also formally 
counteracted by the region Tuscany on legal grounds. On 21st January 2004, the 
regional government of Tuscany appealed to the Constitutional Court against the 
part  of  the  2003  reform  of  the  local  public  services  that  provided  a  detailed 
regulation of how franchises for local public services should be awarded to business 
companies selected through tender offer competitions. The regional government of 
Tuscany claimed that these provisions violated the Constitution of Italy as modified 
by  the  2001  constitutional  reform,  which  granted  competences  on  local  public 
services to the regions105. After the Constitutional Court accepted most of Tuscany's 
appeal on 27th July 2004 (sentence no. 272), Matteoli's directives lost much of their 
legal relevance.
By  awarding  water  franchises  to  either  mixed  public-private  ownership 
firms or to “in house” firms, local governments maintained much of their influence 
local government, on the basis that, despite the full ownership, the local government-owned firm 
enjoyed considerable autonomy and the control that the local government exerted over it could 
not be assimilated to the one it could employ on its own departments. Thus, failing to launch a  
tender offer competition for the parking services violated the rules of the EC Treaty referring to  
non-discrimination and transparency.
105 The  2001  constitutional  reform originated  from the  works  conducted  in  the  parliamentary 
special-purpose committee “Commissione Bicamerale per le Riforme” (bicameral committee for 
reforms), established in 1997 under the government of Romano Prodi and charged with the task 
of drafting a constitutional reform bill which would redesign the allocation of authority and the 
relationship between layers of the State. The issue of reforming the Constitution of Italy in such a  
way as to reallocate authority between the state and sub-national governments had floated in 
governmental  agendas since early 1980s. Two special-purpose parliamentary committees had 
been established already (in 1983 and 1993) but were not able to deliver any reform bill until that 
time. 
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on the local water industries. To some extent, local governments even showed to 
prefer  to  manage  water  services  through  (fully  or  partially)  local  government-
owned water firms than through their own departments. An illustrative description 
of this view was provided, for example, by the major of Grosseto (a municipality 
located in Tuscany) and chairman on the Local Public Services Committee of ANCI 
(national  association  of  local  governments),  Alessandro  Antichi,  during  a 
conference of Federgasacqua held in Trieste on 24-26 September 2003, where he 
said:  “We know well,  we mayors, that a tight control on third entities,  like the 
companies which provide local public services, is actually more effective than the 
one we have on our own managers, that we find in a local authority because they 
won a public selection, they chair a division which is only respondent to them, and, 
as a matter of fact, for us it is much easier to manage through the companies than 
through the managers [of the local governments]”. The award of water franchises to 
“in house” firms, then, seemed to allow local governments to retain influence over 
the management of local water services in the same way – if not more – than the 
direct management of water services through local government departments. 
During next years, several local governments followed the common pattern 
of making their water firms restructure,  grow in size, and directly receive water 
franchises from the OTA authorities. In the north of the country,  most profound 
changes in the industrial organisation of the water sector took place especially in 
Piemonte, Liguria, and Lombardy. In Piemonte, in October 2004 the water firms of 
Genoa and Turin,  AMGA and SMAT, jointly acquired the majority stake of the 
water firm Acque Potabili from the gas company Italgas, resulting in the creation of 
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the  third  biggest  water  firm in  the  country106.  In  Liguria,  in  July  2005 AMGA 
acquired ACEA's stakes in the water companies De Ferrari-Galliera and Nicolay, 
which later merged together in December 2005. In Lombardy, parallel efforts to 
merge  local  government-owned  water  firms  took  place  between  the  cities  of 
Cremona, Mantova, Lodi, and Pavia (resulting in the incorporation of the multi-
utility Linea Group company),  Brescia and Bergamo (which merged their  water 
companies, ASM and BAS, in May 2005), and Brescia and Milan (whose mayors in 
September 2006 agreed to merge the water companies of the two cities, ASM and 
AEM).  Since  2004,  moreover,  the  regional  government  of  Lombardy  started 
sponsoring a project to merge the water, electricity, and waste management firms of 
most of the region107.
In the central regions, the most apparent efforts to restructure the local water 
industries took place in Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, and Lazio. In Emilia Romagna, 
in  November  2002 fourteen  local  government-owned water  firms (in  particular, 
those of the cities of Ferrara and Modena) merged into HERA, and in March 2005 
the multi-utility firms of Piacenza, Parma, and Reggio Emilia merged into ENIA. 
The  regional  legislation  that  transposed  the  national  water  reform  in  Emilia 
Romagna, Act 25/1999, had provided that water franchises could be awarded to 
business  companies  selected  through  tender  offer  competitions  or  to  local 
government  majority-owned  companies.  In  order  to  comply  with  these 
requirements, the shares of HERA and ENIA were partially sold to private investors 
106 Later on, in October 2006, AMGA also merged with AEM, the electricity and gas company of 
Turin, leading to the incorporation of Iride, a multi-utility company also operating water services 
through 17 subsidiaries.
107 The  initiative,  sponsored  by  the  Governor  of  Lombardy  Roberto  Formigoni,  took  off  in 
November  2004  with  a  plan  presented  by  a  committee  formed  by  21  utility  firms.  The 
programme would involve about 130 firms operating in various utility sectors.
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by floating  them in  the  Milan  stock exchange in  June 2003 and in  June  2007, 
respectively. In Tuscany, where about 230 firms originally operated in the region 
(Baggiani, 2003), the consolidation of the local water industry led to only 6 water 
firms operating in 2003, i.e., one for each of the 6 OTAs established in the country. 
Aiming to push the consolidation even further, from 2004 the regional government 
started  promoting  among  local  governments  of  the  main  cities  (Florence,  Pisa, 
Pistoia, Prato, Empoli, Grosseto, and Sienna) the idea to merge their water firms 
into a large “regional player” water firm. In Lazio, from 2001 onwards the water 
and  electricity  firm  of  Rome,  ACEA,  carried  out  a  series  of  mergers  and 
acquisitions which led the company to become, in February 2003, the biggest player 
in the country’s water sector, overcoming Acquedotto Pugliese108.
In  the  southern  regions  of  the  country,  part  of  the  water  industry 
consolidated around the relatively large incumbents, such as Acquedotto Pugliese 
and Acquedotto Lucano (originally owned by the State and later transferred to the 
regions Puglia and Basilicata, respectively), ESAF (based in Sardinia), and EAS 
(based in Sicily). In Sicily, however, the water industry remained rather fragmented. 
Several OTA authorities there launched tender offer competitions for the selection 
of private operators, but often no applications were received, mostly because of the 
vagueness of the calls, the difficulty for the applicants to assess the risks and returns 
from investments, and the lack of credibility of the OTA authorities in regulating 
the water tariff according to the franchise terms (Antonioli, 2006; Drusiani et al., 
2004;  Massarutto,  2007).  The  difficulty  of  attracting  private  operators  when 
conducting  tender  offer  competitions  for  the  selection  of  partners  for  local 
108 Il Sole 24 Ore, 7th March 2003.
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government-owned water firms had also been experienced in other OTAs in the 
country, however. On average, tender offer calls for selecting private operators as 
partners  of  local  government-owned  water  firms  received  1.6  applications,  and 
those  for  the  selection  of  business  companies  for  managing  the  water  services 
counted 1.2 bids (Anwandter and Rubino, 2006a, 2006b).
On  the  whole,  by  the  end  of  2006  the  water  reform  had  been  largely 
implemented. At the end of 2001, 11 water infrastructure development and tariff 
plans had been approved and 6 water franchises had been awarded. The number of 
plans approved rose to 38 in 2002, 55 in 2003, 66 in 2004, and 70 in 2005109. The 
number of OTAs which had awarded water franchises increased to 9 in 2002, 17 in 
2003, 33 in 2004, and 47 in 2005110 (Figure 5.1). A survey of water firms conducted 
in December 2009 showed that water franchises had been awarded in 67 OTAs to a 
total number of 102111 water service providers (the total number exceeded the one of 
the OTAs because sometimes the same OTA authorities had jointly awarded water 
franchises to more than one water firm within the same OTA). Most of the water  
franchises were awarded to “in house” water firms (58) and to mixed public-private 
ownership firms (27). In 11 cases water concessions were assigned to public sector 
firms which enjoyed transitory or exemption regime, and in 6 cases only were they 
awarded  to  business  companies  (5  of  them were  selected  through  tender  offer 
competitions,  and one  of  them was  granted  the  water  franchise  in  a  negotiated 
temporary regime). 
109 Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources (2002-2006).
110 Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources (2002-2006).
111 According to data provided by the Supervising Authority on Water Resources and Urban Waste  
(2008),  Bluebook  (2008),  and  direct  inspection  of  the  web sites  of  the  92  OTA authorities 
established in the country (last access, December 2009).
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Figure 5.1. Total number of water infrastructure development and tariff plans (grey bars) and total  
number of water franchises awarded (white bars), per year. Source: Supervising Committee on the 
Use of Water Resources (2001-2005). 
In 2006, the implementation of the water reform came to an end. On 23 rd 
October  2000,  the  EU Commission  had issued  the  Water  Framework Directive 
(WFD) (2000/60/CE), which provided a regulatory framework for the protection of 
the aquatic environment and for the sustainable, balanced, and equitable water use. 
The WFD provided, in particular, that water resource planning would be conducted 
by the authorities of water districts, that is, new jurisdictions that the member states 
were  mandated  to  establish  according to  the  hydro-geographical  features  of  the 
territories. The transposition of the WFD into the Italian national legislation began 
in October 2001, when the central government submitted a bill to the Parliament. 
Since the WFD was not transposed within the deadline set on 22nd December 2003, 
the EU Commission started an infraction procedure against the government of Italy. 
After  the  European Court  of  Justice  sanctioned Italy  on 12 th January 2006,  the 
central  government  speeded  up  the  transposition  of  the  WFD,  which  was 
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accomplished on 3rd April 2006 (Legislative Decree 152/2006).
The legislation which transposed the WFD introduced several changes into 
the  regulatory  framework of  water  management  and various  other  water-related 
areas,  such  as  waste  collection,  protection  of  the  territory,  quality  of  air,  and 
management  of  natural  and  marine  parks.  In  the  area  of  water  management, 
Legislative Decree 152/2006 provided the establishment of eight water districts in 
the  country,  whose  authorities  would  plan  the  interventions  needed  for  the 
preservation of water resources and the development of water infrastructure. For 
what matters the implementation of the water reform enacted in 1994, Legislative 
Decree 152/2006 also abrogated Act 36/1994112, hence putting an end to a process 
which had deeply affected the organisation and management of the water industry 
in the country over the previous twelve years113.
4. An assessment of the water reform implementation outcome (2006).
Having narrated the events which took place between 2001 and 2006, this 
section will outline an assessment of the final implementation outcome of the water 
reform from the viewpoint of an observer of the water sector in 2006. Until 2006, 
the last available dataset on the state of the water industry provided by the national 
statistics office ISTAT dated back to a survey conducted in 1999, which showed that 
112 Apart from article 22, paragraph 6, of the law no. 36/1994, which provided the budget for the 
Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources and the Observatory.
113 With  the  abrogation  of  Act  36/1994,  the  main  institutional  framework  regulating  the  
organisation  and  management  of  the  local  water  services  became  the  Legislative  Decree 
152/2006 and the 2003 local public services reform. More recently, however, a referendum held 
on  12-13  Jun  2011  resulted  in  the  abrogation  of  part  of  Legislative  Decree  152/2006  that 
provided that the water tariff should also remunerate the capital invested by water firms for the  
construction and maintenance of infrastructure. After this referendum, therefore, the regulation of 
the water tariff lacked providing adequate incentives for the participation of private operators and  
investors in the water industry. 
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most of the water services were still directly managed by local governments (the 
survey  counted  6,452  local  governments  directly  involved  in  managing  water 
services out of about 8,100 municipalities in the whole country114). A survey of the 
OTA authorities conducted by the Supervising Committee in 2005 reported, instead, 
a  relatively  minor  role  played  by  the  direct  management  of  local  government 
(apparently only 1,480 local governments still  directly managed water services), 
even if the same Committee held doubts about the reliability of the survey results115. 
In  July  2006,  the  Supervising  Authority  on  Water  Resources  and  Urban 
Waste (which took over the tasks of the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water 
Resources  after  Legislative  Decree  152/2006)  issued  a  report  based  on  a  new 
dataset on the state of the water industry.  This report,  which followed a survey 
conducted in 2005, showed that, of the 91 OTA authorities provided by the regional 
legislations,  87  had  been  established,  70  had  approved  water  infrastructure 
development and tariff plans, and 47 had completed the award of the water service 
franchises. In the same month, also the research centre of the association of local 
government-owned  utility  firms  Federutility,  Utilitatis,  issued  a  report  named 
Bluebook.  This  report,  which  referred  to  2006  data,  showed  that  90  water 
infrastructure  development  and  tariff  plans  had  been  approved,  and  54  water 
franchises had been awarded by the OTA authorities - 31 directly granted to “in 
house” firms, 13 to mixed public-private ownership firms, and 3 only to business 
114 The  1999  ISTAT  survey  also  reported  that  the  water  sector  included  107  special  (i.e.,  
incorporated in accordance with public sector law) local government-owned firms, 526 consortia,  
52 public sector companies, 214 business companies (i.e., companies incorporated in accordance 
with business law, but which might be local government-owned), and 460 other non-classified 
firms. On the whole, the water sector included 7,822 firms. These data were reported in the 2003 
Report to the Parliament of the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources.
115 2006 Report to the Parliament of the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources, 
page 61.
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companies (in the OTAs of “Frosinone”, “Siracusa” and “Enna”). In 8 cases, the 
water  franchises  had  been  awarded  to  water  firms  which  enjoyed  exemption 
regimes. 
The report  of  the Supervising Authority  also illustrated the  results  of  an 
analysis conducted on a sample of 40 water infrastructure development and tariff 
plans.  The  analysis  showed  that,  on  average,  the  OTA authorities  had  planned 
investments in water infrastructure for about € 3.7 billion/year over approximately 
the next 26 years.  The main financing sources consisted of public sector funds, 
which accounted, on average, for about € 850 million/year (i.e., about 22.7% of the 
investments  planned).  Commenting  on  these  figures,  the  Supervising  Authority 
expected  that  private  finance  could hardly  be  raised to  support  the  investments 
planned, because the planned water tariff increase did not seem sufficient to provide 
an  attractive  return  on  investment116.  Additionally,  the  Supervising  Authority 
criticised  the  quality  of  these  plans,  because  they  often  showed  an  incomplete 
survey of the installed water infrastructure,  questionable water demand forecast, 
and unreliable data on leakage and infrastructure maintenance needs. 
On the whole, the Supervising Authority 's assessment of the state of the 
water industry in 2006 included a positive and a negative side. On the positive side,  
the Supervising Authority acknowledged that “the implementation of the reform of 
116 The issue of the insufficient tariff increases had been repeatedly raised by the association of 
local government-owned utility firms Federgasacqua. In an interview with the business press Il 
Sole 24 Ore on 14th March 2006, for example, the Chairman of Federgasacqua Renato Drusiani 
said: “We need to review the tariffs [regulation], otherwise no operator will ever take part in the 
tender offers for 'maecenatism'. [...] If we want to award the management of water service to  
private operators, then we need to offer the operators an adequate return [...] Italy has tariffs  
three, four, five times less that in France and Germany. The truth is that everything must be paid.  
With higher tariffs, operators could make investments, for example in the areas of sewage and  
wastewater treatment, which have never been properly upgraded in the country”.
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the integrated water service [...] seems to have finally started after the delimitation 
of the OTAs and the establishment of the OTA authorities”117.  Most of the OTA 
authorities of the country, moreover, had come to award water franchises according 
to the new regulatory system. Although the OTA authorities were still developing 
their  skills  to  manage  the  regulatory  process,  many  of  them  showed  to  be 
committed to improve regulatory performance.  Some of them, for example, had 
established a  network (Associazione  Nazionale  degli  Enti  ed  Autorità  d'Ambito, 
ANEA) for sharing experiences and develop common standards for monitoring and 
assessing  the  performance  of  water  firms  and  water  services.  Moreover,  the 
reorganisation of the water industry had led to the reduction of the fragmentation of 
the sector and the emergence of some water firms which had gained a relatively 
large scale at the regional level. 
On the negative side, however, the Supervising Authority highlighted that, 
twelve  years  after  the  enactment  of  the  water  reform,  local  governments  still 
dominated, although indirectly, local water industries and the presence of private 
operators and private investors in the sector was minimal. The OTA authorities had 
awarded  the  water  franchises  following  local  governments'  directives,  which 
generally consisted of preserving the position of their incumbent water firms in the 
local water industries. Generally, this resulted in foreclosing the development of a 
competitive water industry, prevented attracting private capital  for investment in 
water  infrastructure,  and  provided  little  pressure  to  improve  water  firms' 
performance. In sum, the Supervising Authority concluded that “if these conditions 
117 Report to the Parliament of the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources, 2006, p.  
23. 
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persist,  the  objectives  of  efficiency,  effectiveness  and  financial  self-sufficiency 
declared by the reform can be hardly achieved”118.
A more recent picture of the water industry in the country was provided by 
data collected for this thesis through the access to the web sites of the 92 OTA 
authorities established in the country (in December 2009). Data show (Table 5.1) 
that “in house” firms were the most common form of water franchise, particularly 
in the northern regions (counting 78% of all the water franchises awarded in that 
part  of the country). Mixed public-private ownership firms were relatively more 
frequent in the central regions (22%) than in the southern (15%) and the northern 
(7%) ones. The award of water franchises to “in house” firms whose shares were 
traded in the stock exchange was relatively diffused in the northern (11%) and the 
central (19%) regions, but absent in the southern ones. Most of the safeguards of 
incumbent water firms took place in the central regions (22%), and the tendering 
out of the water franchises to business companies was more frequent in the south 
(31%).
Recent  research  also  showed  a  relatively  encouraging  picture  of  the 
investment trend in the water sector, however. Based on ISTAT data, Ermano (2012) 
calculated  pro-capita  investment  in  water  infrastructure  during  the  period  1954-
2010, grouped into periods each approximately a decade long (Table 5.2). The table 
exhibits that, after the relative decline of pro-capita investment during part of the 
1990's, both planned and realised investments in water infrastructure remarkably 
increased after the new regulatory regime was put into place. Based on ISTAT data, 
118 Report to the Parliament of the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources, 2006, p.  
209.
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however,  some documentary sources (non-profit  organizations Cgiamestre, 2011, 
and  Cittadinanzattiva,  2011)  also  highlight  that  water  tariffs  sharply  increased 
during the 2000's (about 64.4-70%).
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Regions
No. OTAs which have 
awarded concessions
(No. OTAs 
established)
'In house' 
firms
Mixed public-private 
ownership firms
Firms traded in 
stock exchange or 
owned by 
financial 
institution
Safeguarded 
public sector firms
Private firms 
selected through 
tender offer 
competition
Private firms in 
negotiated 
transitory regime
Total
Piemonte 6 (6) 17 3 4 24
Valle d'Aosta 0 (1)
Lombardy 6 (12) 8 1 2 11
Veneto 7 (8) 12 1 13
Friuli Venezia Giulia 1 (4) 1 1
Liguria 2 (4) 4 1 5
Total northern regions 22 (35) 42 (78%) 4 (7%) 6 (11%) 2 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 54
Emilia Romagna 9 (9) 1 6 3 10
Tuscany 6 (6) 1 5 6
Umbria 3 (3) 1 2 3
Marche 4 (5) 3 3 6
Lazio 4 (5) 1 1 1 1 4
Abruzzo 6 (6) 4 2 6
Molise 0 (1) 0
Total central regions 32 (35) 12 (33%) 8 (22%) 7 (19%) 8 (22%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 36
Campania 2 (4) 1 1 2
Puglia 1 (1) 1 1
Basilicata 1 (1) 1 1
Calabria 3 (5) 2 1 3
Sicily 5 (9) 1 4 5
Sardinia 1 (1) 1 1
Total southern regions 13 (21) 5 (38%) 2 (15%) 0 1 (8%) 4 (31%) 1 (8%) 13
Interregional OTAs 0 (1)
Total 67 (92) 58 14 13 11 5 1 102
Table 5.1. Distribution of the types of firms which have been awarded water concessions, per region, 2008 (Source: Supervising Authority on Water Resources and Urban Waste,  
2008; web sites of the OTAs, last access in December 2009).
Periods Per-capita investment
1954-1969 16.2
1970-1979 18
1980-1989 32.4
1990-1997 17.3
1997-2010, as provided in OTA plans (*) 30.6
1997-2010, realised 33
Table 5.2. Pro-capita investments in water infrastructure, values in constant prices 2010 €. (*) Values 
inferred on the basis of 19 OTAs (Source: Ermano, 2012, on the basis of ISTAT data and Bluebook,  
2010).
5. Chapter summary.
In sum, the privatisation part of the water reform was largely implemented 
during the period between 2001 and 2006. By 2005, the water reform resulted in the 
establishment  of  87  OTA  authorities,  out  of  91  OTAs  provided  by  regional 
legislations; in the approval of 80 water infrastructure development and tariff plans; 
and in the award of water concessions in 47 OTAs – which later rose to 67 in 2009. 
The  implementation  of  the  water  reform,  moreover,  proceeded  together  with 
significant  changes  in  the  industrial  organisation  of  the  water  sector.  The 
fragmentation of the water industry, in particular, was significantly reduced through 
several  mergers  and  acquisitions  which  took  place  between  local  government-
owned water firms. All in all, in 2006 the water industry and its regulatory system 
looked quite different than they had been before the enactment of the water reform 
in 1994.
In  the  period  between  2001  and  2003,  the  implementation  of  the 
privatisation  part  of  the water  reform  largely  resulted  in  the  award  of  water 
franchises  to  mixed public-private  ownership  firms.  The  period  begun  with  the 
enactment of the 2001 reform of local public services, which provided the general 
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rule  that  franchises  of  local  public  services  should  be  awarded  to  business 
companies selected through tender offer competitions. The 2001 reform, however, 
also contained provisions  for  derogating to  the tender offer competition rule  by 
applying  an  exemption  or  a  transition  regime  to  water  firms.  In  order  to  take 
advantage of these provisions, several local governments restructured their water 
firms, opened them partially to private ownership, and made the OTA authorities 
directly assign them the water franchises. 
In  the  period  between  2003  and  2006,  the  implementation  of  the 
privatisation part of the water reform speeded up further. The period begun with the 
enactment of another reform of local public services, which restated the general rule  
that franchises of local public services should be awarded to business companies 
selected through tender offer competitions. The 2003 reform, however, also allowed 
that the franchises are awarded to mixed public-private ownership firms or to fully 
local  government-owned  firms  that  complied  with  the  requirements  of  the  “in 
house” model. From 2003 onwards, a growing number of water franchises were 
awarded in the country especially to “in house” firms, despite efforts to open up the 
sector to the participation of private operators and investors from the side of the 
Minister of the Environment. 
The  implementation  of  the  water  reform  terminated  in  2006,  when 
Legislative Decree 152 abrogated the national water reform statute (Act 36/1994). 
The  outcome  of  the  process  of  implementing  the  water  reform  in  2006  was, 
according  to  the  Supervising  Authority  on  Water  Resources  and  Urban  Waste 
(which  took over  the tasks  of  the Supervising Committee  on the Use  of  Water 
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Resources), a mix of success and failure. On the one hand, the water reform had 
eventually been implemented in most of the country and had been accompanied by 
significant  changes  in  the  industrial  organisation  of  the  water  sector,  whose 
fragmentation had been largely reduced. On the other hand, local governments still 
dominated,  either  through  full  or  partial  ownership  of  water  firms,  the  water 
industry, while the presence of private operators and private investors was minimal. 
Incumbent  local  government-owned  water  firms  had  effectively  preserved  their 
positions in the local water industries, while no competition mechanisms had been 
substantially put into place, relatively little private capital had been attracted for 
investments in the water infrastructure, and little pressure had been put on water 
firms to improve their performance. 
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Chapter 6
Analysing the implementation of the water reform in Italy (1994-2006): 
institutional rational choice approach
This chapter presents an analytic narrative of the implementation stage of 
the  water  reform  in  Italy  in  the  period  1994-2006  conducted  by  following  an 
institutional rational choice approach. The chosen  explanandum  is what accounts 
for the variation in the pace of the implementation of the water reform between a 
first period, that amounted to a failure to execute the regulatory reform mandate, 
and a second period, that resulted in a final state close to full implementation; and 
what  accounts  for  the  variation in  the pace  of  the implementation of  the water 
reform between Alto Valdarno area in Tuscany and the rest of country. 
The  chapter  is  divided  into  two  parts.  The  first  part  will  focus  on  the 
analysis of the implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part  of the 
water reform. This part  of the analysis is conducted in two steps.  First,  we will 
explain why, after the enactment of the water reform, local governments did not 
define  the  boundaries  of  the  OTAs.  We will  move,  then,  to  explain  why local 
governments in Alto Valdarno deviate from this general pattern. Next step will be to 
explain  why,  after  a  “turning  point”  that  we  date  in  1997,  local  governments 
progressed to define the OTA boundaries and establish the OTA authorities. 
The  second  part  of  this  chapter  will  be  concerned  with  analysing  the 
implementation  of  the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform.  This  part  of  the 
analysis is conducted in two steps, too. First, we will explain why, once the OTA 
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authorities  had  been  established,  they  generally  did  not  execute  the  regulatory 
reform mandate to award the water franchises. We will move, then, to explain why, 
after a “turning point” that we date in 2001, the OTA authorities started to award the  
water franchises to mixed public-private ownership firms. Finally, we will provide 
an explanation for why, after 2003, OTA authorities generally awarded the water 
franchises to “in house” firms.
1. Explaining the implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of 
the water reform.
1.1. Explaining the faltering implementation in the first period (1994-1997).
The  first  step  of  this  part  of  the  analysis  is  explaining  why,  after  the 
enactment of the water reform, local governments did not define the boundaries of 
the OTAs. In order to tackle this question,  we turn to modelling the interaction 
between actors of the water policy domain (i.e., local governments and the regions) 
in a game theoretic fashion. Let Ri indicate any of the 19 regions of the country 
involved in the implementation of the water reform, with i = integer, 1 <= i <= 19. 
Because of water reform design features, any Ri can pass regional legislation, that is 
required  to  enforce  the  water  reform  at  the  regional  level,  only  after  local 
governments agree on the definition of the boundaries of the OTAs. The agreement 
between local governments is conceived as an equilibrium of a coordination game, 
where local governments choose whether to agree with neighbouring municipalities 
on the definition of the OTA boundaries or not. 
Let LGji indicate any j-th local government within the i-th region. Any LG ij 
plays a coordination game with an unspecified number (tens or even hundreds) of 
neighbouring municipalities. Any local  government could, in principle,  negotiate 
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the  definition  of  the  OTA  boundaries  with  any  bordering  and  surrounding 
municipalities.  Modelling this  coordination game in detail  would be particularly 
complex, because (a) the number of players of the game is not given (i.e., any local  
government can choose whether to sit  the negotiation table or not)  and (b) any 
player can participate to several games at the same time (i.e., any local government 
can  negotiate  the  definition  of  the  OTA boundaries  with  different  sub-sets  of 
municipalities).  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  let  us  consider  an  overly  simplified 
scenario in which two local governments only, LG1 and LG2, play the coordination 
game. Players have infinite horizon and a time discount factor of δ ∈ (0,1), that is 
assumed constant for all players. 
Each  local  government  is  assumed  to  hold  relatively  homogeneous 
preferences119. Generally, local governments are assumed to be relatively indifferent 
towards the execution of the water reform mandate by itself, while they care about 
the  consequences  of  executing  the  water  reform at  the  local  level.  Taking into 
account that the control of water firms grants local governments the possibility to 
affect water-related jobs and public contracts and the role that the water business 
traditionally plays within the local political environments,  local governments are 
assumed to prefer holding direct control of water firms rather than giving up any of 
the  water  planning,  regulatory  and  management  functions.  In  addition,  local 
governments are assumed to prefer controlling relatively larger water organisations 
than smaller ones, for reasons related to increased budget (and, relatedly, jobs and 
119 The modelling assumptions may be relaxed in such a way as to allow heterogeneity between the 
preferences held by each local government. Indeed, some degree of heterogeneity between local 
governments' preferences will be discussed later on in the analysis. At this stage, however, the 
assumption  of  homogeneous  local  governments'  preferences  allows  to  make  the  issue  of 
analysing the strategic interaction between local governments more tractable. 
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public  contracts)  with  respect  to  those  of  water  firms  that  operate  in  smaller 
territories.  Local  governments'  utility  function,  therefore,  is  assumed  to  be 
positively related to direct control of the water planning and regulatory functions, to 
direct control of water management functions, and to the size of water firms. 
Each local  government  can choose whether to  agree on the definition of 
OTA boundaries or not. If both local governments do not agree, then they maintain 
the status quo and get nil payoff. If any local government chooses to agree while the 
other does not, then no agreement can be reached and they both get nil payoff. If 
both  local  governments  agree,  then  they  allow  the  region  Ri to  pass  regional 
legislation.  In this case,  local governments anticipate the expected payoff which 
would arise from progressing to implement the water reform. This payoff includes 
(a) the cost Clg1 of losing direct control of water planning and regulatory functions 
(which,  if  the  water  reform  is  implemented,  are  centralised  into  the  OTA 
authorities), (b) the cost Clg2 of losing direct control of water management functions 
(which, if the water reform is implemented, are centralised into partially or fully 
privatised water firms), and (c) the benefit Blg1 of shared influence on larger water 
firms  (if  the  water  franchise  is  awarded  to  firms  partially  owned  by  local 
governments). Costs (Clg1 and Clg2) and benefits (Blg1) take place at future times (t1, 
t2, and t3). Hence, the payoff for each local government can be written in the form:
LG1
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To define the OTA 
boundaries (D)
Not to define the OTA 
boundaries (ND)
LG2
To define the OTA boundaries 
(D)
plg , plg 0, 0
Not to define the OTA (ND) 0, 0 0, 0
Table 6.1. Payoff matrix of local governments' coordination game of defining the OTA boundaries.
Table  6.1 shows the payoff matrix  of  the game played by the two local 
governments. If plg is negative, then the strategy not to define the OTA boundaries 
(ND) weakly dominates the strategy to define the OTA boundaries (D). The strategy 
(ND, ND) is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., if both local governments choose ND, then 
none of them would be better off by deviating to play D. Instead, (D, D) is not a  
Nash equilibrium, i.e., if at least one local government deviates to play ND rather 
than D, then both local governments would be better off by getting 0 rather than p lg. 
If plg is positive, then the strategy D weakly dominates the strategy ND. In this case, 
playing (D, D) is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., if both local governments choose D, then 
neither would be better off by deviating to play ND. However, in this case also the 
strategy (ND, ND) is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., if one local government deviates to 
play D rather than ND, then it would be no better off than playing ND. Thus, even 
if plg is positive, local governments may be “stuck” to play not to agree with each 
other to define the OTA boundaries.
When is plg positive, anyway? The value of plg is affected by four factors. 
First, plg is greater – ceteris paribus – the lower is the value of the costs incurred by 
local governments for the loss of direct control of the water planning and regulatory 
functions (Clg1) and water management functions (Clg2). Control of these functions is 
assumed to provide benefits to local governments in terms of influence on water-
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related  jobs  and public  contracts.  Second,  plg is  greater  –  ceteris  paribus  – the 
higher  is  the  value  of  the  benefits  which  arise  from the  joint  control  of  larger 
organisations, once the water planning and regulatory functions are pooled together 
into the OTA authorities and the water firms are merged and (partially) privatised. 
These benefits (Blg) may offset the costs of the loss of direct local governments' 
influence  on  water-related  jobs  and  public  contracts.  The  realisation  of  Blg, 
however,  is  dependent  on  setting  up  governance  arrangements  in  the  OTA 
authorities and in the privatised water firms that protect the stakes of each local 
government.  Local  governments  may  not  know  in  advance  how  well  future 
governance  arrangements  will  protect  their  stakes,  hence  they  do  not  possess 
information as to whether Blg is higher than the costs of the loss of direct influence 
on water-related jobs and public contracts. 
The third and the fourth factors which affect the value of plg are the time in 
which the costs (Clg1 and Clg2) and benefits (Blg) materialise (t1, t2, and t3) and the 
discount rate (δ). The earlier the costs  and the later the benefits are believed to 
materialise,  –  ceteris  paribus –  the lower the value of plg.  If  local governments 
believe that the costs of the loss of direct influence on water-related jobs and public 
contracts  materialise  relatively early,  while  the benefits  that arise from the joint 
control of larger organisations materialise relatively late, then discounted Blg may 
be quite small with respect to discounted Clg1 and Clg2. The extent to which future 
benefits offset future costs is also affected by the discount rate δ (which is assumed 
as  a  given  constant).  The  more  local  governments  are  “patient”  or  “forward 
looking” (i.e., δ is relatively low),  – ceteris paribus – the more future benefits at 
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time t3 may offset future costs at time t1 and t2. 
This analysis suggests that local governments may not come to agree on the 
definition of the OTA boundaries because of two reasons. First, if  plg is negative, 
then  local governments may choose not to define the OTA boundaries because of 
avoiding negative outcomes. If plg is positive, local governments may choose not to 
define the OTA boundaries because they have no incentive to deviate from playing 
the defection strategy. The belief that plg is positive, therefore, is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for local governments to agree to define the OTA boundaries. In 
other words, the lack of negative payoff when playing the strategy not to define the 
boundaries  of  the  OTAs  has  important  effects  on  the  outcome  of  the  game 
interaction120. 
Evidently,  features  of  the  water  reform  design  effectively  put  local 
governments in the position of “veto players”, which could block passing regional 
legislations. As recounted in the historical narrative, the central government exerted 
pressures on the regional governments to pass regional legislations even if local 
governments did not collaborate to define the OTA boundaries. A question arises, 
then, concerning whether the regions could pass the regional legislations anyway, 
irrespective of  local  governments'  lack of agreement  on this  matter.  In  order  to 
120 The  analysis  could  be  extended  to  model  the  strategic  interaction  between  several  local 
governments rather than two of them only. Issues related to the conditions for the emergence of 
cooperation to define the OTA boundaries between some of local governments, and to the effect  
that  cooperation between some local governments has on other  defecting local  governments, 
would arise.  It  may be possible,  for example, that “early movers” that  show to cooperate to  
define the OTA boundaries affect other local governments' beliefs about expected payoff, e.g., by 
signalling privately held information concerning future costs and benefits, and therefore “recruit” 
other local governments to cooperate with them. This further line of analysis is not pursued,  
however,  because  of  the  lack  of  empirical  evidence  that  any  such  negotiations  or  imitation 
patterns between local governments ever took place, in the phase of the implementation process 
under consideration. 
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tackle this question, we model the game interaction between a region Ri and any 
local government LGji located within Ri. 
Similarly to modelling local governments' preferences, also the regions are 
assumed to hold relatively homogeneous preferences and to be relatively indifferent 
towards the execution of the water reform mandate by itself. Also the regions are 
rather assumed to care about the consequences of executing the water reform at the 
regional and local level. Taking into account that regional governments wished to 
avoid hostile confrontations with local governments – either in the form of passing 
regional legislations while local governments had not reached any agreement on the 
boundaries of the OTAs, or in the form of neglecting passing regional legislations 
while local governments wished to progress in the execution of the water reform 
mandate – regions' utility function is assumed to be negatively related to any rise of 
political conflict with the municipalities. 
If  the  region  Ri chooses  to  pass  the  regional  legislation  while  local 
government LGji does not define the OTA boundaries, then the region incurs the 
cost of a political conflict with the local government (Cr1), that would struggle to 
affirm its prerogatives on the organisation of the water service areas against  the 
“violation” perpetrated by the region. If the local government chooses to define the 
OTA boundaries while the region does not pass any regional legislation, then the 
region incurs the cost of a political conflict with the local government (C r2) as well, 
because the latter would struggle against  the “blockade” of the execution of the 
water reform mandate. If the region chooses to pass the regional legislation while 
the local government chooses to define the OTA boundaries, then the region gets 
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payoff nil while the local government gets the payoff plg (as defined above). Finally, 
if the region chooses not to pass any regional legislation while the local government 
chooses not to define any OTA boundaries, then both players get nil payoff. The 
payoff matrix for this game is: 
LGij
To Contribute defining the 
OTA boundaries (D)
Not to contribute defining the 
OTA boundaries (ND)
Ri
To pass regional legislation (P) 0, plg - Cr1, plg 
Not to pass regional legislation 
(NP)
- Cr2, 0 0, 0
Table 6.2. Payoff matrix of the game played by the region and any local government.
The game shown in Table 6.2 presents two Nash equilibria. The first Nash 
equilibrium is (P, D), i.e., the region passes the regional legislation and the local 
government contributes defining  the OTA boundaries. In this case, no player has 
any incentive to deviate to play another strategy: if the region plays NP, then it  
would get a worse payoff Cr2; if the local government plays ND, then it would not 
improve its payoff. The second Nash equilibrium is (NP, ND), i.e., the region does 
not  pass  the  regional  legislation  and  the  local  government  does  not  contribute 
defining  the  OTA boundaries.  Also  in  this  case  no  player  has  any incentive  to 
deviate to play another strategy: if the region plays P, then it would get a worse 
payoff Cr1; if the local government plays D, then it would not improve its payoff121. 
This analysis suggests, then, that the regions did not have any available strategy 
(i.e., course of action) for making local governments define the OTA boundaries. 
The model suggests that, if the local government chooses not to define the OTA 
121 Clearly, both Nash equilibria are determined by weakly dominant strategies.
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boundaries, then it would not deviate to play to define the OTA boundaries even if 
the region plays to pass the regional legislation122.  
Could the central government affect the definition of the OTA boundaries, 
then? The central government is understood here to care about the execution of the 
water  reform  mandate,  for  reasons  especially  related  to  central  government's 
interest  to  increase  the  appropriation  of  public  funds  for  water  infrastructure 
development. Accordingly, the utility function of the central government is assumed 
to  be  positively  related  to  the  passing  of  regional  legislations.  The  interaction 
between the central government CG, any region Ri, and any local government LGji 
can be modelled here as a sequential game. In the first stage of the game, Ri chooses 
whether  to  pass  the  regional  legislation  (P)  or  not  (NP).  If  R i plays  P,  then  – 
provided that, within this scenario, local governments do not agree on the definition 
of the OTA boundaries – it incurs the cost of the political conflict with  LGji (Cr1) 
while  the CG gets  the benefit  of getting this implementation task accomplished 
(Bng1).  As  recounted  in  the  historical  narrative,  however,  the  regions  generally 
withheld  passing  the  required  legislation,  and  the  central  government  pondered 
whether to exercise its substitutive powers.
If Ri plays NP, then the CG can choose whether to exercise its substitutive 
powers (E) against the region or not (NE). If the CG plays NE, then it incurs the 
cost of having misallocated budgetary resources to infrastructure works which are 
not accomplished (Cng2), while Ri does not incur any cost. If the CG plays E (i.e., 
122 The interaction between the region and the local governments could be modelled, alternatively,  
as  a  sequential  game,  i.e.,  first  local  governments  coordinate  to  find  an  agreement  on  the 
definition of the OTA boundaries, and then the region chooses its strategy. This game structure, 
however, does not seem to fit the characteristics of the interaction between the regions and local  
governments,  which  included  a  negotiation  process  where  regions  consulted  with  local 
governments for designing the regional legislation rather than a clear-cut division of tasks.
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central  government's  special  commissioner  passes  the  regional  legislation),  then 
payoff depends on the strategy played by LGji. Previous analysis showed that, even 
if Ri plays the strategy to pass the regional legislation, LGji may not define the OTA 
boundaries anyway,  depending on the value of  LGji'  expected payoff  plg.  If  LGji 
plays the strategy to define the OTA boundaries (D), then the CG gets the benefit of 
getting  this  implementation  task  accomplished (Bng1)  and incurs  the  cost  of  the 
political conflict with Ri (Cng1) while Ri incurs the cost of having being spoiled of its 
competences123 (Cr2). If LGji plays not to define the OTA boundaries (ND), then the 
CG gets the cost of the political conflict with the regions (Cng1) while Ri incurs both 
the cost of the political conflict with local governments (Cr1) and the one of having 
being spoiled of its competences (Cr2). Picture 7.1 shows this game in extensive 
form.
In the last stage of this game, LGji is  indifferent whether to play D or ND. 
The CG, then, is uncertain whether the strategy to exercise the substitutive powers 
(E) brings a payoff Bng1 – Cng1 (if  LGji plays D) or – Cng1 only (if  LGji plays ND). 
Even if the CG believes that LGji plays D, it would exercise the substitutive powers 
only if Bng1 – Cng1 > - Cng2. If the cost of the political conflict with the region (Cng1) is 
higher than the benefit of accomplishing the implementation task and avoiding the 
misallocation of budgetary resources  (Bng1 + Cng2),  then  the CG is better  off  by 
playing not to exercise its substitutive powers (NE). In the first stage of this game, 
Ri can anticipate  that  the  CG plays  NE.  The region,  therefore,  is  better  off  by 
123 We assume here that  the region is interested to protect its prerogatives against  any form of  
“expropriation”  of  legislative  competences.  If  the  central  government  appoints  a  special 
commissioner  for  taking  over  the  competences  on  passing  the  regional  legislation,  then  the 
region incurs a political cost, including the detriment of its “public image” for not exercising its 
competences.
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playing not to pass the regional legislation (NP, which brings to Ri a payoff nil) 
rather than playing to pass it (P, which brings to R i a payoff – Cr1). This analysis 
suggests,  than,  that  also  the  CG  has  no  strategies  available  for  affecting  the 
definition of  the OTA boundaries.  Even if  CG plays to  substitute  the region in 
passing the regional legislations, the LGji does not necessarily coordinate with other 
local governments to define the OTA boundaries.
Picture  7.1.  Sequential  game  between  the  region  Ri,  the  central  government  CG,  and  local 
government LGji. Payoffs refer to (the regions, the central government).
1.2. Explaining variation from the overall pattern in Alto Valdarno area (1994-
1999).
As recounted in  the historical  narrative,  some parts  of Italy – especially, 
some areas of Tuscany named Alto Valdarno – deviated from the overall pattern of 
non-implementation after the enactment of the water reform. In order to explain this 
part  of  the  episode,  we  focus  on  modelling  the  interaction  between  local 
governments in the Alto Valdarno area in the same fashion of the coordination game 
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of defining the OTA boundaries (Table 6.1). For the sake of simplicity, we consider 
again an overly simplified scenario where two local governments only, LG1 and 
LG2, play the coordination game (negotiations to define shared water service area 
actually involved the city of Arezzo and 24 neighbouring local governments). Each 
player can choose whether to agree on the definition of the OTA boundaries or not. 
The payoff structure is equivalent to the coordination game presented in the first 
step of the analysis. If both local governments agree to define the OTA boundaries, 
they both get a payoff which includes the cost of losing direct control of water 
planning and regulatory functions (Clg1),  the  cost  of losing direct  control of  the 
water management functions (Clg2), and the benefit of influencing the activities of 
the partially privatised water firm (Blg1). 
As  shown  in  the  first  part  of  the  analysis,  coordination  between  local 
government may arise if players perceive plg to be positive. Differently from the rest 
of the country,  particular conditions which apply to the Alto Valdarno area may 
contribute increasing the value of plg. Local governments of the Alto Valdarno area 
had already negotiated the merger of their water firms well before the enactment of 
the water reform. Even if previous negotiations did not result in any reorganisation 
of local water services, local governments could form the belief that future benefits 
of pooling together their water firms offset the costs of losing direct control of the 
water functions within their respective municipal service areas. The past experience 
of  negotiation  could  facilitate  the  emergence  of  cooperation  (Axelrod,  1984) 
between local governments when they played the game to define the boundaries of 
the OTAs. Local governments of the Alto Valdarno area, moreover, were especially 
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receptive to the political orientation of the regional branch of the party Democratici 
di  Sinistra  (DS),  which  favoured  the  privatisation  of  local  public  services  into 
mixed public-private ownership firms. Local governments of the Alto Valdarno area 
could  form  the  belief  that  the  other  municipalities  of  Alto  Valdarno  shared 
equivalent views about how to privatise water firms. Within the model, then, we can 
assume that local governments expect that future benefits of pooling together the 
water  functions  materialise  relatively  fast,  i.e.,  that  little negotiation  would  be 
required to agree on the governance institutions of the centralised water service 
provision. 
Taking these conditions into account, we can infer that local governments of 
the Alto Valdarno believe (a) the costs of losing direct control of the water planning 
and regulatory functions (Clg1) and of the water management functions (Clg2) to be 
lower than believed by local governments in other areas of the country, because 
preparatory actions have been taken already to give up their direct involvement in 
water service provision, (b) the benefits of influencing the activities of the partially 
privatised  water  firm  (Blg1)  to  be  higher,  and  (c)  the  time  in  which  benefits 
materialise to be shorter because of shared views about reorganising water service 
provision. Additionally, we can argue that not defining the OTA boundaries bore 
negative implications for local governments of the Alto Valdarno area, because of 
the  loss  of  the  political  capital  that  had  been  accumulated  when  forming  the 
consensual view about the benefits of pooling together water services in a partially 
privatised water firm. Taken together, these conditions account for relatively higher 
benefits from the definition oft the OTA boundaries that local governments of the 
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Alto Valdarno expect to get with respect to local governments in other areas of the 
country, and lower costs that these local governments expect to incur if not defining 
the OTA boundaries. The payoff structure outlined here,  therefore, suggests that 
local governments of the Alto Valdarno area were more inclined to coordinate with 
neighbouring municipalities to define the OTA boundaries because, having already 
made preliminary steps in negotiating the pooling together of their water services, 
net benefits from implementing the water reform were more apparent to them than 
to local governments in other parts of the country.
1.3.  Explaining  the  acceleration  of  the  implementation  process  after  the 
turning point (1997-2006).
As recounted  in  the  historical  narrative,  in  1997 the  central  government 
enacted a legislation which provided funding for sewage and wastewater treatment 
infrastructure. This legislation provided that funds would be allocated on the basis 
of plans formulated on an OTA-by-OTA basis. Additionally, the legislation provided 
that, in those regions which did not transpose the water reform, the boundaries of 
the OTAs would coincide with the territorial  jurisdictions of the provinces.  The 
analysis conducted in this section is concerned with explaining why, after the 1997 
legislation, local governments accelerated the implementation of the liberalisation 
and re-regulation part of the water reform. The analysis will focus on two questions 
in particular, namely, why local governments defined the OTA boundaries, and why 
they also progressed to establish the OTA authorities.
In order to tackle the first question, we model the interaction between local 
governments and the regions in the same fashion of the game shown above (Table 
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6.2).  After  the  1997 legislation,  any  region  Ri can  choose  whether  to  pass  the 
regional legislation by including the “default” definition of the OTA boundaries as 
equalling the provincial territories (P) or not to pass it (NP). Any local government 
LGij included  in  the region  Ri can  choose  whether  to  coordinate  with  other 
municipalities  to  define  the  OTA boundaries  (D) or  not  (ND).  Similarly  to  the 
model shown in Table 6.2, if the region plays P and the local government plays D, 
then payoff is (0, plg).  If the region plays NP while the local government plays D, 
then payoff is (- Cr2, 0). Differently from the model shown in Table 6.2, if the region 
plays P while the local government plays ND, then payoff is (-Cr1, plg – Clg3),  i.e., 
the region incurs the cost of  a political conflict  with the local government (Cr1), 
while  the  local  governments  gets  the  discounted  net  benefit  plg minus  the  cost 
incurred for having been overridden in the definition of the OTA boundaries124. If 
the region plays NP while the local government plays ND, then payoff is (0, -C lg3), 
i.e., the regions does not incur any cost while the local government suffers the cost 
for having been overridden in the definition of the OTA boundaries anyway. The 
payoff matrix for this game interaction is: 
LG1
To contribute defining the 
OTA boundaries (D)
Not to contribute defining 
the OTA boundaries (ND)
Ri
To pass the regional legislation (P) 0, plg - Cr1, plg - Clg3
Not to pass the regional legislation 
(NP)
- Cr2, 0 0, - Clg3
Table 6.3. Payoff matrix of the game played by the region and any local government after 1997.
The game shown in Table 6.3 presents one only Nash equilibrium, (P, D) 
124 We assume, as before, that local governments care about protecting their prerogatives against 
any form of “violation”.
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(while the one shown in Table 6.2 contained two Nash equilibria). If the region 
plays P and the local government plays D, no player has any incentive to deviate to 
play any other strategy. The strategy (NP, ND) is not a Nash equilibrium, instead. 
While the region would not deviate to play P rather than NP (because it would get a 
negative payoff – Cr1 rather than nil), the local government would be better off if 
playing D rather than ND (because it would get a payoff nil instead of negative – 
Clg3). We note that the strategy (NP, D) is not a Nash equilibrium either, because, if 
the local government plays D, then the region would be better off by deviating to 
play the strategy P (because of getting a payoff nil instead of – Cr2). In sum, if we 
assume that the imposition of the “default” definition of the OTA boundaries as 
equalling  the  provincial  territories  is  perceived  by local  governments  as  a  cost 
(because  it  overrules  their  competences  on  the  organisation  of  local  water 
provision), then both the regions and the local governments end up better off if they 
cooperate to define the OTA boundaries and passing the regional legislation. 
In  order  to  tackle  the  second  question,  namely  why  local  governments 
established the OTA authorities after the regions passed the regional legislation, we 
again model the interaction between local governments as a coordination game. Let 
us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that two local governments only (LG1 and 
LG2) are located in the same OTA. Each local government can choose whether to 
establish the OTA authority (E) or not (NE). If both local governments choose to 
establish  it  (E),  then they incur  the  costs  of  losing  direct  control  on  the  water 
planning  and  regulatory  functions  because  of  centralising  them  into  the  OTA 
authority (the cost Clg1 is incurred at the present time) and on the water management 
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function because of the privatisation of water service provision (C lg2 at future time 
t1), and get the benefit of jointly controlling larger water firms (Blg1 at future time 
t2). Local governments, therefore, get the payoff:
If both local governments choose not to establish the OTA authority (NE), 
then they incur the cost of political blame for not implementing the water reform125 
(Clg4).  If any local government chooses to establish the OTA authority while the 
other does not, the former gets a payoff nil while the latter receives the negative 
payoff  Clg4.  The  payoff  matrix  of  this  game  is  shown  in  Table  6.4.  Any  local 
government's strategy depends on the value of qlg. If qlg is greater than -Clg4, then 
strategy  E  dominates  the  strategy  NE,  hence  the  strategy  (E,E)  is  a  Nash 
equilibrium. If qlg is less than -Clg4, then the game shown in Table 6.4 has no (even 
weakly) dominant strategies: if any local government plays E, then the other plays 
NE, while if any local government plays NE, then the other plays E. In this case, the 
game has two Nash equilibria when one local government chooses to establish the 
OTA authority while the other does not [(E,NE) and (NE,E)]. Local governments, 
therefore, are not able to coordinate a joint strategy to establish the OTA authorities.
125 We assume here that, once the OTA boundaries are defined and regional legislation is passed,  
local  governments  bear  the  responsibility  for  carrying  out  the  implementation  tasks  for 
liberalising and re-regulating water service provision. If they do not cooperate to establish the 
OTA authorities, then they would incur the political blame for not contributing reorganising the 
water services.
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LG1
To establish the OTA 
authority (E)
Not to establish the OTA 
authority (NE)
LG2
To establish the OTA authority 
(E)
qlg , qlg 0, - Clg4
Not to establish the OTA 
authority (NE)
- Clg4, 0 - Clg4, - Clg4
Table 6.4. Payoff matrix of local governments' game of establishing the OTA authorities.
This analysis shows that the values of qlg and Clg4 are important in order to 
determine  whether  local  governments  establish  the  OTA authorities  or  not.  The 
establishment of the OTA authorities is more likely to happen the higher the value 
of qlg and the higher, in absolute terms, the value of C lg4. As for qlg, its value is 
higher – ceteris paribus – the lower are the costs incurred by local governments for 
the loss of direct control of the water planning and regulatory functions (C lg1) and of 
the water management function (Clg2), the higher is the value of the benefits which 
arise  from the  joint  control  of  larger  water  firms (B lg1),  the  earlier  the  benefits 
materialise in time (t2) with respect to the costs (t1), and the lower the discount rate 
(δ). The value of Clg4, is higher in absolute terms if the cost of the political blame 
charged  on  the  local  governments  for  not  implementing  the  water  reform  is 
relatively high. 
Particular conditions of water sector characteristics after 1997 could play an 
important causal role in the establishment of the OTA authorities. As recounted in 
the historical narrative, at that time local governments became exposed to accounts 
of early experiences of implementing the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the 
water reform, with the Alto Valdarno being a frequent reference. This information 
could make local governments believe that the costs of losing direct control of the 
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water planning and regulatory functions and the water management functions were 
relatively small in comparison to the benefits that related to shared control of larger 
organisations. Local government, then, may believe that the value of qlg is relatively 
high with respect to -Clg4, with the effect that local governments choose to establish 
the  OTA authorities.  Also  a  mechanism of  imitation  in  playing strategic  games 
(Levine and Pesendorfer, 2007) could affect local governments' beliefs in such a 
way as to make the emergence of cooperation more likely to happen.
In sum, this part of the analysis provides an explanation for why, after the 
“turning point” that we date in 1997, local governments progressed to define the 
boundaries  of  the  OTAs and to  establish  the  OTA authorities.  This  explanatory 
research argument highlights the importance of the 1997 legislation, that provided 
funding for sewage and wastewater treatment works, for making local governments 
play  the  strategy  to  define  the  OTA boundaries,  and  of  earlier  experiences  of 
implementing the water reform conducted in Alto Valdarno area for making local 
governments establish the OTA authorities. The explanatory argument, therefore, is 
particularly sensitive to changed features of the water reform design (especially, the 
provision of a “default” definition of the OTA boundaries) and of the water policy 
domain  (i.e.,  accomplished  implementation  in  the  Alto  Valdarno  area),  in 
conjunction  with  steady  conditions  of  the  sector  characteristics  (i.e.,  local 
governments' stakes in the water industry) and of the territorial organisation of the 
sector (i.e., fragmentation of water service areas). 
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2. Explaining the implementation of the privatisation part of the water reform.
2.1. Explaining the obstructed implementation in the first period (1994-2001).
The  first  step  of  this  part  of  the  analysis  is  explaining  why,  after  their 
establishment, generally the OTA authorities did not award water franchises, while 
a few OTA authorities chose to privatise water service provision in the hands of 
mixed public-private ownership firms. In order to tackle this question, we turn to 
modelling  the  options  that  OTA authorities  have  for  privatising  water  services. 
According to the regulatory system provided by the water reform, after 1994 the 
OTA  authorities  can  award  water  franchises  to  either  mixed  public-private 
ownership  firms  or  to  business  companies  selected  through  tender  offer 
competition126. If any OTA authority awards the water franchise to a mixed public-
private  ownership  firm,  then any local  government  included in  the  OTA gets  a 
payoff of – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1, where Clg1 is the cost of the loss of direct control of 
the water planning and regulatory functions, α Clg2 is the (partial) cost of the loss of 
control of the water management function, with 0 <  α < 1 (Clg2 is the cost of the 
total loss of control of the water management function that any local government 
incurs  if  the  concession  is  awarded  to  a  business  company),  and  β Blg1 is  the 
(partial) benefit of jointly controlling the privatised water firm, with 0 < β < 1 (Blg1 
is the total benefit that any local government would enjoy if it is the sole proprietor 
of the  water firm). If any OTA authority awards  the water franchise to a business 
126 It may be recalled here that, according to Act 142/1990 on the management of local public 
services,  water  services  could  be  managed  wither  through  (a)  direct  local  government 
management,  (b)  special-statute  municipal  organisation,  (c)  mixed  public-private  ownership 
firms, or (d) business company selected through tender offer competition. Features of the water  
reform statute, however, explicitly referred to the assignment of water franchises, therefore only 
options (c) and (d) were considered legitimate.
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company  selected  through  tender  offer  competition,  instead,  then  any  local 
government  included  in  the  OTA gets  a  payoff  of  –  C lg1 –  Clg2.  The  local 
government, in fact, would incur the (total) cost of losing direct control of both the 
water planning and control functions and the water management function, and does 
not get any benefit from controlling the water firm. Finally, if any OTA authority 
does not award any water franchise, then any local government included in the OTA 
gets a payoff of -Clg1,  that  is,  the cost of the loss of direct control of the water 
planning and regulatory functions which are centralised into the OTA authority. The 
payoff are shown in Table 6.5.
OTA authority's options Local governments' payoff
To award to mixed public-private ownership water firm – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1
To award to business company selected through tender offer 
competition
– Clg1 – Clg2
Not to award the water franchise – Clg1
Table 6.5. Local governments' payoff depending on OTA authorities' choice.
Given this payoff structure, what choice would local governments make to 
privatise water service provision127? The option not to award the water franchise is 
preferred to the option to award the water franchise to a business company selected 
through tender offer competition (– Clg1 > – Clg1  – Clg2). The option to award the 
water franchise to a mixed public-private ownership firm is preferred to the one to 
award  the  water  franchise  to  a  business  company selected  through tender  offer 
127 OTA authorities are not considered here as “actors” that can make choices independently from 
the local governments. The basic argument is that the OTA authorities are owned and controlled 
by local governments, therefore the choice to privatise water service provision is made by local 
governments in consent. In other words, it is assumed here that the OTA authorities make choices  
which run in favour of the interest of local governments. 
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competition (as 0 < α < 1 and β > 0, then  – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1 > – Clg1 – Clg2). 
Local  governments,  evidently,  get  the  lowest  payoff  if  they  make  the  OTA 
authorities award the water franchise to business companies selected through tender 
offer competition. They would rather make the OTA authorities award the water 
franchise to mixed public-private ownership firms if – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1 is higher 
than – Clg1.  i.e.,  if  β Blg1 -  α Clg2 > 0.  Otherwise,  they would prefer  the OTA 
authorities not to award the water franchise to anyone. Clearly, local governments 
prefer  that  the  OTA authorities  award  the  franchise  to  a  mixed  public-private 
ownership  firm if  the  benefit  of  jointly  controlling  the  privatised  water  firm is 
higher than the (partial) cost of the loss of direct control of the water management 
function. 
This  analysis  suggests  that,  after  local  governments  establish  the  OTA 
authorities, they may not find it advantageous to also make them privatise water 
services.  The option to  make the  OTA authorities  award the  water  franchise  to 
business  companies  selected  through  tender  offer  competition  is  not  exercised. 
Local governments may prefer to privatise water services in  the hands of mixed 
public-private  ownership  firms,  because  this  option allows them to retain  some 
control of the water management function and enjoy some benefits because of the 
shared control of the privatised water firm. However, if local governments do not 
get any net benefit from the privatisation of water services in the hands of mixed 
public-private  ownership  firms,  then  they  rather  prefer  not  to  make  the  OTA 
authorities award any water franchise (i.e., if β Blg1- α Clg2 < 0).
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2.2.  Explaining  the  acceleration  of  the  implementation  process  after  the 
turning point (2001-2006).
In 2001, the central government enacted a reform of local public services 
that contained the general  provision that water franchises should be awarded to 
business companies selected through tender offer competition. The reform design, 
however, also provided that, within 18 months (i.e., by 30th June 2003), incumbent 
local government-owned water firms could be awarded the water franchises for a 
period up to 10 years if certain requirements are satisfied (especially, if a growing 
part of water firms' shares were sold to private water operators or investors over 
time). Taking into account these provisions, we can re-model local governments' 
payoff for any of the options available to the OTA authorities for privatising water 
service provision, as shown in Table 6.6.
OTA authority's options Local governments' payoff
Before 30.6.2003 After 30.6.2003
Award to mixed public-private ownership 
water firm 
– Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1 – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1
Award to business company selected through 
tender offer competition
– Clg1 – Clg2 – Clg1 – Clg2
Not award – Clg1 – Clg1 – Clg2
Table 6.6. Local governments' payoff depending on OTA authorities'  choice after the 2001 local  
public services reform.
If  any OTA authority  awards  the water  franchise to  a  business company 
selected through tender offer competition,  any local  government  included in the 
OTA gets a payoff – Clg1 – Clg2. If local governments make the OTA authority award 
the  water  franchise  to  a  mixed  public-private  ownership  firm,  then  (if  certain 
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requirements were met) local governments get the payoff – C lg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1. If 
the OTA authority does not award the water concession before the deadline set on 
30th June 2003, then local governments get the payoff – C lg1 until the deadline only. 
After the deadline, the OTA authorities must award the water concession to business 
companies  only,  therefore  local  governments  get  the payoff –  Clg1 –  Clg2.  Local 
governments can anticipate that if they do not make the OTA authorities award the 
water franchise before the deadline, then they would get a payoff as negative as the 
one that they get if privatising water service provision to any business company 
selected through tender offer competition. Local governments, therefore, prefer to 
make  the  OTA authorities  award  the  water  franchise  to  mixed  public-private 
ownership firms, because – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1 > – Clg1 – Clg2 (provided that 0 < α < 
1 and β > 0). 
This analysis  suggests  that,  after  the  enactment  of  the  2001 local  public 
service reforms, local governments' beliefs about the payoff could induce them to 
privatise  water  service  provision  to  mixed  public-private  ownership  firms.  This 
result, however, holds if local governments believe that, after the expiry of the 30 th 
June 2003 deadline,  the OTA authorities have no other choice but to award the 
water franchise to business companies selected through tender offer competitions if 
they did not privatise the water service provision yet. If local governments believe 
that this provision of the 2001 local public service reform is not enforced, or that it  
is subject to amendments, than the option to wait cannot be ruled out.
Indeed,  in  2003 the  central  government  enacted  another  reform of  local 
public  services.  The  2003  reform  restated  the  general  provision  that  water 
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franchises should be awarded to business companies selected through tender offer 
competition.  The  reform  design,  however,  also  provided  that,  under  particular 
circumstances,  water  franchises  could  be  also  awarded  to  either  mixed  public-
private ownership firms or to firms fully owned by the local governments and that 
subjected their business activity to the limitation of servicing the proprietors only 
(i.e., so-called “in house” firms). Taking into account these provisions contained in 
the 2003 local public services reform, we can again re-model local governments' 
payoff as shown in Table 6.7.
OTA authority's choices Local governments' payoff
Award to 'in house' firm – Clg1 – γ Clg2 + ε Blg1
Award to mixed public-private ownership water firm – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1
Award to business company selected through tender offer 
competition
– Clg1 – Clg2
Not award – Clg1
Table 6.7. Local governments' payoff depending on OTA authorities'  choice after the 2003 local  
public services reform.
Part  of  Table  6.7  is  congruent  to  the  original  option  choice  and  payoff 
structure of Table 6.5. If any OTA authority awards the water franchise to a mixed 
public-private ownership firm, then any local government included in the OTA gets 
a payoff of – Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1. If any OTA authority awards the water franchise 
to a business company selected through tender offer competition, then any local 
government included in the OTA gets a payoff of  – Clg1 – Clg2. If any OTA authority 
does not award any water franchise, then any local government included in the OTA 
gets a payoff of -Clg1. After the enactment of the 2003 local public services reform, 
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local governments can also make the OTA authorities award the water franchises to 
“in house” firms. In this case, each local government included in the OTA gets a 
payoff  –  Clg1 –  γ Clg2 +  ε Blg1,  where  γ Clg2 is  the  cost  incurred  by  the  local 
government for the (partial) loss of control of the water management function, with 
γ, 0 < γ < 1, and ε Blg1 is the (partial) benefit which arises from the joint control of 
the local government-owned water firm, with ε > 0. 
Given this payoff structure, what choice would local governments make to 
privatise water service provision? The option not to award the water franchise is 
again preferred to  the  one  to  award the  water  franchise to  a  business  company 
selected through tender offer competition, because – Clg1 > – Clg1 – Clg2. The option 
to  award  the  water  franchise  to  a  mixed  public-private  ownership  firm  is  also 
preferred to the one to award the water franchise to a business company selected 
through tender offer competition, because – Clg1 – α Clg2 +  β  Blg1 > – Clg1 – Clg2 
(provided that 0 < α < 1 and β > 0). Also the option to award the water franchise to  
an “in house” firm is preferred to the one to privatise water service provision in the 
hands of a business company selected through tender offer competition, because – 
Clg1 – γ Clg2 + ε Blg1 > – Clg1 – Clg2 (provided that 0 < γ < 1 and ε > 0). Again, local 
governments  get  the lowest  payoff if  they make the OTA authorities  award the 
water franchise to business companies selected through tender offer competition. 
Whether local governments make the OTA authorities award the water franchise to 
“in house” firms, or to mixed public-private ownership firms, or not to award any 
water franchise, instead, depends on the relative value of – Clg1 – γ Clg2 + ε Blg1, – 
Clg1 – α Clg2 + β Blg1, and – Clg1. 
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The payoff of privatising water service provision in the hands of “in house” 
firms may be the highest among other choice option. If local governments pool 
together their water management functions in an “in house” firm, then the cost of 
the (partial) loss of direct control of the water management function may be lower 
than in the case where local governments share ownership of the water firm with a 
private  investor  (i.e.,  γ  <  α).  In  terms  of  benefits  which  arise  from  jointly 
controlling a larger water firm, if  local governments are the only owners of the 
water firm then they can arguably get higher benefits than if they share control with 
private operators or investors too (i.e., ε > β), because of greater congruence of 
preferences between local governments than between local governments and private 
actors. The option to award the water franchise to “in house” firms, then, may be 
the preferred one with respect to both privatising water service provision in the 
hand of a mixed public-private ownership firm (if ε B lg1 – γ Clg2 > β Blg1 – α Clg2 ) or 
not awarding the water franchise (if ε Blg1 – γ Clg2 > 0).
In sum, this part of the analysis accounts for why, after the “turning point” 
dated in 2001, the OTA authorities accelerated the process of awarding the water 
franchises.  This explanatory research argument  highlights  the  importance  of  the 
institutional  changes  brought  about  by  the  2001 and 2003 local  public  services 
reforms,  and  of  the  ways  ownership  structure  of  water  firms  may  affect  the 
allocation  of  costs  and  benefits  related  to  local  governments'  give  up  of  water 
management functions and shared control of larger water firms. The explanatory 
argument, therefore, is particularly sensitive to changed features of the local public 
service reforms design (especially, the inclusion or removal of option choices for 
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the  award  of  water  franchises)  and  of  the  sector  characteristics  (i.e.,  local 
governments' stakes in the water management function). 
3. Chapter summary.
The analytic narrative presented in this chapter provides an explanation of 
the path and outcome of the implementation of the water reform in Italy in the 
period  1994-2006  by  following  the  institutional  rational  choice  approach.  The 
explanation for the trajectory of the implementation of the liberalisation and re-
regulation part of the water reform accounts for both the faltering implementation 
process in the period 1994-1997 and the acceleration of the implementation process 
after the “turning point” in 1997, as well as for the divergent trajectory of the water 
reform implementation in Alto Valdarno with respect to  the general pattern in  the 
country. The core of the explanatory argument is that, after the enactment of the 
water  reform in  1994,  features  of  the  water  reform design,  of  the  water  sector 
characteristics, and of the territorial organisation of water service provision induced 
local  government  to  neglect  defining  the  OTA boundaries.  In  1997,  however, 
changes in the water policy domain related to the piece of legislation that provided 
funding for sewage and wastewater treatment works,  in conjunction with steady 
conditions  of  water  sector  characteristics,  resulted in  making local  governments 
active to define the OTA boundaries. Once regional legislations were passed, local 
governments also progressed to establish the OTA authorities,  when information 
about early experiences of implementing the water reform in the Alto Valdarno area 
contributed  persuading  local  governments  of  the  viability  and  net  benefits  of 
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executing the water reform mandate.
The explanation for the privatisation part of the water reform accounts for 
both  the  obstructed  implementation  process  in  the  period  1994-2001  and  its 
acceleration  after  the  “turning  point”  in  2001,  together  with  the  resulting 
heterogeneous organisational forms of water service delivery at the local level. The 
core of the explanatory argument is that, after the enactment of the water reform in 
1994,  features  of  the  water  reform  design  and  of  water  sector  characteristics 
induced  local  governments  not  to  make  the  OTA authorities  award  any  water 
franchise. In 2001, a reform of local public services brought about changes of the 
water reform design features which, in conjunction with steady conditions of water 
sector characteristics, made local governments seriously consider to award water 
franchises  to  mixed public-private  ownership  firms.  In  2003,  another  reform of 
local public services changed again the features of the water reform design, that, in 
conjunction with the conditions recalled above, opened up to local governments the 
option to award water franchises to “in house” firms. 
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Chapter 7
Analysing the implementation  of the water reform in Italy (1994-2006):
institutional processualist approach
This chapter presents an analysis of the implementation stage of the water 
reform in Italy in the period 1994-2006 conducted by following an institutional 
processualist  approach.  The  chosen  explanandum  of  the  analysis  is,  as  in  the 
previous chapter, what accounts for the variation in the pace of the implementation 
of the water reform between a first period, that amounted to a failure to execute the 
regulatory reform mandate, and a second period, that resulted in a final state close 
to  full  implementation;  and  what  accounts  for  the  variation  in  the  pace  of  the 
implementation of the water reform between the Alto Valdarno area in Tuscany and 
the rest of country. 
As the previous chapter, also this one is divided into two parts. The first part 
is  concerned  with  analysing  the  implementation  of  the  liberalisation  and  re-
regulation part of the water reform. We will again follow two steps in the analysis. 
First,  an explanation will  be provided of why,  after  the enactment  of the water 
reform, local governments did not define the boundaries of the OTAs, while those 
in Alto Valdarno progressed relatively faster. Then, we will explain why, after the 
“turning  point”  set  in  1997,  local  governments  progressed  to  define  the  OTA 
boundaries and establish the OTA authorities. 
The  second  part  of  this  chapter  will  analyse  the  implementation  of  the 
privatisation part of the water reform. Again, this part of the analysis is conducted 
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in two steps. First, an explanation will be provided of why, after the establishment 
of the OTA authorities, generally water franchises were not awarded. Next step will 
be to explain, then, why, after the 2001 “turning point”, water franchises started to 
be awarded especially  to  mixed public-private  ownership firms and,  after  2003, 
generally to “in house” firms.
1. Explaining the implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of 
the water reform.
1.1. Explaining the faltering implementation process in the first period (1994-
1997).
The  first  step  of  this  part  of  the  analysis  is  explaining  why,  after  the 
enactment of the water reform, local governments did not define the boundaries of 
the OTAs. In order to tackle this question, we consider first the role played by two 
features of the water reform statute. First, Act 36/1994 required that responsibility 
for settling the geographical boundaries of OTA authorities be shared by regional 
and local governments. Regions were given the exclusive authority to divide their 
territories into watershed areas.  They could not exercise this authority, however, 
before local  governments had agreed on the boundaries of the OTAs within the 
regional territories. Neither the regional nor central government could impose the 
OTA boundaries on their  own authority,  because of the constitutional autonomy 
granted to local governments on the organisation of local public services. Second, 
Act 36/1994 required that the regions passed regional legislation which made the 
water reform enforceable at the regional level within six months after its coming 
into  effect.  No  penalty,  however,  was  provided in  case  the  regions  missed  the 
deadline. 
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Explaining  why  the  water  reform statute  contained  these  provisions  lies 
outside the scope of this analysis of the implementation stage of the water reform. 
At least two features of the context within which the water reform was made are 
relevant  here,  however.  First,  the  Constitution  of  Italy,  which  granted  to  local 
governments some autonomy from the national legislation on such matters as the 
organisation and management of local public services. Second, national legislation 
on local public services (Act 142/1990), which provided that local governments 
could choose whether to pool together the delivery of local public services or not, 
and to which kind of firm local public service franchises could be awarded. These 
conditions  clearly  constrained  the  alternatives  available  to  policy-makers  when 
designing the water reform statute. 
What kind of behaviour of local governments did these features of the water 
reform statute  elicit?128 The provision contained in the water  reform statute that 
required local government to define the OTA boundaries can be understood as a 
“cooperative intergovernmental  policy mandate” (May,  1995).  The water reform 
mandated  sub-national  governments  to  collaborate  in  order  to  achieve  a  given 
objective – defining the OTA boundaries – while remaining largely silent on how 
implementers were expected to accomplish it. As highlighted by May (1995), in 
such  scenario  the  implementation  of  the  policy  mandate  is  sensitive  to 
implementers'  technical  and  financial  capacity,  inducements  for  compliance, 
structure of the policy community, and implementers' commitment. In the absence 
128 For the sake of simplicity, this analysis will generally refer to local governments and regional 
governments as actors within the water reform implementation process, although it should more 
appropriately  mention  the  politicians  in  executive  positions  within  local  governments  and 
regional governments. Whenever appropriate, the analysis will more precisely refer to individual 
level. 
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of  any  of  these  conditions,  May  (1995)  argued,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the 
mandate is carried out.
Conditions within the water sector in Italy, especially related to features of 
the water industry and of local governments’ stakes in water firms, seemed loaded 
against the implementation of the water reform statute. Such conditions included 
widespread direct local governments’ ownership of water firms all over the country. 
As  recounted  in  the  historical  background,  these  features  of  the water  sector 
originated from local governments'  traditional  role  in  the supply of local  public 
services  (including  water)  in  the  early  twentieth  century.  Over  time,  local 
governments had come to dominate the water industry by directly providing water 
services  either  through  own  agencies  or  local  governments'  consortia.  Local 
governments'  stakes in water firms also came to play an important role in local 
government  politics,  because  they allowed politicians  to  gain  support  of  voters' 
clienteles by granting favours in the form of water-related job and public contracts.
Conditions within the water sector also included the fragmentation of the 
water  industry  into  relatively  small  service  areas.  These  areas  generally 
corresponded to the administrative territories of single local governments or local 
government consortia. Also these features of the water sector originated from local 
governments'  traditional  role  in  the  supply  of  water  services  about  one  century 
before, when local governments established water providers and took over privately 
owned water firms which serviced the municipal areas. In some southern regions of 
the country only, where local communities were mostly scattered over relatively dry 
and cragged territories, did the central government and the regional governments 
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organise  part  of  water  service  provision  through  relatively  large  firms  (e.g., 
Acquedotto Pugliese, EAF, and ESAF). In the rest of the country, the same hydro-
geographical characteristics of the territory generally induced the construction of 
relatively small-scale water supply systems. 
These  conditions  need  to  be  taken  into  account  for  understanding  the 
identities of local governments, the ways in which they perceived their situations, 
how they interpreted their role and, consequently, how they considered appropriate 
to behave (March and Olsen, 1989; March, 1994). When called to collaborate to 
define  the  boundaries  of  the  OTAs,  local  government could  anticipate  that  this 
activity would commit them to later centralise their water planning and regulatory 
functions,  and that  they would  be  later  expected  to  pool  together  water  service 
provision  with  other  neighbouring  local  governments.  Given local  governments' 
identities as direct providers of water services to local communities, as well as their 
stakes in the water firms,  they could consider  appropriate  to  their  role  to  resist 
implementing the liberalisation and re-regulation of the water sector as provided by 
the water reform. Acting in this way allowed them to protect their position as direct 
providers of water services and to retain their influence on water-related jobs and 
public contracts. 
Both features of the water reform design (that put local governments in the 
position of “veto players” in the definition of the OTA boundaries) and of the water 
sector concurred in making local governments hamper the implementation process. 
The central government tried to make the regional governments pass the regional 
legislation irrespective of local governments' inertia. A question arises, then, about 
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whether the regions  could surrender to  central  government's  pressure.  As actors 
within  the  multi-layered  governance  structure  of  Italy,  the  regions  were  not 
compelled  to  conform  to  the  central  government's  instructions.  Additionally, 
conditions  of  the  polity  and  historical  context  –  especially,  the  constitutional 
autonomy granted to local governments on the organisation and management of 
local public services, and the political weakness of the central government and the 
regional governments in the aftermath of the 1992-1993 corruption scandals – could 
also contribute making the regions resist passing the required legislations despite 
local governments’ inertia to define the OTA boundaries.
Another question arises concerning whether the central government could 
affect the definition of the OTA boundaries. The central government threatened the 
regions to exercise the substitutive powers to circumvent the obstruction to pass the 
regional legislations. The resignation of the Minister of Public Works Di Pietro, 
however, weakened the sense of urgency that he had tried to instil on the regional 
governments. The postponing of deadlines for passing the regional legislation by 
his  successor,  Costa,  plausibly  undermined the  credibility  of  the  threat  that  the 
regions  might  attribute  to  national  governments'  prospective actions.  Conditions 
such as turnover of government officers, then, are also part of the explanation for 
the  ineffective  actions  conducted  by  the  central  government  to  stimulate  the 
implementation process. 
1.2. Explaining variation from the overall pattern in Alto Valdarno area (1994-
1999).
Differently from the general pattern described above, in the area of Tuscany 
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called Alto Valdarno local governments collaborated with each other to define the 
OTA boundaries  since  immediately  after  the  passing  of  the  water  reform.  In 
explaining what accounts for this within-case variation, we focus on the particular 
initial and context conditions that were especially present in Alto Valdarno with 
respect to the rest of the country.
In  Alto  Valdarno,  local  governments  had  been  concerned  with  the 
reorganisation of water service provision since well  before the enactment of the 
water  reform.  We  briefly  recall  that,  by  1993,  the  gas  firm  owned  by  the 
municipalities  of  Arezzo,  Coingas,  had  marshalled  the  consensus  of  local 
governments of the Alto Valdarno area for merging local government-owned water 
and  gas  firms.  Even if  Coingas'  plan  was  eventually  dropped  after  turnover  in 
mayor's office, local governments of Alto Valdarno had come to broadly agree on 
the terms of consolidation of water and gas service provision and of the ownership 
structure of the consolidated public service firm. Arezzo's mayor Paolo Ricci, in 
addition, subscribed to the policy idea held by the Tuscany branch of Italy's party 
Democratici di Sinistra (DS), which envisioned the award of local public services to 
mixed public-private ownership companies. Specifically, the mayor advocated the 
merger  of  local  government-owned  water  firms  within  the  Alto  Valdarno  area 
surrounding Arezzo.
By the  time  the  national  water  reform was  enacted  in  1994,  a  cohesive 
“water  policy  community”  within  Alto  Valdarno  had  formed.  This  policy 
community – mainly constituted by a network of local water policy experts – had 
reached accord on the advantages and on the details of reorganising water service 
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provision in Alto Valdarno. Differently from other local governments in the rest of 
country, that resisted the definition of the OTA boundaries because anticipating that 
the consolidation of water firms would make them lose some influence on the local  
water industry, those of Alto Valdarno were united by a common definition of the 
problem and the domain. As a whole, the policy community formed around local 
governments of Alto Valdarno was capable and motivated to act as an advocacy 
coalition (Sabatier, 1988) for the implementation of the national water reform. 
The social mechanism of committed interpretation can help explaining why 
local  governments of  Alto Valdarno collaborated to  define  the OTA boundaries. 
Committed interpretation (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) is an important mechanism 
that generates sense-making in organisational settings (Weick, 2001). Briefly put, it 
provides that actors' behaviour is rationalised by referring to confirmatory features 
of  the  environment,  and  that  attention  to  environmental  features  is  selectively 
placed on those that better support actors' behaviour itself. Once actions are made 
public  and volitional,  actors  cannot  easily  deny,  disown,  or  reverse  them. They 
rather search for environmental cues that help justifying why actors should stick to 
the same course of action.
In Alto Valdarno, the mayors of Arezzo and of the other local governments 
openly  committed  themselves  to  consolidate  water  services  since  before  the 
enactment  of  the water reform. When they approved Coingas'  plan for merging 
water and gas services, they made public a policy orientation that they later could 
hardly disown. Features of the water reform design, especially the requirement to 
pool together local governments' water planning and regulatory functions within the 
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OTAs,  provided  cues  that  water  services  should  be  consolidated.  Local 
governments  of  Alto  Valdarno,  then,  shared  a  sense  of  unity  of  purpose  and 
commitment that facilitated the negotiations for defining the OTA boundaries, once 
the water reform was enacted.
1.3.  Explaining  the  acceleration  of  the  implementation  process  after  the 
turning point (1997-2006).
The implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water 
reform remarkably accelerated after the “turning point” in 1997. In order to explain 
why this happened, we examine, first, how contemporaneous events changed the 
context where local governments were required to define the OTA boundaries. An 
important  contemporaneous  event  was  the  policy-making  cycle  that  culminated 
with the passing, in October 1997, of Act 344/1997. This legislation provided that 
the  central  government  would  allocate  funds  for  investments  in  sewage  and 
wastewater treatment systems on the basis of plans prepared by regional or local 
governments. This planning and budgeting scheme also provided that plans would 
be  formulated  according to  OTA territories  –  hence,  the  definition  of  the  OTA 
boundaries was required in order to get the plans funded. 
The  making  of  the  1997  legislation  was  affected  by  local  governments' 
inertia to define the OTA boundaries. In June 1997, the Supervising Committee on 
the Use of Water Resources had issued its first report to the Parliament on the state 
of the implementation of the water reform, which briefed MPs about the obstacles 
encountered in implementing the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water 
reform.  Legislators  of  the  Territory,  Environment  and  Environmental  Goods 
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Committee  of  the Senate might  have  considered that  the  implementation  of  the 
legislation  then  under  consideration  could  well  be  blocked  by  the  same 
constellation of factors that had halted the implementation of the water reform. In 
order to prevent this source of implementation failure, the committee included in 
the  legislation  under  consideration  the  provision  that,  in  the  event  local 
governments did not reach a mutual agreement on OTA boundaries, the regional 
governments could pass regional legislations that made OTA boundaries coincide 
with the provincial ones. With this provision, the legislation cleared both the Senate 
and the House in September 1997.
A side  issue  arises,  here,  concerning  how the  central  government  could 
overrule the autonomy of local governments under the constitution on the matter of 
defining  water  service  areas.  As  narrated  in  the  historical  background,  policy-
makers of the 1994 water reform could not mandate local governments to establish 
compulsory consortia because of local governments' constitutional autonomy on the 
organisation and management  of  local  public  services.  The making of  the 1997 
legislation,  however,  did  not  compel  local  governments  to  define  the  OTA 
boundaries nor, for that matter, to establish the OTA authorities. In other words, the 
1997 legislation required local governments to define territories where funds for 
infrastructure development would be allocated, not where water services would be 
centralised.  Taking  into  consideration  the  difficulties  encountered  in  the 
implementation  of  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the  water  reform 
under  way,  the  Senate  committee  members  decided  to  relate  allocation  of 
infrastructure development funds to prospective water service areas. This link, as 
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we  are  going  to  see,  had  important  consequences  for  the  trajectory  of  the 
implementation process.
Another side issue that also deserves some consideration, however, is why 
policy-makers did not include this provision in the design of the water reform in the 
first place. As narrated in the historical background, the making of the water reform 
took place in  an historical  context  characterised by particular  conditions.  These 
conditions include the outbreak of one of the worst financial crisis of Italy in 1992-
1993,  which  had  brought  public  finance  under  considerable  stress.  Given these 
conditions,  at  that  time the  national  government  could make limited use of the 
instrument of “treasure” (Hood, 1983) as a way of stimulating local governments' 
interest  to  get  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the  water  reform 
implemented.  By 1997,  instead,  these conditions  had largely  disappeared,  while 
other  conditions  related  to  access  to  EU  funds  for  infrastructure  development 
programmes enabled the allocation of funds on the basis of the new water service 
areas.
What was the effect of the 1997 legislation on local governments' response 
to the liberalisation and re-regulation of water services? The legislation passed in 
1997, in conjunction with given initial conditions, had the effect to rise the issue of 
the definition of the OTA boundaries in local governments'  agendas.  This effect 
resulted,  in  particular,  from the  joint  combination  of  two  conditions.  First,  the 
provision contained in the 1997 legislation that required the definition of the OTAs 
in order to access funds for infrastructure development. Second, local governments' 
stakes in water firms among the characteristics of the water sector, that induced 
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local  governments  to  appropriate  funds  to  be  spent  in  their  administrative 
jurisdictions. 
Provided that the issue of the definition of the OTA boundaries had gained 
attention in local governments' agendas, another question is how local governments 
solved this issue under consideration. We can recall that local governments agreed 
to define the OTAs according to existing administrative jurisdictions. In most of the 
regions (12), the OTA boundaries equalled, or were very proximate to, provincial 
territories. In some regions (5), local governments agreed to define one only OTA 
which corresponded to the territory of the whole region. In Tuscany and Campania 
only did the OTA boundaries map onto watershed river areas. Setting the cases of 
OTAs in Tuscany and Campania aside129, then, generally local governments found 
their  way out  of  the  negotiations over  the definition of the OTA boundaries  by 
resorting to status-quo conditions. 
The  fact  that  local  governments  generally  defined  the  OTA boundaries 
according to the territories of existing administrative jurisdictions may be related to 
how they anticipated the consequences of executing the water reform mandate for 
the organisation of water service provision. Had local governments been concerned 
with  the  design  of  centralised  water  planning  and  regulatory  functions  in 
accordance with the principles of the water reform, they would arguably define the 
OTA boundaries according to features of the watershed river areas. Instead, local 
129 Evidence collected on the implementation of the water reform in Alto Valdarno area shed some 
light onto the conditions that concurred to affect the path and outcome of the implementation 
process in this region. No evidence has been collected, instead, on the implementation of water  
reform in Campania. This gap, which is primarily imputed to lack of resources for zooming in 
the implementation process at the local level, might be well filled by further research, intended to 
undertake  explicit  comparative  case  study between  single  trajectories  of  the  implementation 
stage of the water reform at the local (i.e., OTA) level.
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governments seemed mainly concerned with defining the OTA boundaries as a way 
of catching the opportunity (McAdam et al.,  2001) of appropriating funds to be 
spent in their administrative jurisdictions – with little regard to the implication that 
water franchises would be awarded on an OTA-by-OTA basis, and therefore future 
water  service  providers  would  serve  users'  basins  tailored  to  administrative 
jurisdictions that did not necessarily fit technical or economic efficiency criteria. 
Once local governments had reached an agreement on the OTA boundaries, 
the regions progressed to pass the regional legislation relatively fast. Much of the 
political controversy that had impeded the making of regional legislations rested in 
the definition of the boundaries of the OTAs. Once this issue ad been settled, the 
regions did not encounter any tough resistance form local governments anymore. 
Why, anyway,  did the regions care to pass the regional legislations? In order to 
address this question, we again consider that the context where such decisions were 
made included conditions related to the linkage between the implementation of the 
water reform and access to funding water infrastructure development. Provided that 
also regional governments were interested to appropriate funds for infrastructure 
investments likewise local governments, this condition played an important role in 
making the regions pass the regional legislations in relatively short time.
After  the  regions  passed  the  required  legislations,  local  governments 
progressed  in  establishing  the  OTA  authorities.  Why  did  they  care?  The 
establishment of the OTA authorities implied that these new local regulatory entities 
were  transferred  the  water  planning  and  regulatory  functions  of  the  local 
governments. According to canons of instrumental rationality,  local governments 
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should have resisted centralising these functions into the OTA authorities in order to 
retain stronger influence on local water industries. As already recalled, influence on 
local water industries allowed local government politicians to affect  water-related 
jobs and public contracts. Within local governments' political economy, influence 
on  the  local  water  industries  helped  local  politicians  in  executive  positions  to 
cultivate supportive constituencies.
Conditions associated with changing sector characteristics and interests of 
water  policy  experts  need  to  be  taken  into  account,  then,  to  explain  local 
governments' decisions to establish the OTA authorities. We can recall that, from 
1997 onwards, local governments became exposed to information about other parts 
of  Italy where the  OTA authorities  had been established.  The early experiences 
conducted  in  Tuscany  were  frequently  referenced  as  exemplars  of  how  water 
service provision could be liberalised and re-regulated. This view was especially 
channelled,  in  the  forms  of  a  stock  of  publications  and  conference  speeches, 
through a network of water policy experts whose professional identification centred 
in the association of municipal water and gas companies Federgasacqua. Generally, 
water policy experts referred to the establishment of the OTA authorities in Alto 
Valdarno (and, later, in other areas) as “success stories” of the “Tuscany model” that 
showed the viability of pooling together water service provision within watershed 
areas.
Early  experiences  of  establishing  the  OTA authorities  in  Tuscany,  then, 
brought about changes of water sector characteristics. First, these events changed 
the organisation of the local water industry in Alto Valdarno, in the sense of making 
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it  partially  aligned  with  the  water  reform objectives.  Second,  these  events  also 
affected  the  formation  of  local  water  policy  communities  in  the  same  OTA in 
Tuscany,  in  the  sense  of  making  the  network  of  water  policy  experts  more 
interconnected.  These  changing sector  characteristics,  in  conjunction  with  water 
policy experts' efforts to advocate the merits of implementing the liberalisation and 
re-regulation part of the water reform, triggered the activation of a mechanism of 
diffusion of ideas concerning the merit of establishing the OTA authorities. 
The  social  mechanism  of  diffusion  (or  network  diffusion)  is  widely 
employed as  a  processual  theoretical  resource  in  social  sciences  (Hedström and 
Swedberg,  1998; Coleman et al.,  1957).  In essence,  the mechanism of diffusion 
centres  on  the  notion  that  “one  individual’s  belief  in  the  value  or  necessity  of 
performing a certain act is partially a function of the number of other individuals 
who have already performed the act. In an uncertain decision context, the number 
of individuals who perform a particular act signals to others the likely value or 
necessity  of  the  act,  and this  signals  will  influence  other  individuals’ choice  of 
action” (Hedström and Swedberg,  1998: 313).  At the very core of the diffusion 
mechanism, then, rests the view that imitation of others' actions is one main driver 
of  individual  behaviour  (Schelling,  1998;  Hedström,  1998).  Within  any  social 
process, the mechanism of diffusion results in the progressive enlargement of the 
number of actors involved in performing similar activities over time. 
In  the  implementation  of  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the 
water reform, the mechanism of diffusion contributes explaining how policy ideas 
spread from early experiences conducted in Alto Valdarno (and, later, in other areas 
229
of Tuscany, too) to the rest of the country. Conditions related to the alignment of the 
local  water  industry  in  Tuscany  with  the  water  reform  objectives  and  to  the 
interconnection of the network of water policy expert in the country played the role 
of an enabling factor for the activation of the diffusion mechanism. Policy ideas that  
gained currency in Tuscany, clearly, could not “spread” to the rest of the country if 
water policy experts had not exerted efforts to advocate water liberalisation and re-
regulation.  Water  policy  experts  generally  endorsed  these  ideas,  which  matched 
well-regarded guidelines for organising and managing water service provision as 
developed in the international water policy community.
In explaining why the idea to establish the OTA authorities gained currency 
among  local  governments,  we  can  also  consider  some  benefits  that  local 
governments  gained  from  the  centralisation  of  water  planning  and  regulatory 
functions. The early experiences in Alto Valdarno showed that local governments 
could enjoy shared  control  of  the  activities  carried  out  by the  OTA authorities, 
especially the award of water franchises to local government-owned firms and the 
selection of private partners. Control of these activities could help mayors and local 
governments' cabinet officers to marshal the political consensus to centralise water 
regulation in the municipal councils, where resistance to give up close control of the 
local  water industry was rooted in  strong ideological  positions (especially,  both 
right-wing and left-wing parties, like Lega Nord and Partito Comunista Italiano, 
regarded  public  ownership  as  the  most  appropriate  regulatory  system  of  water 
service provision). 
In  explaining  how  local  governments  agreed  to  establish  the  OTA 
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authorities,  we  can  also  consider  the  absence  of  coordination  costs  required  to 
negotiate the territorial jurisdictions of future water service providers. Once OTA 
boundaries  had  been  defined,  local  governments  did  not  need  to  devote  their 
attention to issues related to the formation of the coalitions of municipalities taking 
part  to  the  establishment  of  the  OTA authorities.  In  other  words,  the  issue  of 
defining which local governments are included in the OTAs had been de-coupled 
from the  one  of  defining  the  terms  of  centralisation  of  the  water  planning and 
regulatory functions. Also this condition could play an important role in the framing 
of local governments' agenda when they came to consider the issue of establishing 
the OTA authorities. 
1.4. Synthesis.
The  explanation  for  the  path  and  outcome  of  the  liberalisation  and  re-
regulation part of the water reform can be illustrated, in synthesis, in Table 7.1. 
Table  7.1  exhibits  the  component  parts  of  the  explanatory  argument  across  the 
different  trajectories  followed  in  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the 
water reform implementation over time and across space. Component parts of the 
explanatory argument include initial conditions that characterise the “status quo” of 
the water sector before the coming into force of the 1994 water  reform; policy 
content features related to the water sector; policy process features related to the 
mode  of  interaction  within  the  water  policy  domain;  and  historical  context 
conditions  that  originate  from contemporaneous  events.  In  addition,  component 
parts  of the explanatory argument  also include the social  mechanisms that have 
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been  employed  for  providing  hypothetical  causal  linkages  between  the  joint 
occurrences  of  causal  conditions  and  the  features  of  the  water  reform 
implementation  trajectory  that  are  explained.  These  component  parts  of  the 
explanatory arguments are provided for both explaining the inertia to implement the 
liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform in the period 1994-1997, 
the implementation that took place in Alto Valdarno in the period 1994-1999, and 
the acceleration of the overall implementation pattern in the country in the period 
1997-2001.
232
Inertia part
(1994-1997)
Alto Valdarno part 
(1994-1999)
Accelerated liberalization and re-regulation part
(1997-2006)
Explananda No execution of the water reform mandate Establishment of the new water regulatory system Establishment of the new water regulatory system
Initial conditions Features of the water industry (fragmentation of the water 
sector and diffused local government ownership of water 
service providers)
Stakes of local governments (cultivation of electoral 
support of local constituencies)
Features of the water industry (diffused local government 
ownership of water service providers)
Stakes of local governments (cultivation of electoral 
support of local constituencies)
Negotiated agreement on reforming water service provision 
(consolidating water services and opening up access to 
private operators and investors)
Features of the water industry (diffused local government 
ownership of water service providers)
Stakes of local governments (cultivation of electoral 
support of local constituencies)
Policy content features Consolidation of water services 
Centralisation of water regulatory functions
Consolidation of water services 
Centralisation of water regulatory functions
Consolidation of water services 
Centralisation of water regulatory functions
Funding of sewage and wastewater treatment infrastructure
Policy process features Water reform procedural rules 
(required agreement between local governments; lack of 
penalty for missing deadline)
Formation of an advocacy coalition
(shared views about re-regulating local water service 
provision)
Activation of the policy community of water experts
(diffusion of ideas about early experience of water reform 
implementation)
Sequencing of water reform implementation tasks 
(definition of the OTAs decoupled from the negotiation 
about the centralisation of water planning and regulatory 
functions)
Historical context 
conditions
Constitutional autonomy of local governments on 
organisation and management of local public services
Political weakness of governmental authorities after 1992-
1993 corruption scandals
Turnover of government officers
Constitutional autonomy of local governments on 
organisation and management of local public services
Policy orientation of Tuscany's DS party 
Constitutional autonomy of local governments on 
organisation and management of local public services
Hypothesized social 
mechanisms
Logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989; March 
1994)
Committed interpretation 
(Weick 2001; Salancik and Pfeffer 1978)
Attribution of opportunities and threats (McAdam et al. 
2001)
Network diffusion (Hedström and Swedberg 1998; 
Coleman et al., 1957)
Table 7.1. Components of the explanatory argument for the path and outcome of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform implementation (1994-2006).
2. Explaining the implementation of the privatisation part of the water reform.
2.1.  Explaining  the  obstructed  implementation  process  in  the  first  period 
(1994-2001).
While  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the  water  reform  was 
implemented,  generally the newly established OTA authorities did not undertake 
any action to award water franchises. In order to explain this inertia, we first need 
to  review how the  decision  to  privatise  water  service  provision  was  made.  An 
important  condition,  in  this  respect,  is  the  governance  system  of  the  OTA 
authorities.  The  OTA authorities  were  established  as  organisations  owned  and 
controlled  by  local  governments,  rather  than  as  independent  agencies.  Local 
governments, in other words, retained considerable influence on the decisions made 
by the OTA authorities, including those related to the privatisation of water service 
provision. These features of the governance system of the OTA authorities resulted 
from the decisions that local governments made in the establishment of the OTA 
authorities themselves. These decisions, in turn, were especially affected by features 
of the water reform statute (which did not provide that the OTA authorities should 
be necessarily established as independent regulators of local water industries) and 
of  general  legislation  of  local  public  services,  in  conjunction  with  local 
governments' interest to retain influence on the local water industries.
Another  important  condition  to  take  into  account  relates  to  the 
characteristics of the water sector, especially diffused local government ownership 
of  water  service  providers  and  local  governments'  stakes  in  the  local  water 
industries.  As  already  recalled,  local  governments'  influence  on  the  local  water 
industries  played  an  important  role  in  the  local  political  economy,  because 
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politicians could acquire  support of voters'  clienteles by granting favours in the 
form of influence on water-related jobs and public contracts. Local governments, 
then, were inclined to resist privatisation schemes that implied any significant loss 
of control  of water management functions, if  not compensated by any (at least) 
commensurate benefit. The governance system of the OTA authorities allowed them 
to affect the selection of privatisation schemes, provided that only the majority of 
local governments could make the OTA authorities adopt binding decisions. Local 
governments'  stakes  in  the  local  water  industries,  in  this  respect,  were  rather 
homogeneous  within  any  given  OTA,  therefore  conflicts  between  local 
governments  concerning the  adoption  of  privatisation  schemes  were unlikely  to 
arise. 
Why, then, did local governments not make the OTA authorities award the 
water franchises in this part of the episode? In order to answer this question, we 
especially  take  into  account  design  features  of  the  water  reform  and  initial 
conditions of the water industry. Design features of the water reform included the 
provisions that each OTA authority would award water franchises to one only water 
company – apart from exceptional circumstances in which water franchises could 
be awarded to more than one water company in the same OTA (by partitioning the 
OTA service  area)  if  incumbent  water  firms  satisfied  criteria  of  economic  self-
sufficiency. In order to be eligible to receive the water franchise, water firms were 
required to possess the size and capacity to service entire OTA users' basins.
Initial conditions of the water industry include the ownership structure of the 
water industry, especially the predominance of local government-owned firms and 
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consortia  among  water  service  providers  in  the  country.  Given  that  the  design 
features of the water reform required that water franchises should be awarded to 
mixed public-private ownership firms or to business companies selected through 
tender offer competitions, then incumbent local government-owned firms were not 
eligible for managing water service provision. Local governments, however, were 
generally inclined to resist sharing ownership of water firms with private partners, 
because the joint ownership of water firms would limit the discretion that they had 
traditionally  exercised  on  the  management  of  water  firms.  Typically,  local 
governments  were  even  less  inclined  to  contract  out  water  service  provision, 
because the award of water franchises to business companies would have spoiled 
them of their sway on water business. 
Taking  these  conditions  into  account,  we  argue  that  local  governments 
considered it appropriate for their identity and role to keep the privatisation of water  
service  provision  out  of  their  agendas  (March,  1994;  March and  Olsen,  1989). 
Design  features  of  the  water  reform  implied  that  local  governments  should 
consolidate their incumbent water firms into larger providers and give up at least 
part of their ownership. Given local governments' traditional role in the supply of 
local public services, the costs of pursuing privatisation of water service provision 
were apparent, in the form of loss of influence on water-related jobs and public 
contracts.  No apparent  benefits,  instead,  did  local  governments  expect  from the 
decision to privatise water services according to any of the schemes provided by the 
water reform. 
As recounted in the historical narrative, during the period 1994-2001 only 
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one area of the country did deviate from the general pattern of implementing the 
privatisation part of the water reform. In Alto Valdarno, the OTA Authority came to 
award the water franchise to a mixed public-private ownership firm, Nuove Acque, 
in 1999. As already explained in the first part of this chapter, particular features of 
the  setting  of  Tuscany  in  general  and  Alto  Valdarno  in  particular  contribute 
accounting for the deviation of the trajectory of implementation of the water reform 
in this area from the general pattern in the country. Well before the enactment of the 
water reform in 1994, in this part of Tuscany the idea to consolidate and partially 
privatise  incumbent  water  and  gas  service  providers  had  gained  serious 
consideration  among  local  policy-makers.  Negotiations  conducted  for  the 
privatisation of Coingas and other local utility firms, in particular, had contributed 
to the formation of a water policy community that had come to agree on the terms 
of the merger between incumbent local government-owned firms and the sale of 
minority shareholding to private water operators and investors. 
This  agreement  between  local  governments  of  Alto  Valdarno  played  an 
important role in the privatisation of local water service providers. Once the OTA 
Alto Valdarno Authority was established, local governments required little further 
negotiation to come to agree to merge their water firms and make the OTA authority  
select the private partner. Indeed, the privatisation of water service provision seems 
to have never been removed from local governments' agendas – at least, from the 
one of the leading municipality in the area, Arezzo, that had openly committed to 
this course of action (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978; Weick, 2001). Additionally, the 
privatisation  scheme  which  had  been  considered  for  the  centralisation  of  water 
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service provision – namely, the award of water franchise to a mixed public-private 
ownership firm – corresponded to one of those allowed by the water reform design. 
These conditions,  then, facilitated the privatisation of water service provision in 
Alto  Valdarno  and  account  for  the  deviation  of  this  local  trajectory  of  the 
implementation  of  the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform  from  the  general 
pattern in the rest of the country.
2.2.  Explaining  the  acceleration  of  the  implementation  process  after  the 
turning point (2001-2006).
From 2001 onwards,  the  number of  OTA authorities  that  awarded water 
franchises sharply increased. In order to explain why this acceleration took place 
after a “turning point” in 2001, we examine, first, how a piece of legislation (Act 
448/2001) passed in 2001 changed conditions relate to features of the water reform 
and of the context of the water sector. As we shall see, these changed conditions 
played an important role in the privatisation of water service provision. Then, we 
examine  how other  pieces  of  legislation  (Legislative  Decree  269/2003  and  Act 
350/2003) passed in 2003 and a constitutional reform (Constitutional Act 3/2001) 
changed again conditions related to features of the water reform, and how these 
changes contributed affecting the implementation of the privatisation process. 
As recounted in the historical narrative, in 2001 the central government led 
the Parliament to pass a reform of local public services. The reform originated, in 
part,  from  central  government's  liberalisation  agenda,  and,  in  part,  from  the 
requirement  to transpose EU directives 92/50/CE and 93/38/CE on transparency 
and  publicity  of  procedures  for  awarding  public  service  franchise  and  public 
238
contracts into the national legislation. The 2001 reform provided the general rule 
that local public services should be awarded through tender offer competitions, but 
it also contained special provisions for water services. In this particular sector, the 
award of water franchises through tender offer competitions could be postponed for 
a period up to 10 years if the OTA authorities assigned water concessions to local 
government-owned firms within 18 months (i.e., by 30th June 2003) and if certain 
requirements were satisfied (especially,  if  a  growing part  of water firms'  shares 
were sold to private water operators or investors over time). After the passing of the 
2001  reform,  several  OTA  authorities  intensified  their  efforts  to  finalise  the 
privatisation process. 
Within the conditions of the water sector at that time, the legislation passed 
in 2001 contributed to raise the issue of the privatisation of water service provision 
in local governments' agenda. One important effect of the 2001 legislation, in this 
respect, was to change design features of the water reform, especially in relation to 
the  privatisation  schemes  allowed  to  OTA authorities.  While  the  original  water 
reform statute provided that water franchises should be awarded to either mixed 
public-private ownership firms or to business companies selected through tender 
offer  competitions,  the  provisions  introduced  by  the  2001  local  public  services 
reform mandated to  tender  out  water  service provision while  it  also allowed to 
bypass the tendering out rule by awarding the water franchises to mixed public-
private ownership firms within a set deadline (provided that certain conditions were 
met). 
Among the conditions of the water sector at that time, local governments' 
239
stakes in the local water industries are especially relevant.  This condition made 
local governments generally inclined to retain ownership of water firms rather than 
to give up water service provision to business companies. Given the changed design 
features  of  the  water  reform,  local  governments  faced  the  alternative  between 
surrendering  ownership of  water  firms by tendering  out  the  water franchises  to 
business  companies  or  opening  up  partial  ownership  of  water  firms  to  private 
operators and investors. The deadline set for selecting the option to make the OTA 
authorities  award  the  water  franchises  to  mixed  public-private  ownership  firms 
generated  a  sense  of  urgency  to  consider  the  privatisation  issue  in  local 
governments' agendas. Even if, for the reasons articulated above, local governments 
generally  preferred to  retain the status quo, the requirement  to tender out  water 
service provision after the 30th June 2003 deadline made them seriously consider the 
merits of privatising water service provision according to the mixed public-private 
ownership scheme. 
Since 2001 onwards, several  local governments merged their  water firms 
within  OTAs,  reincorporated  them as  business  companies,  awarded  them water 
franchises,  and  gradually  shared  their  ownership  with  private  operators  and 
investors. Many others, however, did not carry out any action before the 30th June 
2003  deadline130. Particular  conditions,  especially  related  to  features  of  local 
context,  may  account  for  this  variety  of  local  trajectories  of  the  privatisation 
process. One among such conditions is the fragmentation of local water industries 
130 No data are available concerning the number of water franchise concessions awarded by 30 th 
June 2003, but a rough inference suggests that possibly about one third of OTA authorities might  
have accomplished this task. By the end of 2002, water franchises had been awarded in 24 out of  
84 OTAs (29%), while by the end of 2003 the figure had climbed up to 38 out of 87 OTAs 
(44%).
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into several small-scale firms, which required more or less extensive periods needed 
to negotiate the terms of the privatisation scheme. 
Another  of  such  conditions  is  the  heterogeneity  of  ownership  forms131, 
which  related  to  diverse  attitudes  towards  privatisation  held  by  water  firms’ 
management. Among the types of water firms, municipal companies were generally 
associated  to  more  favourable  conditions  towards  privatisation  than  other 
organisational forms, i.e., local government departments and consortia. Municipal 
companies  typically  possess  particular  institutional  features  (especially  statutory 
autonomy with respect to the municipal owner) that make them enjoy relatively 
more “freedom to act” with respect to other types of public service firms. In other 
words, it seems that local government departments and consortia encountered mode 
sources  of  “institutional  inertia”,  in  such  forms  as  statutory  or  legislative 
constraints, that played against the privatisation of water service provision. 
Another  of  such  conditions  is  the  presence  of  policy  ideas  that  were 
supportive of partial privatisation schemes. As recalled in the historical narrative, 
the  Tuscany  branch  of  the  party  Democratici  di  Sinistra  (DS)  had  become 
favourably inclined towards the award of franchises for local  public services to 
mixed public-private ownership firms. Other areas of the country, however, did not 
share the same policy orientation, especially where parties located towards the poles 
of the national political spectrum (e.g., Lega Nord and Partito Comunista Italiano) 
formed part of the executive. As an effect of this variety of conditions, then, Italy 
was not uniform in the readiness of local governments towards the privatisation of 
131 Part of water firms consisted of local government departments, others of municipal companies, 
and others of consortia jointly owned by several municipalities.
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water  service  provision  after  the  2001  legislation.  Only  part  of  the  country, 
therefore, came to privatise water service provisions by mid-2003.
The social mechanism of attribution of opportunities and threats (McAdam 
et al., 2001) may be recalled here to contribute explaining why local governments 
accelerated the privatisation of water service provision after the 2001 legislation. 
Attribution of opportunities and threats is “an activating mechanism responsible in 
part for the mobilisation of previously inert population” (McAdam et al., 2001: 45). 
At  the  core  of  the  mechanism  is  an  interpretation  of  the  context  that  frames 
conditions  as  originating  potentially  beneficial  or  harmful  outcomes.  In  the 
implementation of the  privatisation  part  of the  water  reform, local  governments 
could perceive the 2001 legislation as both a source of opportunities and threats. On 
the  one  hand,  the  mandate  to  tender  out  water  service  provision  evidently 
threatened local governments to lose their influence on local water industries. On 
the  other one,  the possibility  to  award water franchises  to  mixed public-private 
ownership firms offered the opportunity to retain some ownership of the privatised 
water firms. The deadline set on 30th June 2003 could play the role of focusing 
event (Kingdon, 1984) that catalysed local  governments'  efforts  to speed up the 
privatisation of water service provision. 
As recounted in the historical narrative, from 2003 onwards water franchises 
were typically awarded to fully local government-owned firms (“in house”) rather 
than to mixed public-private ownership ones. An important event that should be 
taken into account in order to explain this part of privatisation is the reform policy 
cycle that resulted in legislation passed in 2003, which contained another reform of 
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local public services. The 2003 reform originated, in part, from the request of the 
EC  Commission  to  amend  the  2001  local  public  services  reform  because  its 
provisions  allowed  the  OTA  authorities  to  postpone  the  call  of  tender  offer 
competitions  for  too many years.  In  part,  the 2003 reform also originated from 
pressures that came from the most conservative wing of the governmental coalition, 
which was interested to provide local  government with legal ways to bypass the 
application of tender offer competition rules even after 30th June 2003 deadline. The 
2003 reform provided, in particular, that if certain requirements were met then local 
public  services  could  be  assigned,  rather  than  to  business  companies  selected 
through tender offer competitions or to mixed public-private ownership firms, also 
to companies fully owned by local governments only (“in house”). 
The legislation passed in 2003 brought about important changes of the water 
sector institutional context. Until that time, this context included general legislation 
on local public services that had banned the assignment of local public services 
franchises to fully local  government-owned firms. The 2003 legislation,  instead, 
granted legitimacy to the award of water service provisions to “in house” firms, 
although  under  exceptional  circumstances.  This  change  of  conditions,  in 
conjunction  with  steady  features  of  the  water  sector  and  interests  of  local 
governments  recalled  above,  played  an  important  role  in  enhancing  local 
governments'  efforts  to  privatise  water  service  provision.  These  conditions 
generally stimulated local governments to collaborate to merge their water firms 
and  reincorporate  them  as  business  companies,  while  retaining  joint  local 
government  owned  of  the  “formally”  privatised  water  firms.  In  addition,  these 
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conditions made local governments inclined to select the “in house” scheme for 
making the OTA authorities award the water franchises.
The award of water franchises to “in house” firms offered local governments 
the benefit  of retaining influence on local water industries,  albeit  in a way that 
entailed  shared  ownership  of  water  service  providers.  Rather  than  giving  up 
ownership of water firms to private operators and investors either completely or 
partially,  however,  local  governments  could  merge  their  water  firms  with 
neighbouring  municipalities  within  the  OTAs.  According  to  this  privatisation 
scheme, each and single local government would not enjoy full control of water 
firms, nevertheless it could exercise some influence on larger organisations jointly 
with other municipalities.
Another important event that needs to be taken into account to explain this 
part  of  privatisation  is  the  reform  policy  cycle  that  resulted  in  the  2001 
constitutional  reform.  The  2001  Constitutional  reform,  that  redesigned  the 
allocation of authority and the relationship between government layers of the State, 
provided  (among  others)  that  competences  on  the  organisation  of  local  public 
services and the management of water resources were transferred from the state to 
the regions. On the basis of this reallocation of authority, the regional government 
of  Tuscany appealed to  the Constitutional Court  against  some provisions  of  the 
2003 legislation that (among others) narrowly specified the requisites for awarding 
water franchises to “in house” firms132. The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of 
132 It may be recalled here that these requirements included, in particular, the provision that the 
award  of  franchises  to  “in  house”  companies  should  be  justified  by  particular  efficiency  or 
service delivery circumstances for which the benefits of the “in house” firms offset those of 
awarding the franchise to business companies. On the basis of these requirements, in 2004 the 
Minister of the Environment Altero Matteoli, who advocated the use of tender offer competitions  
for  the  selection of  business  companies,  issued  a couple  of  directives  which remarked  local 
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region  Tuscany's  appeal  in  July  2004,  and  after  this  pronouncement  local 
governments faced no more restrictions to the award of franchises to “in house” 
water firms.
Again,  the  social  mechanism  of  attribution  of  opportunities  and  threats 
(McAdam et  al.,  2001) contributes explaining why local  governments  made the 
OTA  authorities  award  water  franchises  to  “in  house”  firms  after  the  2003 
legislation.  The  2003 legislation  could be  perceived  by local  governments  as  a 
source of opportunity to retain greater influence on local water industries than other 
privatisation  schemes  –  the  award  of  water  franchises  to  mixed  public-private 
ownership  firms  or  to  business  companies  selected  through  tender  offer 
competition.  The 2001 Constitutional reform, instead, could be perceived by the 
regions as a source of opportunity to assert their competences on regulating local 
public services. Both conditions, therefore, come into play in order to explain local 
governments’ efforts to privatise water service provision to “in house” firms despite 
the efforts of the central government (especially, the Minister of the Environment 
Matteoli) to steer the selection of the privatisation scheme. 
2.3. Synthesis.
The explanation for the path and outcome of the privatisation part of the 
water reform can be illustrated, in synthesis, in Table 7.2. Similarly to Table 7.1, 
Table  7.2  exhibits  the  component  parts  of  the  explanatory  argument  across  the 
governments' obligation to award the franchise through competitive tenders, and that unjustified 
awards to “in house” firms would be persecuted as illegitimate. Local governments that had not  
applied  the  tender  offer  competition  rules  put  forward legal  arguments  against  the  Minister,  
including  the  claim  that  the  2001  Constitutional  reform  had  limited  the  competence  of  the 
national government on the matter of the organisation of local public services. 
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different  trajectories  followed  in  the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform 
implementation over time and across space. Component parts of the explanatory 
argument include initial conditions that characterise the “status quo” of the water 
sector  before  the  coming  into  force  of  the  1994  water  reform;  policy  content 
features that relate to provisions of the water reform statute; policy process features 
that refer to traits of the mode of interaction within the water policy domain; and 
historical context conditions that arise from contemporaneous events. In addition, 
component parts of the explanatory argument also include the social mechanisms 
that have been employed for providing hypothetical causal linkages between the 
joint  occurrences  of  causal  conditions  and  the  features  of  the  water  reform 
implementation  trajectory  that  are  explained.  These  component  parts  of  the 
explanatory  arguments  are  provided for  explaining  the  inertia  to  implement  the 
privatisation part of the water reform in the period 1994-2001, the implementation 
that took place in Alto Valdarno in the period 1994-2001, and the acceleration of the 
overall implementation pattern in the country in the period 2001-2006 – including 
an  explanation  for  why water  franchises  were  awarded  to  mixed public-private 
ownership firms in the period 2001-2003 and typically to “in house” firms in the 
period 2003-2006.
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Inertia part
(1994-2001)
Alto Valdarno part 
(1994-1999)
Mixed ownership 
privatization part
(2001-2003)
“Formal” 
privatization part
(2003-2006)
Explananda No execution of the water reform mandate Privatisation into mixed ownership firms Privatisation into mixed ownership firms Privatisation into “in house” firms
Initial conditions Features of the water industry (diffused local 
government ownership of water service 
providers)
Stakes of local governments (cultivation of 
electoral support of local constituencies)
Features of the water industry (diffused local 
government ownership of water service 
providers)
Stakes of local governments (cultivation of 
electoral support of local constituencies)
Negotiated agreement on reforming water 
service provision (consolidating water services 
and opening up access to private operators and 
investors)
Features of the water industry (diffused local 
government ownership of water service 
providers)
Stakes of local governments (cultivation of 
electoral support of local constituencies)
Features of the water industry (diffused local 
government ownership of water service 
providers)
Stakes of local governments (cultivation of 
electoral support of local constituencies)
Policy content features Privatisation of water service provision in the 
forms provided by Act 142/1990
Privatisation of water service provision in the 
forms provided by Act 142/1990
Privatisation of water service provision through 
tender offer competitions or mixed ownership 
firms by a set deadline
Privatisation of water service provision through 
tender offer competitions or “in house” firms
Policy process features Formation of an advocacy coalition
(shared views about privatising local water 
service provision)
Activation of the policy community of water 
experts
(diffusion of ideas about early experience of 
water reform implementation)
Historical context 
conditions
Constitutional autonomy of local governments 
on organisation and management of local 
public services
Constitutional autonomy of local governments 
on organisation and management of local 
public services
Policy orientation of Tuscany's DS party 
Constitutional autonomy of local governments 
on organisation and management of local 
public services
Constitutional reform strengthening regional 
competences on organisation of local public 
services
Constitutional autonomy of local governments 
on organisation and management of local public 
services
Constitutional reform strengthening regional 
competences on organisation of local public 
services
Hypothesized social 
mechanisms
Logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 
1989; March, 1994)
Committed interpretation (Weick, 2001) Attribution of opportunities and threats 
(McAdam et al., 2001)
Network diffusion (Hedström and Swedberg 
1998; Coleman et al., 1957)
Attribution of opportunities and threats 
(McAdam et al., 2001)
Table 7.2. Components of the explanatory argument for the path and outcome of the privatisation part of the water reform implementation (1994-2006).
3. Chapter summary.
The analysis presented in this chapter offers an explanation of the trajectory 
and outcome of the implementation of the water reform in Italy in the period 1994-
2006 based on institutional processualist approach. The explanation accounts for 
the  traits  of  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the  water  reform 
implementation  –  especially,  the  faltering  part  in  the  period 1994-1997 and the 
acceleration after the “turning point” in 1997, as well as the divergent trajectory of 
the  water  reform  implementation  in  Alto  Valdarno  with  respect  to  the  general 
pattern  in  the  country.  The  core  of  the  explanatory  argument  is  that,  after  the 
enactment of the water reform in 1994, the behaviour of local governments can be 
understood  taking into  account  how initial  conditions  contributed  framing  their 
identities and roles in such a way as to make them consider appropriate to resist 
implementing the  water  reform.  In  1997,  however,  changes  in  the  water  policy 
domain related to the piece of legislation that provided funding for sewage and 
wastewater  treatment  works,  made  local  government  react  to  perceived 
opportunities and changing features of the water sector, as diffused throughout the 
network of water policy experts. 
The explanation also accounts for the traits of the privatisation part of the 
water  reform –  especially,  the  obstructed  part  in  the  period  1994-2001 and the 
acceleration  after  the  “turning  point”  in  2001,  together  with  the  resulting 
heterogeneous organisational forms of water service delivery at the local level. The 
core of the explanatory argument is that, after the enactment of the water reform in 
1994, the behaviour of local governments can be understood taking into account 
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how their perceived identities and roles made them consider appropriate to retain 
direct ownership of water service providers rather  than giving up full  or partial 
ownership to private operators and investors. After 2001, two successive reforms of 
local public services brought about changes in the water policy domain that induced 
local governments to react to perceived opportunities to retain their sway on the 
local water industries. 
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Chapter 8
Discussion
This final chapter aims to draw the implications of the present case study for 
improving our understanding of the public policy implementation process. First, the 
chapter contrasts and compares the explanatory arguments for the path and outcome 
of the implementation of the water reform in Italy provided by the two theoretical 
perspectives followed in this study, namely the institutional rational choice (analytic 
narrative) and the institutional processualist ones. Then, it discusses how findings 
of this case study relate to – and partially qualify – existing generalised arguments 
about  the  process  dynamics  of  public  policy  in  the  implementation  stage. 
Implications  of  this  case  study include  the  identification of  a  different  research 
agenda but the one currently followed in mainstream public policy implementation 
research and that should be pursued in further research.
The chapter is organised into three parts. The first part will recall the key 
features  of  the  alternative  explanatory  arguments  that  have  been  made  for  the 
implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform, i.e., 
for the original inertia to implement the water reform, for the within-case variation 
of the water reform implementation trajectory in Alto Valdarno with respect to the 
rest of the country, and for the acceleration to implement the water reform after the 
“turning  point”  in  1997.  The  second  part  will  recall  the  key  features  of  the 
alternative explanations made for the implementation of the privatisation part of the 
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water reform, i.e., for the obstructed privatisation of water services before 2001, 
and for the acceleration of the privatisation process after that year. Finally, the last 
part of this chapter will discuss the implications of the findings of the present case 
study for our theoretical understanding of the public policy implementation process. 
1. Explaining the implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of 
the reform.
The implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water 
reform included two types of variation, along time and across space. Along time, 
this part of the water reform episode included two sequential trajectories, linked by 
a  “turning  point”  in  1997.  During  the  first  trajectory  (1994-1997),  the 
implementation of the water reform was largely ineffective, as indicated by the very 
few OTA authorities established in the country by the end of the period. After the 
“turning point”  in  1997,  the  implementation  process  shifted  into a  higher  gear. 
During the second trajectory (1997-2006), an increasing number of OTA authorities 
were established – resulting in a cumulative number of 74 out of 89 OTAs that had 
been provided by regional legislation by that time. Across space, this part of the 
water  reform  episode  included  the  different  trajectory  of  the  water  reform 
implementation in Alto Valdarno – where local governments came to establish the 
OTA authority  already in 1997 – with respect  to  the rest  of  the country.  These 
stylised facts play the role of explananda in the analysis of the implementation of 
the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform. The explanatory issues 
that have been tackled are (1) what accounts for the original inertia to define the 
OTA boundaries, (2) what accounts for the particular features of the trajectory of 
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the water reform implementation in Alto Valdarno with respect to the rest of the 
country, and (3) what accounts for the acceleration of the implementation process 
after 1997.
1.1. Accounting for the inertia to implement the water reform.
The first analytic issue at stake is explaining what accounts for the inertia to 
define  the  boundaries  of  the  OTAs  during  the  period  1994-1997.  It  should  be 
recalled here that, under provisions of the water reform legislation, the OTAs were 
to  be designed by regional  legislation,  but  local  governments were supposed to 
voluntarily agree to have their territories comprised within watershed areas. In a 
sense,  responsibility  for  setting  the  geographical  boundaries  of  watershed 
authorities  was  shared  by  regional  and  local  governments.  Regions  were  given 
exclusive authority to divide their territories into watershed areas, but they were 
disallowed from exercising this authority before local governments had manifested 
their consent to a particular organisation of the regional territory into watershed 
areas. Regional governments were not given any means of recourse in the event that 
local  governments  did  not  arrive  at  any  agreement.  In  effect,  water  reform 
legislation’s procedural rules turned local governments into veto players within the 
implementation process, since neither the regional nor central governments could 
implement the watershed boundary scheme on their own authority. 
Following the institutional rational choice perspective, expected payoff and 
structure of interaction between sub-national governments play the important role 
of causal factors for explaining the original inertia to define the OTA boundaries 
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during  the  first  period (1994-1997).  Building  on assumptions  that  include  local 
governments’ preferences for retaining control of water functions, the explanatory 
argument  developed  under  this  approach  holds  that  local  governments  had  no 
incentives to deviate from choosing not to define the OTA boundaries (i.e., playing 
the strategy not to define OTA boundaries resulted in a Nash equilibrium). The lack 
of apparent negative payoff when local governments play the strategy not to define 
the OTA boundaries, in particular, had important effects on the outcome of the game 
interaction. Given the structure of interaction provided by the water reform statute 
and  by  the  country’s  multi-layered  governmental  system,  moreover,  neither  the 
regional governments nor the central government could induce local governments 
to define the OTA boundaries. Both the prospect of passing the required regional 
legislation  even  without  local  governments’ consent  and  the  threat  to  exercise 
central  government’s substitutive powers, in fact, did not result  in any effect on 
local governments' strategy. 
In contrast,  the institutional  processualist  approach entails  an explanation 
that calls into play the combined influence of features of the policy reform design, 
initial  conditions,  and historical  context.  Features of the reform legislation (that 
relate to both features of the policy content and of the policy process contained in 
the water reform statute) were causal factors because they intersected in time and 
space  with  other  conditions,  including  especially  features  of  the  water  industry 
(fragmentation  of  the  water  sector  and diffused  local  government  ownership  of 
water service providers), of local governments' stakes in the water firms (related to 
cultivation of electoral support of local constituencies), and of the historical context 
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(such  as  local  governments'  constitutional  autonomy  on  organisation  and 
management  of  local  public  services,  political  weakness  of  governmental 
authorities  after  1992-1993  corruption  scandals,  and  turnover  of  government 
officers). All these conditions are taken jointly into consideration in the explanatory 
argument  of  why  few agreements  were  reached  by  local  governments  on  OTA 
boundaries during this period.
Features of the water industry and local governments' stakes in the water 
sector are especially important in order to account for local governments' decision 
not  to  define  the  OTA boundaries.  Features  of  the  water  industry  include  the 
fragmentation  of  the  sector  into  relatively  small  service  areas,  generally 
corresponding to the administrative territories of single local governments or local 
government consortia, and diffused local government ownership of water service 
providers, which dated back to about one century before. Local governments' stakes 
in water firms originated from the role that was played often by water provision in 
local government politics, that especially related to local governments' interest to 
exert influence on water-related job appointments and public contracts for the sake 
of  gaining  electoral  support  of  local  constituencies.  These  conditions  figure 
importantly  for  explaining  local  governments'  attitude  towards  the  prospect  of 
giving  up  control  of  water  regulation  and  management  functions.  Given  local 
governments' perceived identity and role, they considered appropriate to resist the 
definition  of  the  OTA boundaries,  because  they  anticipated  that  the  regulatory 
system provided by the water reform, once implemented, would spoil them of their 
traditional  role  within the political  economy of  the local  water industry (March 
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1994; March and Olsen, 1989). 
1.2. Accounting for within-case variation.
While  the  implementation  of  the  water  reform  generally  faltered  in  the 
country, one OTA authority came to be established in the Alto Valdarno area in 
Tuscany.  In  this  sense,  part  of  Tuscany  deviates  from  the  general  pattern  of 
implementation of the water reform in Italy during this period, which we can code 
as a case of non-implementation. Before discussing how this within-case variation 
is  analytically  significant,  we  briefly  recall  the  particular  features  of  the  Alto 
Valdarno case. In this part of Tuscany, high-level concern about the organization of 
water provision pre-dated the national water reform. Beginning in 1990, the subject 
of  water  provision  came  to  figure  prominently  in  the  agenda  in  the  mayor  of 
Arezzo,  the  principal  urban  centre  of  Alto  Valdarno.  The  principal  issue  was 
whether  to  consolidate  the  water  firms  that  served  Arezzo  and  its  surrounding 
municipalities;  the  secondary  issue  was  how  to  structure  the  ownership  of  a 
consolidated  water  firm.  Arezzo’s  mayor,  influenced  by leaders  of  the  Tuscany 
branch of Italy’s party Democratici di Sinistra (DS), pressed for both consolidation 
and  limited  privatization.  Specifically,  the  mayor  advocated  the  merger  of 
municipally-owned entities providing water within the part of Alto Valdarno centred  
in Arezzo. The movement toward a merged and semi-privatised entity for water 
provision,  however,  was  blocke,  as  a  consequence  of  elections  that  brought  a 
different mayor (party) to power in Arezzo. Nonetheless, by the time the national 
water  reform  was  enacted  in  1994,  a  “water  policy  community”  within  Alto 
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Valdarno had come together, a network that had reached accord on the advantages 
of  reorganizing  the  provision of  water  in  the  area  surrounding Arezzo and had 
agreed on details of how water provision should be organized within this area. 
Following the institutional rational choice perspective, expected payoff and 
structure of interaction between sub-national governments are pivotal causal factors 
for explaining what  took place in  Alto Valdarno area.  While retaining the same 
assumptions regarding local governments' preferences for keeping control of water 
functions, the explanatory argument for the execution of the tasks related to the 
liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform in Alto Valdarno holds that 
local  governments  of  this  particular area  of  the country chose to  collaborate  to 
define the OTA boundaries and establish the OTA Authority because they believed 
that merging and semi-privatising their water firms would result in greater benefits 
than status quo conditions and, in addition,  past experience of negotiation could 
facilitate the emergence of cooperation between them (Axelrod, 1984). While local 
governments in Alto Valdarno faced the same structure of interaction as other sub-
national governments in the country, then, they held different expectations for the 
payoff  of  the  strategic  interaction  and  for  the  likely  strategies  that  other  local 
governments  in  Alto  Valdarno  could  play,  both  formed  on  the  basis  of  past 
interactions about merging water providers and semi-privatisation plans.
In contrast, the institutional processualist approach provides an explanation 
that places greater emphasis on how initial and context conditions are brought to 
bear in local governments' decisions to collaborate to liberalise and re-regulate local 
water services. Differently from local governments in the rest of the country, those 
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in  Alto  Valdarno  faced  a  situation  that  included  particular  features  of  initial 
conditions, of the policy process, and of historical circumstances. Initial conditions 
include the negotiated agreement on reforming water service provision (in the form 
of  consolidating  water  services  and opening up access  to  private  operators  and 
investors) built on past interactions with other local governments of Alto Valdarno. 
Historical circumstances specifically include the policy orientation of Tuscany's DS 
party, that favoured the policy idea to semi-privatise local public services. Features 
of  the  policy process relate  to  the  formation  of  an advocacy coalition of  water 
experts who shared similar views about re-regulating local water service provision. 
An hypothesised mechanism of  committed interpretation (Weick 2001;  Salancik 
and Pfeffer 1978) helps explaining how these conditions,  taken together,  jointly 
resulted in local governments' decision to collaborate to define the OTA boundaries 
and establish the OTA Authority in Alto Valdarno.
On the basis of this examination of the Alto Valdarno case, we infer that 
clearly  Italy  was  not  uniform  in  the  readiness  of  sub-national  governments  to 
respond to the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform. Needless to 
say, the success achieved in defining some OTA boundaries in Tuscany (the one of 
Alto Valdarno first, and of a few other OTAs within a few years later) was relatively  
small  with  respect  to  the  overall  failure  to  implement  the  liberalisation  and re-
regulation part of the water reform in the rest country. The success achieved in this 
part of the country, however, plays an analytically important role for explaining the 
acceleration of the implementation process after the “turning point” in 1997, as we 
shall recall shortly. In a sense, the success achieved in implementing part of the 
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water  reform  in  Alto  Valdarno  generated  a  feedback  effect  into  the  policy 
implementation processes that took place in other local areas of the country.
1.3. Accounting for the acceleration part of the implementation process.
As already recalled, the total number of OTA authorities established in the 
country increased from 1997 onwards, and reached  74 out of 89 OTAs that had 
been designed by 2005. In this sense, 1997 marks a “turning point” in the pattern of 
implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform in 
Italy.  Before  reviewing  the  alternative  explanations  for  why  local  governments 
increased their efforts to establish the OTA authorities at that time, we briefly recall 
that, in 1997, the central government enacted a legislation at the end of a policy 
cycle  centred on a different  issue but  reforming the economic regulation of  the 
water  sector.  The  policy  cycle  whose  decisional  stage  concluded  in  1997  was 
centred on the quality and capacity of sewage and wastewater treatment systems in 
the country. The matter to be decided was how to use fiscal resources available to 
the  central  government  by  the  EU  to  improve  wastewater  management.  The 
approach  incorporated  into  the  legislation  was  for  the  central  government  to 
allocate funds for investment in sewage and wastewater treatment systems on the 
basis of plans prepared by regional or local governments. A specific feature of this 
planning and budgeting scheme was for plans to be formulated on an OTA-by-OTA 
basis. This feature evidently created a link between the wastewater treatment issue 
and the implementation of the water reform. The legislation, with this provision, 
cleared both the Senate and the House in September 1997.
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Following the  institutional  rational  choice  perspective,  changed  expected 
payoff play an important causal role for explaining the acceleration to implement 
the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the  water  reform  after  1997.  While 
keeping  the  same  assumptions  regarding  local  governments'  preferences  for 
retaining control of water functions, local governments' strategy to collaborate to 
define the OTA boundaries within the strategic interaction scenario provided after 
the 1997 legislation is explained by the expectation that collaborating to define the 
OTA boundaries  would  result  in  higher  payoff  than  resisting  it,  provided  that 
regions could progress to design the OTA boundaries as equalling the provincial 
territories anyway, and that local governments would then suffer the political cost of 
having been overridden in the definition of the OTA boundaries. In addition, once 
the  OTA  boundaries  are  defined  and  regional  legislation  is  passed,  local 
governments bear the responsibility for carrying out the rest of the liberalisation and 
re-regulation part of the water reform and, if they do not cooperate to establish the 
OTA authorities,  then they would  incur  the  political  blame for  not  contributing 
reorganising the water services. Local governments' belief that the strategy not to 
establish  the  OTA authorities  would  result  in  inferior  payoff  than  the  one  of 
collaborating, then, is an important causal factor for explaining local governments' 
collaboration to set up the local water regulatory agencies. Taking into account that 
several such games were played in various local areas in the country, a mechanism 
of imitation  (Levine and Pesendorfer, 2007) can also suggest that, as some local 
governments  collaborated  to  establish OTA authorities,  others  might  follow suit 
because  of  adapting  their  belief  to  changed  strategies  played  by  surrounding 
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counterparts. 
In contrast, the institutional processualist approach provides an explanation 
that places  particular emphasis on changed features of the policy process under 
consideration.  In part,  this  explanation holds  that the provision contained in the 
legislation passed in 1997, in conjunction with conditions related to the interests of 
local  governments  to  appropriate  funds  to  be  spent  in  their  administrative 
jurisdictions, resulted in raising the issue of OTA formation in local governments' 
agendas and in inducing local governments to agree to define the OTA boundaries 
for  the  sake  of  clearing  access  to  funding public  works.  In  part,  however,  this 
explanation  also  highlights  that  the  1997  legislation  has  the  effect  to  help  the 
sequencing of water reform implementation tasks, in the sense of de-coupling the 
issue of the definition of the OTAs from the negotiation about the centralisation of 
water  planning  and  regulatory  functions.  The  first  issue  at  hand,  namely  the 
definition of the OTA boundaries, could be collectively framed as an opportunity 
(McAdam et al., 2001) to access funds for water infrastructure development rather 
than  part  of  a  threat  to  lose  control  on  the  local  water  industries.  Once  local 
governments  had  reached  an  agreement  on  the  OTA boundaries,  the  regions 
progressed  to  pass  the  required  legislation  relatively  fast.  Since  much  of  the 
political controversy about the design of the regional legislation had been solved, 
the regional governments did not encounter any resistance from local governments 
anymore. 
After local governments agreed on the definition of the OTA boundaries, 
they also progressed to establish the OTA authorities. This part of the episode is 
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apparently  at  odds  with  the  presumed  attitude  of  local  governments  to  resist 
centralising water planning and management functions because of their interest to 
retain control of local water industries. The explanation for the establishment of the 
OTA authorities, however, highlights the causal role played by the activation of the 
policy  community  of  water  experts,  that  contributed  to  the  diffusion  of  ideas 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998;  Coleman et al.,  1957) about the net  benefits  of 
liberalising and re-regulating water service provision in the same way as it had been 
done in the early experiences of water reform implementation at the local level in 
Alto Valdarno and, later, also in other areas of the country. The policy advocacy 
played by this  network  of  water  experts  contributed  making local  governments 
more favourable towards centralising water regulation in the OTA authorities. In 
accounting for this change of attitudes, we can also recall that, once coordination 
costs incurred to agree on the definition of the OTA authorities were sunk, local 
governments assessed that by establishing the OTA authorities they could enjoy 
benefits (in the form of influencing job appointments and public contracts of the 
jointly  owned  OTA authorities)  that  offset  the  loss  of  planning  and  regulatory 
functions in  the respective municipalities.  This belief  helped mayor and cabinet 
officers  to  marshal  the  political  consensus  to  centralise  water  regulation  in  the 
municipal  councils,  overcoming  resistance  to  liberalise  and  re-regulate  water 
service provision from part of local politicians. 
2. Explaining the implementation of the privatisation part of the reform.
Also  the  implementation  of  the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform 
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included two types of variation, along time and across space. Along time, this part 
of  the  water  reform  episode  included  two  sequential  trajectories,  linked  by  a 
“turning point” in 2001. During the first trajectory (1994-2001), the implementation 
was largely ineffective, as indicated by the only one water franchise awarded in the 
country  by  the  end  of  the  period.  After  the  “turning  point”  in  2001,  the 
implementation process swiftly accelerated. The  cumulative number of franchises 
awarded increased smoothly during the second trajectory (2001-2006), totalling 47 
by 2005 (out of 89 OTA authorities which had been established by that time). The 
explanatory  issues  that  have  been  tackled  are  (1)  way  was  privatisation  so 
obstructed during the first period, and (2) what accounts for the acceleration of the 
of the privatisation process after 2001 – and, after 2003, for the award of water 
franchises to “in house” water firms.
2.1. Accounting for the obstructed part of the implementation process.
The  first  analytic  issue  at  stake  is  explaining  what  accounts  for  the 
obstructed  privatisation  process  during  the  period  1994-2001.  Following  the 
institutional rational choice perspective, expected payoff and structure of interaction 
between sub-national governments play an important causal role for explaining the 
resistance of local governments to privatise water service provision. While keeping 
the assumptions related to local governments' preferences for retaining control of 
water functions, the explanatory argument developed under this approach holds that 
local governments had no incentives to give up ownership of water firms if they 
expected that payoff under conditions of full local government ownership exceeded 
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those  under  different  ownership  arrangements.  Provided  that,  within  the 
explanatory argument, local governments' beliefs are inferred from their conduct, 
we conclude that neither semi-privatisation nor full privatisation of water service 
providers were expected by local governments to result in higher net benefits with 
respect to retaining the status quo, and were therefore discarded as disadvantageous 
alternatives.
In contrast,  the institutional  processualist approach entails an explanation 
that calls into play the combined influence of features of the policy reform design, 
initial conditions, and historical context. Design features of the reform included the 
provisions that, in principle, each OTA authority would award water franchises to 
one only water company133, which could be either a mixed public-private ownership 
company  or  a  business  company  selected  through  tender  offer  competition.  In 
effect,  water reform legislations'  procedural rules made the establishment of the 
OTA  authorities  an  essential  condition  within  the  privatisation  part  of  the 
implementation process. Therefore, the delay to privatise water service provision 
can be  explained,  in  part,  by  the  delay to  accomplish the  liberalisation  and re-
regulation part of the water reform. After the liberalisation and re-regulation part of 
the  water  reform  was  implemented,  however,  the  privatisation  process  was 
obstructed  by  the  combined  effects  of  adverse  conditions  especially  related  to 
characteristics of the water industry and local governments' stakes.
Features  of  the  water  industry  that  are  relevant  here  include  the 
fragmentation  of  the  water  sector  and  the  predominance  of  local  government 
133 Award  of  water  franchises  to  more  than  one  water  company in  the  same OTA (through  a 
partition of the OTA service area) was allowed only if incumbent water firms satisfied criteria of 
economic self-sufficiency.
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agencies and consortia among water service providers in the country. The water 
industry was largely fragmented into service areas that generally corresponded to 
municipal jurisdictions or administrative territories of local governments' consortia. 
This industrial structure allowed local governments' politicians to enjoy influence 
on  water  service  provision  operated  in  the  respective  municipal  territories,  that 
could serve their interest to distribute favours to electoral constituencies in the form 
of  job  appointments  and  public  contracts.  Taking  these  initial  conditions  and 
historical circumstances into account, local governments could consider appropriate 
for  their  identity  and  role  (March  1994;  March  and  Olsen,  1989)  to  resist 
privatisation because, if water firms were fully or partially transferred to private 
operators and investors, then the influence of local government politicians on water 
firms  (that  would  be  then  jointly  owned  with  private  shareholders)  would  be 
significantly diminished.
The case of privatisation of water services in Alto Valdarno only deviates 
from the general pattern of implementing the privatisation part of the water reform 
during the 1994-2001 period. As already recalled, particular features of the setting 
of Tuscany in general and Alto Valdarno in particular contribute accounting for the 
deviation from the general water reform implementation pattern. Briefly put, in this 
part  of Tuscany the policy idea to  consolidate  and partially  privatise  incumbent 
municipal water service providers had gained serious  consideration among local 
policy-makers  since  1990.  A water  policy community within Alto Valdarno had 
formed and came to agree on the terms of the merger between incumbent water 
firms  and  of  the  sale  of  minority  shareholding  to  private  water  operators  and 
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investors. This agreement played an important causal role in the privatisation of 
local  water  service  providers.  Once  the  OTA  Alto  Valdarno  Authority  was 
established, local governments required little further negotiation to come to agree to 
merge their water firms and make the OTA authority select the private partner for 
awarding the first water franchise in the country, in 1999.
2.2. Accounting for the acceleration part of the implementation process.
As already  recalled,  from 2001 onwards  an  increasing  number  of  water 
franchises were awarded in the country, reaching the total number of 47 by 2005. In 
this sense, 2001 marks a “turning point” in the pattern of implementation of the 
privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform in  Italy.  Before  reviewing the  alternative 
explanations for why local governments become inclined to privatise water services 
at  that  time,  we  briefly  recall  that,  in  2001,  the  central  government  led  the 
Parliament to pass a reform of local public services that provided that local public 
services should be awarded through tender offer competitions. Special provisions, 
however, applied to water services so that the award of water franchises through 
tender offer competitions could be postponed up to 10 years if the OTA authorities 
assigned  water  concessions  to  local  government-owned  firms  by  the  end  of  a 
transitory period of 18 months (i.e., by 30th June 2003) and if certain requirements 
were satisfied (especially, if part of water firms' shares were sold to private water 
operators or  investors over time).  In 2003,  then,  another reform of  local  public 
services included the provision that, if certain requirements were met, local public 
services could be also assigned to companies fully owned by local governments 
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only (“in house”).
Following the  institutional  rational  choice  perspective,  changed expected 
payoff play an important causal role for explaining the acceleration to implement 
the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform  after  2001.  While  keeping  the  same 
assumptions regarding local governments' preferences for retaining control of water 
functions, local governments' choice to privatise water services is explained by the 
expectation that awarding water franchises to a mixed ownership firm results in 
higher net benefits than the alternative option available provided by the legislation –  
namely, to award the franchise to business companies selected through tender offer 
competition – and than the option to wait until the end of the transitory period. If 
we agree with the part of the explanatory argument that local governments' beliefs 
are  inferred from their  conduct,  then we infer that,  after  the 2001 legislation,  a 
growing number of local governments expected that awarding water franchises to 
mixed  ownership  firms  would  deliver  higher  net  benefits  than  any  alternative, 
including maintenance of status quo.
In contrast, the institutional processualist approach provides an explanation 
that places particular emphasis on both changed features of the policy content and 
of the policy process under consideration. In part, this explanation holds that the 
provisions contained in the 2001 local public services reform, together with steady 
conditions related to the interests of local governments to retain control of water 
functions, resulted in rising the issue of water privatisation in local governments' 
agendas  and  affected  local  governments'  decision  to  award  water  franchises  to 
mixed ownership firms, also taking into account  the perceived threat that water 
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franchises should be awarded to business companies selected through tender offer 
competition after the end of the transitory period (McAdam et al., 2001). In part, 
however, the explanation also highlights the causal role played by the activation of 
the policy community of water experts, that contributed to the diffusion of ideas 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998;  Coleman et al.,  1957) about the net  benefits  of 
privatising  water  services  in  the  same  way  as  it  had  been  done  in  the  early 
experiences of water reform implementation at the local level in Alto Valdarno and, 
later, also in other areas of the country. Similarly to the influence exerted on the 
diffusion  of  ideas  about  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  of  water  service 
provision, the policy advocacy played by this network of water experts contributed 
making local governments also more favourable towards privatising water services 
to mixed ownership firms. 
The institutional rational choice perspective also informs an explanation for 
the  “formal  privatisation”  that  took  place  from  2003  onwards,  when  water 
franchises  were  generally  awarded  to  “in  house”  firms  rather  than  to  mixed 
ownership  ones.  Under  the  same  assumptions  regarding  local  governments' 
preferences for retaining control of water functions, local governments' strategy to 
award water franchises to fully local governments owned firms is explained by the 
belief  that  payoff  resulting  from “formal  privatisation”  (that,  as  an  option,  was 
made  available  by  the  provisions  contained  in  the  2003  local  public  services 
reform) were higher than alternative privatisation schemes. If we again hold that 
local governments' beliefs are inferred from their conduct, then we conclude that, 
after the 2003 legislation, retaining full ownership of water firms (albeit jointly with  
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other neighbouring municipalities) was expected to deliver higher net benefits to 
the local governments than any alternative.
In contrast, the institutional processualist approach especially highlights the 
causal  role  played  by  both  changes  of  policy  content  conditions  and  historical 
circumstances. In part, this explanation holds that local governments' decision to 
award water franchises to “in house” firms is related to important changes of rules 
about the allowed privatisation schemes brought about by the 2003 local public 
services  reform,  together  with  steady  conditions  related  to  local  governments' 
interests  to  retain  control  of  water  functions.  In  part,  however,  the  explanatory 
argument  also  highlights  the  role  played  by  changed  historical  conditions, 
especially related to the enlargement of competences on the organisation of local 
public services and the management of water resources attributed to the regions as 
provided by the reform of the Constitution in 2001. This reallocation of authority 
between  government  layers  of  the  country  enabled  the  regional  government  of 
Tuscany to appeal to the Constitutional Court against some provisions of the 2003 
legislation that narrowly specified the requisites for awarding water franchises to 
“in house” firms. After the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of region Tuscany's 
appeal in July 2004, local governments faced no more restrictions to the award of 
franchises to “in house” water firms, especially in relation to central governments' 
efforts  to  steer  the  privatisation  process  away  from  the  “formal  privatisation” 
scheme. 
269
3. Drawing implications from this case study.
Having recalled the key features of the alternative explanatory arguments for 
the implementation of the liberalisation, re-regulation, and privatisation parts of the 
water  reform,  this  final  section  will  contrast  and  compare  the  two  alternative 
explanations for the sake of drawing the implications of the present case study for 
our theoretical understanding of the process of implementing regulatory reforms. It 
should  be  highlighted,  first,  that  the  two  explanatory  arguments  exhibit  several 
similarities. Both the explanations formulated by following the institutional rational 
choice and the institutional processualist perspectives highlight, in particular, the 
causal role played by past experience of negotiation in accounting for the different 
trajectory of water reform implementation in Alto Valdarno with respect to the rest 
of  the  country,  by  changes  of  policy  content  features  brought  about  by  1997 
legislation  and  by  the  activation  of  the  policy  community  of  water  experts  in 
accounting for the acceleration of the liberalisation and re-regulation part  of the 
water reform, and by changes of policy content features brought about by 2001 and 
2003 legislations and by the activation of the policy community of water experts in 
accounting for the acceleration of the privatisation part of the water reform and for 
the kind of privatisation schemes pursued when awarding water franchises. Both 
theoretical perspectives, then, are relatively congruent in identifying relevant causal 
factors that contribute explaining within-case variation both over time and across 
space. 
At a more fine-grained level, however, differences between the explanatory 
arguments provided by the two alternative perspectives become more apparent. The 
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explanatory arguments made by following the institutional rational choice approach 
especially  highlight  how features  of  the  water  reform implementation  trajectory 
relate to equilibrium strategies played by the actors under conditions that arise from 
different sets of expected payoff and changing features of the institutional context. 
The  different  trajectory  of  water  reform implementation  in  Alto  Valdarno  with 
respect  to  the  rest  of  the  country,  for  example,  especially  is  explained  by  the 
particular expectations, held by local governments that strategically interacted in 
that area and related to past experience of interaction, that cooperating to define the 
OTA boundaries  and to  establish  the  OTA authority  would  result  in  higher  net 
benefits than maintaining the status quo. The explanation for the acceleration of the 
liberalisation and re-regulation part of the water reform highlights the role played 
by changed expectations of local governments concerning future net benefits that 
would  arise  from  defining  the  OTAs,  that  especially  included  access  to 
infrastructure development funding provided by 1997 legislation,  and that could 
become  apparent  to  local  governments  on  the  basis  of  the  observed  strategies 
played by other local governments in other local interactions. The explanation for 
the acceleration of the privatisation part of the water reform especially relates to the 
role played by changed expectations about payoff that local governments would get 
if choosing to make OTA authorities award water franchises to mixed ownership 
firms, for reasons related to features of the 2001 local public services reform, and, 
after the enactment of the 2003 local public services reform, if putting water service 
provision in the hands of “in house” firms. 
In contrast, the institutional processualist perspective especially highlights 
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how  features  of  the  water  reform  implementation  trajectory  relate  to  the  joint 
combination of initial conditions, features of the policy content and process, and 
changing historical circumstances. With respect to the institutional rational choice 
explanation,  the  one  formulated  under  this  theoretical  perspective  is  especially 
attentive to how various context conditions jointly contribute orienting the conduct 
of  implementers  in  ways  that  are  not  exclusively  related  to  expected  payoff 
calculations.  The  explanation  for  the  different  trajectory  of  water  reform 
implementation  in  Alto  Valdarno  with  respect  to  the  rest  of  the  country,  for 
example,  is  especially  attentive  to  past  experience  of  negotiation between local 
governments in that area and builds on the hypothesised mechanism of committed 
interpretation  to  account  for  local  governments'  efforts  to  define  the  OTA 
boundaries and establish the OTA authority. The acceleration of the liberalisation 
and  re-regulation  part  of  the  water  reform  is  explained  especially  by  placing 
particular  attention  to  how  changed  policy  content  features,  that  related  to  the 
introduction  of  default  definition  of  OTA  boundaries  for  bypassing  local 
governments'  inertia,  contributed  framing  the  opportunity  to  appropriate 
infrastructure development funding, and to how changed policy process features, in 
the form of an activation of the policy community of water experts, contributed to 
diffuse  the  policy  idea  to  liberalise  and  re-regulate  water  service  provision 
throughout the water policy network in a way akin to Alto Valdarno experience. 
These  sources  of  causal  factors  had  the  combined  effect  to  induce  local 
governments to speed up the execution of the tasks to define the OTA boundaries 
and establish the OTA authorities. Finally, the acceleration of the privatisation part 
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of the water reform is explained by especially highlighting the causal role played by 
changed policy  content  features,  that  related  to  the  menu of  option choices  for 
privatisation schemes provided by 2001 and 2003 local public services reforms, and 
changed policy process features related to the activation of the policy community of 
water  experts.  These  sources  of  causal  factors  jointly  contributed  to  frame the 
opportunity  for  local  governments  to  avoid  full  privatisation  scheme and (after 
2003) retaining full control of water service provisions.
Taken together,  how do the explanations provided by the two theoretical 
perspectives contribute improving our  understanding of the political economy of 
implementing regulatory reforms? It is worth briefly recalling, first, the argument 
made in the literature review (Chapter 1) that current scholarly literature on public 
policy implementation places relatively little attention to the jagged and ineffectual 
type of implementation process that especially takes place when the execution of 
the policy reform mandate entails the political confrontation between government 
authorities  situated  at  different  levels  of  a  governmental  system.  This  “gap”  is 
especially evident when considering the implementation of infrastructure regulatory 
reforms  (as  a  particular  type  of  public  policy  reform),  where  the  technical, 
economic, and territorial characteristics of the target domain of the policy reform 
play an important  role  in  the path and outcome of  the  implementation  process, 
especially  when  the  reform  implementation  under  consideration  takes  place  in 
multi-level  governance  systems.  Within  this  scenario,  the  implementation  of 
infrastructure  regulatory  reforms  entails  a  complex  pattern  of  political 
confrontations  whose  effects  on  the  path  and  outcome  of  the  implementation 
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process are difficult to discern through the “lenses” of existing general theories of 
public policy implementation. 
Generalised  arguments  about  the  political  economy  of  policy  reform 
implementation  hold  that  the  political  confrontation  between  implementers  and 
target groups plays an important role in the “sustainability” of policy reform in the 
post-enactment  stage.  In  recent  works  made  by  Patashnik  (2003,  2008),  for 
example, the issue of what makes a policy reform sustainable (in the sense of being 
able to “maintain its stability, coherence, and integrity as time passes, achieving its 
basic promised goals amid the inevitable vicissitudes of politics”; Patashnik, 2003: 
207)  in  the  post-enactment  stage  is  related  to  the  strength  of  forces  within  the 
reform target domain that seek to reverse or corrupt the reform. Factors that seem 
especially important to make policy reforms sustainable include the extent to which 
the  reforms induce a  shift  of  political  institutions  (i.e.,  legal  rules,  bureaucratic 
structures,  and  administrative  procedures)  that  effectively  disable  policy-makers 
from taking new actions contrary to the “spirit” and objectives of the reform, and 
the generation of policy feedback effects that reshape identities, political resources, 
and strategic behaviour of the relevant actors. 
In contrast with existing works such as those of Patashnik's (2003, 2008), 
the  present  case  study  evokes  a  more  complex  understanding  of  the  process 
dynamics of the implementation stage of the policy cycle in various respects. First, 
it suggests that common categories used for conceptualising trajectories of policy 
reform implementation – i.e., “sustained”, “reversed”, or “diverted” implementation 
(with respect to policy reform objectives) – may not fully capture features of the 
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path and outcome of policy reform implementation episodes. Episodes of policy 
reform implementation may exhibit relatively “erratic” trajectories, such as those 
where a  period of relatively ineffectual  efforts  is  followed by another  of  hectic 
application  to  execute  the  policy  reform  mandate,  or  those  where  remarkable 
differences  emerge  between  the  behaviour  of  distinct  implementers  and  target 
groups at the local level. Within such scenarios, important analytic issues at stake 
relate to what explains the “turning points” between different parts of the whole 
policy  reform implementation trajectory or  what  accounts  for  variation  of  local 
responses to policy reform mandate, rather than to accounting for sustainability of 
the policy reform during the post-enactment stage.
In addition, the present case study suggests that particular attention should 
be placed on understanding how features of the policy reform (content and process),  
together  with initial  and changing context  conditions,  result  in  the activation of 
processes (such as shifts of political institutions and policy feedback effects) that 
impact  upon the  implementation  path  and outcome.  The  explanatory  arguments 
contained in the present case study provide several propositions about the role of 
policy reform design features, characteristics of the water industry (e.g., sectoral 
fragmentation  and  traditional  public  sector  ownership),  changed  features  of  the 
policy  content  and  process  (e.g.,  range  of  allowed  privatisation  schemes  and 
activation  of  the  policy  community  of  water  experts),  and  changed  historical 
circumstances  (e.g.,  2001  constitutional  change)  in  affecting  the  water  reform 
implementation  trajectory.  In  contrast,  explanatory  arguments  such  as  those  of 
Patashnik's (2003, 2008) do not provide any detailed account for the  conditions  
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under which features of the implementation process dynamics that are regarded as 
important to explain the trajectory of policy reform implementation, such as shifts 
of political institutions and feedback effects, may take place or not. 
Among the conditions identified in the present case study, those related to 
features of the multi-layered structure of the governance system are particularly 
important  to  explain  how  regulatory  reform  implementation  takes  place.  Such 
“class” of conditions (that include, for instance, allocation of authoritative powers 
on the regulation of water services across layers of government as provided by the 
constitution  and  relevant  legislation  and  the  embeddedness  of  the  national 
governance  system  within  the  EU  polity)  are  especially  relevant  to  frame  the 
political confrontation between sub-national governments situated at different levels 
of the governmental systems. In the implementation of the liberalisation and re-
regulation part of the water reform, the allocation of authoritative powers to sub-
national  governments  (specifically,  local  governments'  relative  autonomy on the 
regulation  of  local  public  services)  affected,  together  with  other  causal  factors 
included  in  the  explanatory  argument,  the  kind  of  interaction  between  local 
governments,  regional  governments,  and central  government  that resulted in  the 
definition of the OTA boundaries and the establishment of the OTA authorities. In 
the  implementation  of  the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform,  as  well,  the 
allocation of authoritative powers to sub-national governments (especially related to 
the devolution of some competences provided by the 2001 constitutional reform) 
and the  embeddedness  of  the  national  governance  system within  the  EU polity 
(specifically, the role played by European Court of Justice's rulings on domestic 
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legislative and regulatory authorities)  contributed, together with other conditions 
recalled above, to affect the kind of interaction between local governments, regional 
governments, and central government that resulted in the award of water franchises 
to either mixed ownership or “in house” firms. 
More generally, the present case study identifies and opens up a different 
research agenda but  the one followed by most  of contemporary work on public 
policy  implementation,  especially  those  conducted  in  the  so-called  “third 
generation” approach. Rather than tackling issues related, in broad terms, to what 
factors affect implementation success or failure, this case study aimed to explain 
implementation process dynamics by itself. Rather than seeking to isolate particular 
factors  that  affect  the  path  and  outcome  of  the  implementation  process,  it 
acknowledged that multiple conditions need to be taken into account for explaining 
how implementers and target groups interact with each other. Additionally, this case 
study aimed to identify the mechanisms through which the process dynamics of the 
water reform implementation took place. Such traits of the kind of research interest 
that  has  been pursued in this  work qualify it  as an explorative inquiry into the 
process  dynamics  of  public  policy  implementation  that  deviates,  in  part,  from 
current mainstream research in this area. 
4. Summary.
This chapter aimed to draw the implications of the present case study. It first 
contrasted and compared the two explanatory arguments for both the liberalisation 
and re-regulation part and the privatisation part of the water reform that have been 
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made  by  following  the  institutional  rational  choice  and  the  institutional 
processualist approaches, respectively. Then, it made the case for some similarities 
between the two explanatory argument, in the extent to which both identified the 
causal  role  played  by  particular  initial  conditions  and  changed  context 
circumstances on the path and outcome of the water reform implementation, and for 
some  differences  between  the  two,  especially  related  to  how  various  context 
conditions jointly contribute orienting the conduct of implementers in ways that are 
not exclusively related to expected payoff calculations. 
With respect to current scholarly literature on public policy implementation, 
that  places  relatively  little  attention  to  the  jagged  and  ineffectual  type  of 
implementation process that especially takes place when the execution of the policy 
reform mandate entails the political confrontation between government authorities 
situated at different levels of a governmental system, the findings of the present 
case study suggest some ways to qualify existing generalised arguments about the 
policy  process  in  the  implementation  stage.  Differently  from mainstream “third 
generation” public policy implementation studies, the present case study evokes a 
more complex understanding of the process dynamics of the implementation stage 
of  the  policy  cycle  because  of  its  consideration  of  analytical  issues  related  to 
explaining  “turning  points”  within  the  implementation  process  and  variation  of 
local responses to the policy reform mandate. In addition, the present case study 
places attention to understanding how features of the policy reform (content and 
process),  together  with  initial  and  changing  context  conditions  result  in  the 
activation of  processes  that  impact  upon the implementation path and outcome. 
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Because of  these  features,  the  present  case  study is  explorative  in  the sense  of 
identifying and opening up a different research agenda but the one followed  by 
most of contemporary work on public policy implementation.
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Conclusion
This case study provides an explanation for the features of the trajectory of 
the implementation of the water reform in Italy in the period 1994-2006. Features of 
this trajectory included both variation over time and across space. Over time, the 
implementation  of  the  liberalisation  and  re-regulation  part  of  the  water  reform 
proceeded slowly in the period 1997-2001, but accelerated from 1997 onwards and 
resulted in the set up of the new regulatory system almost all over the country; and 
the  privatisation  part  of  the  water  reform went  through  a  period  of  obstructed 
implementation  in  the  period  1994-2001,  followed by  one  of  intense  efforts  to 
change the form of ownership of water firms from 2001 onwards that resulted in 
some amount of participation of private operators and investors in the water sector. 
Across space, the implementation of the water reform in a particular area of the 
country, Alto Valdarno, proceeded remarkably faster than elsewhere, resulting in the 
establishment of the new regulatory system by 1997 and in the semi-privatisation of 
water service provision in 1999. 
By  the  end  of  the  period  under  consideration,  the  content  of  the  water 
reform was largely implemented. As Table 1 shows, by 2006 the liberalisation and 
re-regulation part  of  the  water  reform resulted in  the  establishment  of  87 OTA 
authorities out of 91 watershed areas that had been provided in regional legislation. 
The privatisation part  of the water reform proceeded somehow more slowly,  as 
illustrated by the relatively few water infrastructure development  plans that had 
been approved and the  only  one water  franchise  that  had  been awarded by the 
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intermediate  date  in  2001.  By  the  end  of  the  period  1994-2006,  instead,  water 
infrastructure  development  plans  had  been  approved  in  70  OTAs,  and  water 
franchises  had  been  awarded  in  47  watershed  areas.  It  should  be  highlighted, 
however, that only partially does the end state of the episode count as privatisation 
of water service provision. As shown in a survey conducted in 2009, when 67 water 
franchises had been awarded by that time, only about one third of water firms took 
the form of mixed public-private ownership entities, while the rest consisted of “in 
house” water firms (i.e., fully local government owned). The privatisation part of 
the water reform, then, largely resulted in “formal privatisation” (i.e., water firms 
were  reincorporated  under  company  laws  but  ownership  was  retained  by  local 
governments) while private operators and investors only entered part of the water 
sector as minority shareholders of local government majority-owned entities134. 
2001 2006
Liberalization and re-regulation part
No. OTAs defined in regional legislation 89 91
No. OTA authorities established 74 87
Privatisation part
No. water infrastructure development plans approved 18 70
No. water franchises awarded 1 47
Table 1.  Indicators of  the implementation of  the liberalisation and re-regulation part  and of the 
privatisation part of the water reform.
While  it  is  possible  to  describe  the  end  state  of  the  water  reform 
implementation  episode  in  terms  of  execution  of  the  policy  reform  content, 
134 For  a  more  detailed  view  of  the  end  state  of  the  water  sector  after  the  water  reform 
implementation episode across regions of the country, please refer to Table 5.1 in Chapter 5.
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relatively less evidence is available about water sector performance under the new 
regulatory  regime.  Data  originated  from  the  national  statistics  bureau  ISTAT 
provide some information about trends in water infrastructure development – that, 
within the  national  water  policy  community,  has  been generally  regarded as  an 
indicator of the extent to which issues of relatively poor water service performance 
are tackled and possibly fixed. This particular aspect of water sector performance 
exhibits relatively encouraging figures. As Table 2 shows, per-capita investment in 
water infrastructure in the period after 1997 soared to about € 33, compared with 
about € 17.3 (constant prices 2010 €) during most of the 1990's. By this indicator, 
the establishment of the new regulatory regime seems related to  water  systems' 
greater capacity to plan, fund, and execute water infrastructure development than 
under the previous regime. 
The amount of investment that were poured into the water sector, however, 
only  provides a  partial  view for  assessing  how well  the  new regulatory  regime 
performed.  According  to  different  independent  reports  based  on  ISTAT  data 
(Cgiamestre,  2011;  Cittadinanzattiva,  2011),  during  the  2000's  water  tariffs 
increased  about  64.4-70%.  Whether  higher  water  charges  are  accompanied  by 
improved water service quality  or improved efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 
water firms, however, is uncertain because of lack of reliable or comparable data at 
the water business level (especially in so-called multi-utility firms, where the same 
company carries  out  both  water  and other  network businesses,  such as  gas  and 
urban waste  disposal).  Further research is  certainly due in order  to evaluate  the 
performance  effects  of  the  new  regulatory  regime  that  resulted  from the  water 
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reform implementation efforts. 
Periods Per-capita investment
1954-1969 16.2
1970-1979 18
1980-1989 32.4
1990-1997 17.3
1997-2010 33 (*)
Table 2. Pro-capita investments in water infrastructure, values in constant prices 2010 €. (*) Values 
inferred on the basis of 19 OTAs (Source: Ermano, 2012, on the basis of ISTAT data and Bluebook,  
2010).
Moving back to the central concern of this study with how the present water 
regulatory regime came into place rather than with the performance effects of the 
water reform, this case study allows us to refine our understanding of the present  
state  of  water  regulation  in  Italy.  Existing  research  on  water  regulation  and 
regulatory  reforms  in  Italy  already  highlighted  the  role  of  factors  such  as 
fragmentation of the water sector, ownership structure of water firms, the presence 
of  a  policy  community  of  water  experts,  and  features  of  the  reform  statute  in 
affecting the emergence of “water  governance structures” in  the new regulatory 
regime (Citroni and Lippi, 2006; Citroni et al., 2007; Lippi et al., 2008; Carrozza, 
2008).  The  explanatory  arguments  contained  in  these  studies  were  particularly 
attentive to how power relationships between influential stakeholders within local 
water  industries  contributed  to  the  particular  “modes  of  governance”  of  water 
services  at  the  watershed  level.  These  works,  however,  placed  relatively  little 
attention to explaining the “turning points” within the trajectory of the episode of 
water reform implementation and the variety of local trajectories across the country. 
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Their  explanations for how the water  regulatory regime was put  into place pay 
relatively little attention to the role played by outcomes of contemporaneous events 
(such  as  1997  legislation,  2001  and  2003  local  public  services  reform,  2001 
constitutional reform, and 1999 decision of the European Court of Justice) and of 
feedback  effects  (especially  the  diffusion  of  policy  ideas  concerning  the 
liberalisation  and  re-regulation  of  water  services  and  the  adoption  of  semi-
privatisation schemes as experienced in Alto Valdarno) in affecting the course of the 
water reform implementation episode. 
In  contrast,  the  present  case  study  better  accounts  for  why  the 
implementation of the water reform accelerated after the “turning points” that have 
been identified in the episode and for some variety of local trajectories across the 
country. Explanations for these features of the trajectory of the implementation of 
the water reform help better understanding of the characteristics of the resulting 
regulation  of  the  water  sector  in  the  country.  These  characteristics  include,  for 
example,  that  the  definition  of  OTA  boundaries  largely  corresponded  to  the 
administrative territories of the provinces, while the water reform mandated that 
they should have been designed according to hydro-geological criteria. This case 
study showed that this feature of the present water regulation in Italy originated 
from the particular circumstances that led to the acceleration of the liberalisation 
and re-regulation part  of the water reform, especially 1997 legislation and local 
governments'  interest  to  appropriate  funds for  infrastructure  development  within 
their respective jurisdictions. Characteristics of the present water regulation in Italy 
also include that private operators and investors play a relatively minor role within 
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the sector, while the intention of policy-makers in the central government was to 
attract  larger  private  capital  participation  in  order  to  contribute  financing 
infrastructure  development  and  improving  efficiency  of  water  firms.  Also  this 
feature of  the present  water sector in  Italy is  explained by this  case  study,  that 
showed how the sequencing of  local  public  services  reforms in 2001 and 2003 
contributed affecting local governments'  decision to semi-privatise  water service 
provision. 
More  generally,  this  case  study  enables  an  advance  in  our  theoretical 
understanding  of  the  policy  process  of  regulatory  reform  implementation.  It  is 
worth briefly recalling, here, that existing theories on public policy implementation 
place relatively little attention to the jagged and ineffectual type of implementation 
process that typically relates to scenarios where government authorities situated at 
different levels of a governmental system engage in political confrontation over the 
execution  of  the  policy  reform  mandate.  As  a  particular  type  of  public  policy 
reform,  infrastructure  regulatory  reforms  provide  an  instance  of  such  scenario 
because the technical, economic, and territorial characteristics of the infrastructure 
policy domain make the political confrontation between governmental authorities 
particularly  relevant,  especially  when  the  reform  implementation  under 
consideration  takes  place  in  multi-level  governance  systems.  The  present  case 
study, in this respect, allows an exploration of the effects of complex pattern of 
political  confrontations that arise in the implementation of regulatory reforms in 
multi-level  governance systems on the path and outcome of the implementation 
process.
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The  analysis  of  the  case  of  the  water  reform  implementation  in  Italy 
suggests that existing generalising arguments about features of the policy cycle in 
the  implementation  stage  may  be  qualified  in  various  respects.  First,  common 
categories used for conceptualising trajectories of policy reform implementation – 
i.e., “sustained”, “reversed”, or “diverted” implementation (with respect to policy 
reform objectives) – may not fully  capture features of the path and outcome of 
policy reform implementation episodes.  Provided that episodes of policy reform 
implementation may exhibit relatively “erratic” trajectories (such as those where a 
period of relatively ineffectual efforts is followed by another of hectic application to 
execute the policy reform mandate, or those where remarkable differences emerge 
between the behaviour of distinct groups of implementers and target groups at the 
local level), explaining the “turning points” between different parts of the whole 
policy reform implementation trajectory and variation of local responses to policy 
reform mandate  are  important  analytic  issues  that  should take the centre  of  the 
stage.
In  addition,  greater  attention  should  be  placed  on  understanding  how 
features  of  the  policy  reform  (content  and  process),  together  with  initial  and 
changing context conditions, result in the activation of processes (such as shifts of 
political  institutions  and  policy  feedback  effects)  that  impact  upon  the 
implementation  path  and  outcome.  Existing  studies  have  already  addressed  the 
issue of what affect the sustainability of policy reforms in the implementation, or 
post-enactment,  stage  (Patashnik,  2003,  2008),  but  they  missed  specifying  the 
conditions under which processes such as shifts of political institutions and policy 
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feedback  effects  may  take  place.  In  contrast,  the  present  case  study  identified 
several conditions (e.g.,  sectoral fragmentation, traditional public sector ownership, 
range of privatisation schemes allowed by relevant legislation, and presence of a 
policy community of water experts) that need to be jointly taken into consideration 
for explaining why local governments moved away from original inclinations to 
resist the liberalisation, re-regulation, and privatisation of water service provision 
and became inclined to execute the implementation tasks. Moreover, the present 
case study also suggested some ways through which such conditions impacted upon 
the  water  reform  implementation  trajectory,  especially  by  contributing  framing 
opportunities or threats  and by triggering a  process  of diffusion  of  policy ideas 
about liberalising, re-regulating, and privatising water service provision in a way 
akin to the early experiences in Alto Valdarno.
A lesson  that  can  be  drawn from this  case  study  is  that  the  sources  of 
resistance  to  liberalise,  re-regulate,  and  privatise  infrastructure  industries  that 
originate  from  “governmental  protectionism”  (Landy  et  al.,  2007)  may,  under 
certain conditions, be overcome. In part, the findings of this case study support the 
argument  that  opening  up  regulated  sectors  of  the  economy  to  competitive 
pressures,  reducing  governmental  ownership  and  control  of  public  services 
providers, and enabling private operators and investors to enter industries that were 
previously  held  under  public  ownership  can  be  effectively  blocked  by  adverse 
governmental  authorities – as it  was the case during the obstructed parts of the 
water reform implementation episode and, in part, during the post-2003 period of 
“formal privatisation” of water service provision into “in house” firms. The case 
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study, however,  also showed that local governments became favourably inclined 
towards implementing the water reform after the “turning points” in 1997, when 
legislation provided subsidies for infrastructure development and default definition 
of  OTA boundaries,  and in  2001,  when legislation changed the  menu of  option 
choices  for  awarding  water  franchises,  for  reasons  that  especially  included  the 
activation of the policy community of water experts that contributed to the diffusion 
of policy ideas based on the Alto Valdarno experience. 
A tentative recommendation stemming from the present case study is that 
overcoming governmental protectionism calls for careful attention to the design of 
reform policy  content  and  process  and  to  the  management  of  policy  networks. 
Within the implementation of the water reform, the explanation for the acceleration 
to liberalise, re-regulate, and privatise water service provision highlighted the role 
played  by  changed  legislation  that  provided  subsidies  for  infrastructure 
development  that  were conditional  on the definition of  OTA boundaries,  by the 
default definition of OTA boundaries in case of local governments' inaction, by the 
modification of the menu of option choices for privatising water service provision, 
and by the activation of the policy community of water experts. The case study 
suggests, then, that policy-makers should make good use of the repertoire of policy 
tools  at  their  disposal  in  such  a  way  as  to  contribute  framing  implementers' 
conceptualisation of the issues at stake and to provide appropriate inducements and 
constraints for orienting implementers' decisions. Moreover, the case study suggests 
that successful experiences of “early movers” in the execution of implementation 
task should be exploited as sources of evidence for the viability and advantages of 
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implementing the reform policy mandate. 
Finally, this case study provides some evidence for engaging the scholarly 
discussion about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the institutional rational 
choice  perspective  with  respect  to  alternative  theoretical  approaches  such  as 
institutional  processualism.  It  is  worth  briefly  recalling,  here,  that  baseline 
arguments  about  the  relationship  between  institutional  rational  choice  and 
institutional processualism include the point that the latter has a general advantage 
with respect to the former because it provides  an account of how features of the 
temporal context are brought to bear into the ways actors within the policy process 
under  consideration  make decisions  and  interact  with  each other  (Barzelay  and 
Gallego,  2006).  More  generally,  the  relationship  between  institutional  rational 
choice and other new institutionalist perspectives has been sometimes characterised 
as a complementary one (Bates et al., 2000), especially on the basis of points of 
intersection and overlap with historical  institutionalism in particular  (Katznelson 
and Weingast, 2005). Sometimes, instead, it has been depicted as a conflictual one, 
especially on the basis  that  preferences  are treated as exogenous in institutional 
rational choice while interests and objectives are created in institutional contexts in 
ways  that  make  them  inseparable  from  them  in  other  varieties  of  new 
institutionalism (Thelen, 1999; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).
With  respect  to  the  baseline  arguments  recalled  above,  this  case  study 
suggests  some  way  to  clarify  differences  in  the  ways  features  of  the  temporal 
context come into play in alternative explanatory arguments made by following the 
institutional  rational  choice  and  the  institutional  processualist  perspectives, 
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respectively. Explanations for the trajectory of water reform implementation made 
by following the institutional rational choice approach include a role for features of 
the temporal context in the form of assumptions concerning game structure and/or 
payoff formulated by the researcher and taken as a given in the analysis of game 
interaction.  For  example,  explanatory  arguments  for  the  acceleration  of  water 
reform  implementation  after  the  “turning  points”  in  1997  and  2001  consist  of 
exercises in comparative static, where exogenous factors related to 1997 and 2001 
legislation  are  supposed  to  change  payoff  and  consequently  affect  local 
governments' strategies. In contrast, explanations for the trajectory of water reform 
implementation  provided by following the  institutional  processualist  perspective 
include a role for features of the temporal context in the form of sources of causal 
factors that  are  connected to the  observed behaviour  that is  to be explained by 
hypothesised  mechanisms.  For  example,  the  acceleration  of  water  reform 
implementation after the “turning points” in 1997 and 2001 is  explained by the 
causal  role  of  changes  of  relevant  legislation  in  activating,  together  with  other 
conditions, a mechanism of attribution of opportunities and threats that accounts for 
local governments' inclination to proceed in the execution of implementation tasks 
(specifically,  defining  OTA  boundaries  and  semi-privatising  water  service 
provision, respectively). 
Having  specified  how  the  temporal  context  plays  different  roles  in  the 
explanations made by following the two approaches, we can elaborate on what are 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two perspectives. A baseline argument 
here  is  that  the institutional  rational  choice approach is  often criticised because 
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explanations  made  by  following  this  approach  build  on  assumptions  about 
preferences  of  actors  that  are  not  really  observable  and  about  payoff  of  game 
interaction that may not be actually known by the researcher. This kind of criticism 
seems relevant also for the explanatory arguments contained in the present case 
study, provided that, as a matter of fact, both actors' preferences and game payoff 
were neither observed nor known. It seems fair to acknowledge also, however, that 
explanations  made  by  following  the  institutional  processualist  perspective 
incorporate an important role played by hypothesised social mechanisms, that are 
conjectured  as  a  way  of  relating  sources  of  causal  factors  and  the  observed 
behaviour that is to be explained without being really observed by the researcher. In 
this  respect,  both  theoretical  perspectives  need  to  resort  to  assumptions  and 
conjectures that are not supported by empirical observations. 
Assumptions  and  conjectures  seem  to  play  different  role  in  the  two 
explanatory  arguments,  however.  The  institutional  processualist  perspective 
suggests to make use of hypothesised social mechanisms as a way of probing the 
causal  linkages  between  sources  of  causal  factors  and  the  explanandum under 
consideration.  In  contrast,  the  institutional  rational  choice  approach  suggests  to 
assume preferences and payoff as a way of modelling game interactions that are 
instrumental in accounting for the explanandum under consideration. In a sense, the 
recourse to hypothesised social mechanisms within explanations made by following 
the  institutional  processualist  perspective  opens  up  further  questions  about  the 
details of the “cogs and wheels” of social interactions that lead from sources of 
causal factors to the explanandum, while assumptions about preferences and payoff 
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within explanations made by following the institutional rational choice approach 
does  not  seem to similarly orient  further  scholarly  inquiry.  This features  of  the 
institutional processualist approach may count as an advantage with respect to the 
other one, at least from the point of view of social scientists who share an interest  
for explaining the process through which social events unfold.
Another  baseline argument  that is  relevant  for this  discussion is  that the 
institutional rational choice approach is often praised because explanations made by 
following rationality assumptions are relatively parsimonious with respect to other 
theoretical approaches.  This apparent strength of the institutional  rational choice 
approach, however, needs to be weighed against the accuracy of its explanations. 
The present case study provides some evidence that explanatory arguments made by 
following the institutional rational choice approach may account for alternative and 
equally  plausible  course  of  actions,  that  correspond to  multiple  Nash equilibria 
within the same game interaction. For example, the explanation for whether local 
governments choose to cooperate or not in the definition of the OTA boundaries 
included the argument that both strategies were Nash equilibria, given the game 
structure  and  payoff  that  contributed  modelling  this  interaction.  When multiple 
Nash equilibria exist, the explanatory argument for why players choose one strategy 
rather than another one needs to make use of hypothesised mechanisms, such as the 
emergence  of  cooperation  on  the  basis  of  past  interaction  (Axelrod,  1984)  and 
imitation of others' strategies (Levine and Pesendorfer, 2007). In doing so, however, 
explanations made by following the institutional rational choice approach give up 
some of their presumed parsimony for the sake of better accuracy. In this respect, 
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the institutional processualist approach seem better positioned than the institutional 
rational choice one to provide accurate explanations without necessarily adhering to 
rational choice's assumption of strict instrumental action. 
A  few  reservations  about  the  present  case  study  should  be  duly 
acknowledged.  First  and  foremost,  the  explanatory  argument  for  the  path  and 
outcome of the water reform implementation does not fully account for local variety 
of implementation trajectories. No explanation is provided, for example, for the few 
local instances of non-implementation of the liberalisation and re-regulation part of 
the water reform in 4 OTAs – one based in Piedmont and 3 in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
regions  –  where  no  OTA authorities  were established  until  the  end of  the  case 
episode in 2006. No explanation is provided, also, for the few local instances of 
privatisation of water service provision into business companies selected through 
tender  offer  competitions  in  6  out  of  9  OTAs in  Sicily,  where  explorative data 
collection  (i.e.,  court  proceedings  and  the  press135)  suggested  that  crime 
organisations might have played some role in the political economy of the regional 
water  sector  on  sustained  basis.  Additional  research  specifically  designed  for 
investigating  differences  between  instances  of  water  reform  implementation 
trajectories across the country is needed in order to shed some light onto the role 
played by particular initial conditions and local historical circumstance on the way 
the water reform was put into effect.
Second, the proposed explanations for features of the path and outcome of 
the  water  reform  implementation  may  be  challenged  or  refined  by  alternative 
135
 See, for instance, Il Sole 24 Ore, 18.11.2009.
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explanatory arguments. The acceleration of the implementation of the water reform, 
for  example,  is  partially  explained  by  the  diffusion  of  policy  ideas  concerning 
liberalising, re-regulating, and privatising water service provision in a way akin to 
the experiences in Alto Valdarno. Although various works within political science 
discipline have highlighted the importance of ideas in politics and policy change 
(Blyth, 1997; Lieberman, 2003), other factors may have contributed to persuade 
reluctant local governments to surrender their control of water functions but the role 
played  by  advocates  of  liberalisation,  re-regulation,  and  privatisation  of  water 
service provision. Also, the explanation for the tendency to award water franchises 
to “in house” firms highlights the role of 2003 legislation in affecting the menu of 
option choices for privatisation schemes. However, this explanation does not take 
into consideration how local  governments first effectively “uploaded” the policy 
issue as to whether local public services should be always contracted out at the EU 
level (i.e., by bringing the “Teckal case” to the European Court of Justice) and later 
“cherry-picked”  and  “downloaded”  policy  solutions  from  the  EU  level  to  the 
domestic  policy  process  in  such  a  way  that  the  2003  legislation  contained 
provisions  that  allowed  them  to  escape  from  the  mandate  to  privatise  water 
services. 
Third,  more  empirical  evidence  would  be  welcome  on  how  local 
governments moved from inaction to inclination to implement the water reform. 
The historical narrative of water reform implementation does not provide details 
about how the policy community of water experts came to share the policy idea of 
liberalising,  re-regulating,  and  privatising  water  service  provision,  how  local 
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governments  were  persuaded  to  consider  liberalisation,  re-regulation,  and 
privatisation in their policy agendas, how political coalitions formed within local 
governments  and  between  local  governments,  and  how  incumbent  water  firms 
affected the course of the water reform implementation efforts. Attention to such 
details, however, seems important in order to account for variety of water reform 
implementation trajectories at  the local level. For example,  the question of why 
only a fraction of OTA authorities awarded water franchises to mixed ownership 
water  firms  (i.e.,  about  one  third  of  water  firms  that  were  surveyed  in  2009) 
deserves some further consideration,  if we are to better understand what factors 
influence the decision to semi-privatise local water service provision.
Finally, the present case study lays the foundations for further research on 
the  political  economy  of  regulatory  reforms  in  the  implementation  stage.  The 
explanations for the trajectory of the water reform implementation in Italy provide 
some evidence for tentative generalised arguments about the process dynamics of 
regulatory  reform implementation.  Comparative research is  needed,  however,  to 
better account for the role played by conditions that affect the situated interaction 
between  implementers  and  target  groups  when  they  execute  policy  reform 
mandates. By contrasting and comparing the findings of the present case study to 
other cases of the same type  of policy process – namely, implementation stage of 
policy cycles  aimed at  reforming the regulation of  sectors  of  the  economy – it  
would be possible to refine tentative generalised arguments about the role played by 
particular  initial  conditions,  policy  reform  (content  and  process)  features,  and 
characteristics of the temporal context, including those that have been identified in 
296
the present case study. 
Several dimensions for comparative analysis may be pursued. One possible 
dimension relates to expanding the empirical range towards instances of regulatory 
reform  implementation  that  exhibit  different  features  of  the  trajectory  of  the 
implementation  process.  For  example,  the  present  case  may  be  contrasted  and 
compared  with  others  whose  features  of  the  implementation  trajectory  include 
“turning points” that relate to the slow down or to the radical diversion, rather than 
to  the  acceleration,  of  the  reform  implementation  process.  Another  possible 
dimension relates to contrasting and comparing the present case study with others 
that exhibit different features of their system of governance, especially in relation to 
the  degree  of  centralisation  or  decentralisation  in  the  allocation  of  authoritative 
power  across  government  layers.  A further  dimension  for  comparative  analysis, 
finally, could be the one related to how sector-specific or country-specific context 
features  affect  the  trajectory  of  regulatory  reform  implementation,  especially 
whether the technical, economic, and territorial characteristics of the infrastructure 
policy domain and initial and historical conditions attached to the particular country 
environment bear any important effect on the way regulatory reforms are put into 
place.
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5. Tendering out the minority share of water firms
6. Directly assigning the water concession 
2. Previous events
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3. Contemporaneous events
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2. Implementing the 2000-2006 CSF
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5. Water business companies
8. Water firms' associations
1. Federgasacqua (later renamed Federutility from 2005)
2. ANIDA  (national  association  of  sewage  and  wastewater  treatment 
business companies)
3. ANFIDA (national association of aqueduct companies)
9. Local regulatory authorities (OTA authorities)
10. CIPE (Inter-ministerial committee on economic planning)
11. European Court of Justice
12. Regional administrative courts
13. Constitutional court
Interests
1. Accomplishing water reform implementation tasks
2. Spending water infrastructure development funds
3. Appropriating water infrastructure development funds
4. Maintaining control on water planning and management functions
5. Protecting incumbents' position in the water industry
6. Maintaining current water tariff levels
308
7. Opening new entrants' access to the water industry
8. Attracting private operators and investors to the water industry
9. Increasing water tariff levels
309
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